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The arms embargo has deprived Bosnia-Hercegovina of
the right of legitimate self-defense. It has caused the
destruction of the country, deepened the war and caused
genocide. It has tied the hands of the attacked and helped
the aggressor. It has made the aggressor reluctant to...
compromise. Those who maintain the arms embargo are
accepting . . . the primacy of force in international
negotiations. President Izetbegovic, Republic of Bosnia-
Hercegovina.'
Madeleine Albright, the United States Ambassador to the
United Nations, warned . . . that the United States would
undermine international sanctions . . . if Congress
unilaterally lifted the arms embargo against Bosnia ....
Members of the Congress who favor lifting the arms
embargo unilaterally say Bosnia is an independent nation
entitled to self-defense under article 51 of the United
Nations charter until the Council has taken measures to
maintain peace.
But Albright said . . . the issue is one of politics, not of
law. 'The bottom line here is that this is not a legal issue,
it is a political issue . . . . If any one country decides to
act on its own and break down a multilateral arms
embargo, we then ruin that as a tool of the international
community. '2
1. Entreaty to the European Community to lift the arms embargo. Boris Johnson and
George Jones, EC refuses to lift arms embargo 'Ending weapons ban would lead to more Bosnia
fighting,' DAILY TELEGRAPH, June 22, 1993.
2. Albright warns against unilateral action on Bosnia, REUTERS LTD. NoRTH AMERICAN
WIRE, May 2, 1994.
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This clash highlights the tension between the United Nations
Charter and the unilateral use of armed force by states. It poses a question
of obvious significance to international law, order and governance:
whether there might not be restrictions upon the Security Council within
the realm of its enforcement authority beyond which even it is powerless to
act.
Which advocate is correct? Is there an overriding legal regime
that precludes Security Council intervention, suspension and obstruction of
a state's efforts to engage in armed self-defense or can decisions curtailing
the exercise of that right be made and enforced on the basis of political
considerations? The answer is found in jus cogens, norms so fundamental
to international order that their operation can effectively trump even the
actions of the Security Council.
This paper will explore jus cogens and its relation to a state's
unilateral use of armed force, armed self-defense and the Security Council,
and will demonstrate the inability of the Security Council to preclude
armed self-defense. Discussion will address the following issues:
1) What is jus cogens?
2) What are the criteria for determining that a norm is jus cogens?
3) Is the use of armed force in interstate relations jus cogens?
4) What is the specific content of the peremptory norm governing the use
of armed force in interstate relations?
5) Is the United Nations Charter subject to jus cogens?
6) Is the United Nations Charter in derogation of jus cogens?
7) What is the relationship between a state's inherent right of self-
defense and Security Council action?
8) What are the implications for enforcement measures imposed by the
Security Council?
I. What is Jus cogens?
Presently there is little dispute that there exist certain peremptory
norms within international law. The use of the term peremptory is to
classify these norms as ones from which no state can derogate. The
identification process has not arisen overnight. It has been evidenced by
over forty years of thought and debate within the relevant scholarly and
political communities.
A. The Scholars'Approach
Juristic efforts to classify certain rules or rights and duties on the
international level as inherent have, intermittently, affected interpretations
of treaties, and eminent opinions have been offered in support of the view
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that certain overriding principles of international law exist, thus forming a
body of jus cogens. However, it was not until the International Law
Commission (ILC) began its work on drafting a treaty on treaties that the
concept of jus cogens became the object of consistent attention.' In his
First Report to the ILC on the Law of Treaties, in his capacity as its
Rapporteur, H. Lauterpact proposed "A treaty, or any of its provisions, is
void if its performance involves an act which is illegal under international
law and if it is declared so to be by the International Court of Justice." 4 In
his view, the test for whether the object of the treaty was illegal and the
treaty void for that reason is, "inconsistency with such overriding
principles of international law which can be regarded as constituting
international public policy.", As reported in the 1953 ILC Yearbook:
[i]n his comment to draft article 15, Lauterpacht stated that
the incorporation of this article must be regarded as
essential in any codification of the law of treaties,
notwithstanding substantial practical and doctrinal
difficulties. That unlawfulness of the object of a treaty
implies the treaty's invalidity is generally - if not
universally - admitted by writers who have examined this
aspect of the validity of treaties.
Lauterpacht went on to say that the test of lawfulness and
validity of a treaty is not pure and simple inconsistency
with customary international law, because states may by
mutual treaties modify rules of customary law, but
inconsistency with those overriding principles of
international law which may be regarded as constituting
principles of international public policy .... 6
3. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 512-13 (1979) (citing
Lauterpacht, 27 B.Y. 397-98 (1950); and [19531 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 154-55, U.N. Doc.
AICN.416311953 especially 4; Fitzmaurice, 30 B.Y.30 (1953); 92 Hague Recueil II, 120, 122,
125 (1957)).
4. Lauterpacht, [1953] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Conm'n 154-55, U'.N. Doc. AICN.4/6311953
reprinted in SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 208-09 (1984).
The International Law Commission (ILC) began work on the law of treaties in 1949. It was not,
however, until 1953, under the leadership of Lauterpacht as its second Rapporteur, that attention
was directed to jus cogens. LAURI HANNIKAINEN, PREREMPTORY NORMS (Jus cogens) IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 157 (1988).
5. SINCLAIR, supra note 4, at 209.
6. Int'l L. Comm'n, [19531 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 154-55, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/63/1953.
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The third Rapporteur, Fitzmaurice, proposed the following as a
draft article in the Third Report on the Law of Treaties in 1958: "[i]t is
essential to the validity of a treaty that it should be in conformity with or
not contravene or that its execution should not involve an infraction of
those principles and rules of international law which are in the nature of
jus cogens." 7 In commentary, Fitzmaurice pointed out that the majority of
rules in international law are jus dispositivum. It is "only as regards rules
of international law having a kind of absolute and non-rejectable character
(which admit of no option) that the question of the illegality and invalidity
of a treaty inconsistent with them can arise." 8
In its work in 1963 and 1966 on the preparation of a treaty on
treaties, under the stewardship of its fourth Rapporteur, Waldock, the ILC
undertook in depth discussions of jus cogens. As reflected in the relevant
Yearbooks, there was agreement that there are rules of jus cogens in
contemporary international law. Peremptory norms were viewed as norms
from which states cannot contract out. 9 They are universal and express the
interest of the international community as a whole.'0
In his second report in 1963, Waldock proposed the following as
draft article 13: "a Treaty is contrary to international law and void if its
object or its execution involves the infringement on a general rule or
principle of international law having the character of jus cogens." He
offered the following definition of jus cogens. "[J]us cogens means a
peremptory norm of general international law from which no derogation is
permitted except upon a ground specifically sanctioned by general
international law, and which may be modified or annulled only by a
subsequent norm of general international law."" The commentary on the
proposal noted:
Imperfect though the international legal order may be the
view that in the last analysis there is no international public
order - no rule from which states cannot at their own free
will contract out - has become increasingly difficult to
sustain. The law of the Charter concerning the use of
force and the development, however tentative - of
international criminal law - presupposes the existence of
an international public order containing rules having the
7. SINCLAIR, supra note 4, at 209; HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 158.
8. SINCLAIR, supra note 4, at 209; HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 158.
9. [19631 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 52, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A/1963.
10. [1966] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 219-20, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A/1966.
11. HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 158.
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character of jus cogens. The Commission will therefore, it
is believed, be fully justified in taking the position in the
present articles that there are certain rules and principles
from which states cannot derogate .... 12
In its 1966 discussions, the ILC, recognizing that such
peremptory, nonderogable norms exist, provided (in its draft article 50) the
following general definition: "[a] treaty is void if it conflicts with a
peremptory norm of general international law from which no derogation is
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of
general international law having the same character."3
There was, additionally, virtual unanimity within the ILC
regarding the existence of rules permitting no derogation in international
law and that peremptory norms express the interest of the international
community as a whole.'4
Commentary in 1963 and 1966 touched on whether the emergence
of rules having the character of jus cogens was comparatively recent or
more long-standing. Several members opined that the concept of jus
cogens had originated in regard to such universal crimes as piracy and the
slave-trade as well as such principles as the freedom of the high seas and
other rules on the law of the sea.'"
The majority view was that jus cogens is a more recent innovation
brought about by the fact that certain aspects of interstate relations have
become of concern to all states, such as the formation of the League of
Nations and its pioneering effort to substitute some form of constitutional
government for the blind play of physical force into international
relations.'6 Those espousing the majority view did not generally attempt to
prove that the notion was an innovation but, rather, referred to jus cogens
12. Id. The ILC did identify bilateral and regional treaty arrangements. Although there
was an exception suggested providing that the article would not be applied to a general
multilateral treaty which expressly abrogated or modified a rule having the character of jus
cogens, such was rejected at the Vienna Convention. The present Convention contains no such
exclusion or exception.
13. [1966] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 247.
14. HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 161 and note 9 (citing the comments of ILC members
Suy and Cadieux).
15. HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 161-62 (reflecting the opinions of El Erian, Yasseen,
Castren and Ago). Rosenne thought that jus cogens had existed in international law for a long
time even if in inchoate form. Id.
16. This position is attributed to member Pal, in comments made during the 1963
discussions. Id. at 162.
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as an accepted fact. It was only the preparation of the Convention that had
rendered the notion a concern of the international community."
Despite the evident agreement within the ILC on the existence of
peremptory norms, it was agreed to leave the full content of the notion to
be worked out in state practice and the jurisprudence of international
tribunals.'8 What the ILC did do was to provide "examples of the more
conspicuous instances of treaties that are void by reason of inconsistencies
with a jus cogens rule."' 9 That content cannot be worked out merely by
treaty. A treaty cannot impart the character of jus cogens to a norm, even
if the parties agree that there is to be no derogation therefrom. It is,
rather, the particular nature of the subject matter with which a treaty deals,
not the form of the provision, that gives a rule the character of jus
cogens.2
The final draft article, submitted for consideration to the state
representatives at the Vienna Conference, proposed: "A treaty is void if it
conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law from which
no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.",,
B. The Vienna Conference: The View of the International
Community of States
The Conference turned its attention to draft article 50 in the 1968
session.22  The ILC draft definition was lengthened and made more
specific.,3 The new article, now renumbered as 53, provides that:
17. Id.
18. Id. at 76 and 164-65. Although there was unanimous agreement on one norm, the use
of force, there was disagreement as to other norms that might be categorized as peremptory.
Consequently, it was determined that illustrations of jus cogens would be noted but that the field
would be left for subsequent development by states and courts.
19. See infra at 13-14.
20. [1966] Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 76, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A/1966. HANNIKAINEN,
supra note 4, at 163. There are a number of views on the manner in which a new or modified
norm emerges. Some commentators, such as Dinstein, although rejecting the notion of instant
custom, have noted that a multilateral treaty could modify jus cogens or demark the emergence of
a new norm if there was extensive recognition/acceptance to be bound to the treaty as a condition
of its entry into force. YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENSE 104-06
(1994). Others, such as Sinclair suggest the logical impossibility of the idea that a treaty itself,
could create such a norm. SINCLAIR, supra note 4, at 225-26. From this author's perspective, it
would seem inconsistent for a peremptory norm to be created by a multilateral treaty unless there
had been extensive antecedent acceptance accompanied by the opinion that derogation therefrom
was not permitted.
21. SINCLAIR, supra note 4, at 218.
22. HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 166.
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A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts
with a peremptory norm of general international law. For
the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory
norm of general international law is a norm accepted and
recognized by the international community of states as a
whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted
and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of
general international law having the same character.24
The final text was arrived at in the 1968 session and was approved in a
final vote of eighty seven-eight-twelve in 1969.2
The consensus at the Conference fell into three primary groups. A
clear majority of states accepted that "there undeniably exist peremptory
norms" in international law. Consequently, a provision to this effect was
necessary. However, it was felt that, at this stage of international
relations, it was not possible to arrive at a detailed definition of the notion,
nor was it the task of the Convention to do so. It was, nonetheless, held
that peremptory norms protect important interests of the international
community.2
A smaller group of states admitted the existence of peremptory
norms but expressed doubt regarding the imprecision of their
identification. Even though this group admitted that certain norms clearly
appeared to be peremptory, they questioned the adequacy of the criteria
available to separate jus dispositivum from jus cogens. This vagueness
might make misuses of the notion possible.27
Only a small group of western states were very critical of or
entirely opposed to the inclusion of provisions on peremptory norms in the
Convention.2 The clear upshot of this and the approval vote reflected that
23. Id.
24. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
(entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
25. United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties (UNCLT), Official Records,
Second Session (1969) at 106-07 [hereinafter UNCLT II]. The 1968 session, (UNCLT I) was
attended by 103 States; the 1969 session by 110. HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 166. The
inclusion of the words at the time of its conclusion was voted on separately. It was adopted by a
vote of 43 to 27 to 12. Id. at 167. Although this seemingly stresses the non-retroactive character
of peremptory norms, the approval numbers are not overwhelming.
26. HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 169.
27. Id. at 170-72.
28. France was among the most critical. HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 17.
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nearly all state participants agreed that there are peremptory norms in
international law. 29
II. What are the Criteria for Determining that a Norm is Jus
Cogens?
As article 53 makes clear, there are four criteria specified for the
identification of a peremptory norm:
1) status as a norm of general international law;
2) acceptance by the international community of states as a
whole;
3) immunity from derogation; and
4) modifiable only by a new norm having the same status?'
What does this first criteria status as a norm of general
international law mean? Although far from settled, it is useful to proceed
from the idea that norms of general international law are of general
applicability, that is they create obligations and/or rights for at least a great
majority of states or other subjects of international law.' Debate is
engaged on whether the reach of such norms is universal in its
obligatoriness or whether a rule of general international law requires the
acceptance of nearly all as opposed to all states.32 Consequently, inclusion
of a norm as part of general international law, would imply that the
obligations it creates are accepted by the great majority of states, if not all
states. 1
Clarification of the universality component of general international
law, for jus cogens identification purposes, is provided in the second
criteria specified in the Convention: that the norm be accepted and
recognized by the international community of states as a whole. In
explaining the meaning of the phrase as a whole, Yasseen, the Chairman
of the Drafting Committee of the Vienna Convention had stated:
By inserting the words as a whole in article 50 the
Drafting Committee had wished to stress that there was no
question of requiring a rule to be accepted and recognized
as a peremptory norm by all states. It would be enough if
a very large majority did so; that would mean that, if one
29. Id. at 174.
30. Vienna Convention, supra note 25, at art. 53; HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 3.
31. HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 208.
32. According to Hannikainen, there is quite a lot of support for this view.
HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 209.
33. Id.
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state in isolation refused to accept the peremptory
character of a rule, or if that state was supported by a very
small number of states, the acceptance and recognition of
the peremptory character of the rule by the international
community as a whole would not be affected. 34
Consequently, for a norm to be recognized by the international
community as a whole, it would suffice if all the essential components of
the international community recognize it. 3  A considerable majority of
those who have commented upon this have seemed to accept the views of
Yasseen. 36 Additionally, most agree that the lack of acceptance or even the
expression of opposition on the part of one or a few states is no obstacle to
a norm having peremptory status. 37
One apparent difference in effect between general international law
and customary international law is the inability of customary international
law to bind those states which persistently object, whereas under general
international law, if a norm has reached the necessary level of widespread
acceptance, its operation can not be avoided by objection or state veto;
non-recognizing states are bound nonetheless.
Obviously, no norm could realistically be considered a principle of
general international law if it did not, at a minimum, meet the criteria of
acceptance and adherence required for customary international law.
However, whether a norm has been denominated or identified as
customary international law should not frustrate, eliminate, or immunize
its categorization and recognition as a norm of an even more profound
nature, such as jus cogens. That inquiry requires assessment of the extent
of recognition and acceptance such as would cause its elevation to the
status of general international law, whereby it would bind even non-
consenting states.
Determining whether a norm rises to the level at which it binds not
only all states, but can not be changed by contract, disobeyed, or subject to
derogation, has one final step. It is the third criteria enunciated in the
34. UNCLT 1 1968, supra note 26, at 472. This remained the position of the ILC on the
term "international community of States as a whole." HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 211.
35. Int'l L. Comm'n Report U.N. Doc. A/31/10, p. 287 and 251 (1976), cited in
HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 211. It would appear that these comments were made in
connection with the ILC efforts towards a draft Convention on State Responsibility.
36. Id.
37. Id. The qualifier "accepted and recognized by the international community of states as
a whole art. 53. . .. [Aipparently . . . means by a 'very large majority' of states, even if over
dissent by a very small number of states." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAw at 102 rep. note 6 (1987) [hereinafter FRL].
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Vienna Convention, the non-derogable nature of what might otherwise be
a norm of custom, that is the dividing line separating principles of general
international law from those of jus cogens.11 Until a norm has attained
widespread recognition that it is not derogable, it remains a matter of jus
dispositivum.
In addition to setting forth these four criteria, there was an
underlying policy consideration stressed by several states similar to that
manifest in earlier ILC Commentaries. 9 This factor, a social criterion, not
articulated in the Convention itself, identified the purpose of peremptory
norms as protecting vital interests of the international community. This
concern expressed the view of the underlying rationale and place for such
norms in international global governance and world public order. 4
Hannikainen incorporates this concern as a fifth criteria to the
provisions of article 53 and suggests:
If a norm of general international law protects an
overriding interest or value of the international community
of states and if any derogation would jeopardize seriously
that interest or value, the peremptory character of the
norm may be presumed but only if the application of the
criteria of peremptory norms produces no noteworthy
negative evidence .
III. Is the Use of Armed Force in Interstate Relations Jus Cogens?
By the same measure of unanimity in which the very existence of
jus cogens was previously accepted by both the scholarly community
represented by the ILC and the political community consisting of the state
38. The inclusion of this norm in the United Nations Charter enhances its non-derogable
nature, as any action in contravention thereof, is a breach of a state's obligation under the
Charter. However, as jus cogens status is not created by treaty, the argument really rests on the
notion that what is incorporated in the Charter is the pre-existent norm, the universality and
acceptance of which is evidenced by inclusion in the Charter.
39. HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 3-5, and 176.
40. Id. at 176. The Mexican delegate, for example, noted that rules of jus cogens are
derived from principles which the legal conscience of mankind deems absolutely essential to
coexistence in the international community at a given stage of the community's historical
development. Id. at 4 (citing U.N. Doc. A/CONF 39/11, p. 294).
A general overview of the writings of some scholars on the origins of the notion of jus
cogens from a natural law and positivist perspective can be found in SINCLAIR, supra note 4, at
201-09. Although some commentators analogize jus cogens proscriptions to municipal law
prohibitions on the unenforceability of contracts as contravening public policy, Sinclair is not too
sympathetic to this view. Id. at 205-06.
41. HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 20 and 207.
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representatives at the Vienna Conference, there was accord that the use of
force constitutes the most conspicuous example of jus cogens.
A. The ILC Position
As early as his writings in 1953, H. Lauterpacht noted that there
had never been any waiver or change from that characterization of the use
of force and its status as jus cogens.4 2 By 1958, Fitzmaurice, the third
Special Rapporteur of the ILC, noted the prohibition of wars of aggression
as an example of a jus cogens rule.4 3
Subsequent commentaries of the ILC clearly accord peremptory
status to the norm prohibiting the use of force, embodied in the United
Nations Charter, as expressing "not merely the obligations of Members of
the United Nations but the general rules of international law of today
concerning the use of force."
Illustratively, Waldock's 1963 draft article provided: "In
particular, a treaty is contrary to international law and void if its object or
execution involves . . . the use or threat of force in contravention of the
principles of the Charter of the United Nations. . . . "' According to the
Commentary this "hardly needs explanation; the principles stated in the
Charter are generally accepted as expressing not merely the obligations of
Members of the United Nations but the general rules of international law
today concerning the use of force.""
The prohibition of the use of force noted by the ILC as a
conspicuous example of a rule of international law having the character of
jus cogens was, in fact, the only rule of jus cogens about which the ILC
was unanimous.41
42. Id. at 180.
43. [1958] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 27-28, and 40-41.
44. [1963] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 53. In what appears as an effort to separate the
dependence of its status as jus cogens from the use of force proscription contained in the United
Nations Charter, Hannikainen refers to such a prohibition as that concerning "the use of
(aggressive) force," rather than "reflected in article 2(4)" or even that "contained in the
Charter." See, e.g., HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 178 and 180.
45. [1963] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 52, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/Ser.A/1963.
46. Id. at 53.
47. HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 163. Despite this unanimity, the ILC eventually
decided that no examples of jus cogens would be included in their draft. Rather such was to be
left to state practice and the decisions of international tribunals. Id. at 162 (citing the 1966 Int'l
L. Comm'n Report).
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B. State Criteria
Following the suggestion of the ILC to give primacy to states in
the determination of the particular norms of jus cogens, the state
representatives at the Vienna Conference reflected much support for the
prohibition of the use of force as an example of a peremptory norm." Of
the thirty-two states submitting examples of jus cogens, half declared that
the prohibition on the use of force was clearly of such character.4 9 Another
one fourth (eight states) listed this prohibition more generally as
peremptory because it constitutes part of the leading principles of the
United Nations Charter.?
The consensus of states on the criteria necessary for jus cogens
status is manifest in article 53 of the Convention. Clearly, under the
perameters set forth therein, the use of force meets those criteria.5' There
is almost no other norm of international relations more embedded in
practice and accepted as law nor with more widespread recognition as non-
derogable than that concerning the use of force regime, long prohibiting
certain uses of armed force in international relations.12
As if further justification were necessary for according jus cogens
status to the use of force regime, it is beyond peradventure that the public
policy concerns underlying the notion of a jus cogens regime; the
protection of overriding interests of the international community of states
are manifest.53
Additional confirmation that the use of armed force in derogation
of the norms reflected in the United Nations Charter, is considered by the
international community of states as a whole to violate jus cogens
48. Id. at 178.
49. Id. at 177.
50. Id. The final vote on the Vienna Convention was 79-1-9. There were eight states that
voted against the draft article on jus cogens (article 50). These were Belgium, France,
Switzerland, Australia, Turkey, Liechtenstein, Monaco, and Luxembourg. Among the states that
abstained were: Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, South Africa, and the United
Kingdom. HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 181 and 174.
51. See id. at 9-12.
52. For an extended discussion of the extent, nature and scope of the use of force
prohibition, see id. at 18-30.
53. The fundamental connection of the norm to the United Nations regime, the aim of
which is to secure international pace and security, fulfills the fifth component of the jus cogens
criteria: the protection of overriding interests of the international community of states.
HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 207.
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proscriptions is reflected in the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of
the United States."
C. Judicial Contribution
The other source of input denominated by the ILC is that of
international tribunals. Decisions of the International Court of Justice
increasingly reflect judicial acknowledgment that jus cogens exists and that
questions pertaining to the use of armed force are involved therein."' For
example, the Court's opinion in the Nicaragua case reflects majority
acceptance of the arguments of both the United States and Nicaragua that
there are certain underlying issues relating to the use of force that have the
character of jus cogens and notes:
The principle of the prohibition of the use of force
expressed in article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the
United Nations . . . is frequently referred to in statements
by state representatives as being not only a principle of
customary international law but also a fundamental or
cardinal principle of such law. The International Law
Commission, in the course of its work on the codification
of the law of treaties, expressed the view that 'the law of
the Charter concerning the prohibition of the use of force
in itself constitutes a conspicuous example of a rule in
international law having the character of jus cogens.'
(citations omitted) (1966 version)."
Notice is given to jus cogens in the separate opinions of Judges Singh and
Setta-Camara as well. 5
54. FRL, supra note 38, at 102, cmt. h and k at 237-8 and rep. note 6 at 34. The United
States agreed to the inclusion of articles 53 and 64 in the Vienna Convention but has yet to ratify
the treaty. HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 149.
55. United States federal courts have even recognized the applicability of jus cogens to
human rights violations such as torture, disappearances, and arbitrary detentions under the Alien
Tort Claim Act as violations of the laws of nations. Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26
F.3d 1166, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Comm. of United States Citizens in Nicaragua v. Reagan,
859 F.2d 929, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699,
715-17 (9th Cir. 1992).
56. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14, at para. 190 (June 27).
57. Judge Singh underscored that "the principle of non-use of force belongs to the realm of
jus cogens." Id. at 153. Judge Sette-Camara expressed the firm view that the non-use of force
can be recognized as a peremptory rule. Id. at 199.
The Court approached the use of armed force as customary international law. To the extent
that the I.C.J. statute speaks to general principles of law as evidenced by custom, the substance of
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D. Scholar's Note
Even a commentator as confessedly conservative in his
investigation and analysis of jus cogens as Sinclair, notes that, applying a
test for qualification of a particular rule as a norm of jus cogens by
reference to the evidence for its acceptance as such by the international
community as a whole, with the burden of proof resting on the party
alleging the jus cogens character of the rule:
It would seem that sufficient evidence for ascribing the
character of jus cogens to a rule of international law exists
in relation to the rule which requires states to refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any other state. There is ample evidence for the
proposition that, subject to the necessary exceptions for the
use of force in self-defense or under the authority of a
competent organ of the United Nations or a regional
agency acting in accordance with the Charter, the use of
armed or physical force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state is now prohibited. This
proposition is so central to the existence of any
international legal order of individual nation states
(however nascent that legal order may be) that it must be
taken to have the character of jus cogens .
IV. What is the Specific Content of the Peremptory Norm
Governing the Use of Armed Force in Interstate Relations?
Peremptory norm status is not accorded to the use of armed force
merely because there are provisions relating thereto in the Charter. That
there is no necessary linkage between and dependence upon peremptory
status and inclusion in a treaty was clear in the debates at the Vienna
Conference? 9 The ILC has clearly set forth the proposition that a treaty in
the jus cogens and customary international law can, effectively, be the same. It is the nature of
the derogation that is the separating line. I.C.J. Statute, art. 38(1)(b) (1945).
The I.C.J. decision in Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. also speaks to the concept of
jus cogens in its references to obligations owed erga omnes (to the international community at
large) such as that derived from outlawing acts of aggression which all states have a legal interest
in protecting. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5).
58. SINCLAIR, supra note 4, at 222-23.
59. Of the thirty-two states offering the use of force as the prime example of jus cogens,
only eight ascribed that status to its inclusion as a fundamental principle of the Charter. None
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and of itself, without pre-existing state practice which it reflects, is
insufficient to create a peremptory norm." Further the commentaries of
the ILC do not restrict its understanding of the jus cogens character of the
use of force to that which was specifically codified in the Charter. Rather,
the comments reflect that the use of force regime is embedded therein, but
derives its peremptory character from its identity as a general principle of
law .6 ,
Logic compels this conclusion because the Charter could not create
or modify a pre-existent peremptory norm without being in violation of the
existent norm unless, at a minimum, there was widespread, pre-existent
recognition of the new norm, confirmed, for example, by extensive state
practice, coupled with evidence that the treaty was written with the intent
to conform international treaty obligations to that new norm. 6  The
relevant Charter travaux clearly reflect the contrary.61
A. What is the Content of the Use of Armed Force Regime that Pre-
existed the Charter and Found Reflection Therein?
The norm prohibiting force in interstate relations, is widely
recognized as prohibiting the threat or use of armed force against the
territorial integrity and/or political independence of another state." This
prohibition is not limited to wars of aggression but also extends to the use
or threat of aggressive armed force.6 This normative regime is reflected in
seemed to specifically restrict and identify the content of this norm as reflected in the Charter
alone. See HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 15.
60. This result is the logical extension of the rule that would void any treaty that, at the
time of its creation, is in conflict with a pre-existent peremptory norm. See id. at 7, and note 21.
61. See generally [1953] Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n; [1966] Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n.
62. DINSTEIN, supra note 21, at 105-06 (rejecting the notion of instant custom and
highlighting that treaties effecting a modification of jus cogens could occur if, at the time of their
making the modifying treaty had gained the backing of the international community as a whole).
See also SINCLAIR, supra note 4, at 225-26.
63. This is more thoroughly presented infra pp. 38-59, 61-63.
64. See generally Military and Paramilitary Acitivities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, at para. 190 (June 27). See also infra pp. 18-25.
Use of the term aggression or aggressive use of force will be used as a term of art to denote
the use of armed force in contravention of this general proscription. Just as the term force has
been subject to definitions that range from military to non-military coercion, both direct and
indirect, the almost fifty year effort, still not definitively resolved, to come to a specific definition
of aggression, renders its use here more confusing than clarifying. It is, perhaps, essential to
remember that at the UNCIO in 1945, the Charter drafters rejected any effort to insert a set
definition of aggression although such is featured in the authority of the Security Council. See 6
UNCIO (1945), discussions of Comm. 3, Comm. III.
65. HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 327.
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article 2(4) of the Charter, in the charters of such regional organizations
and entities as the OAS, OAU, the Arab League, NATO, and the Warsaw
Pact, as well as various declarations of non-aligned countries and bilateral
treaties." The prevalence of its inclusion in these numerous instruments
emphasizes the universality of the prohibition, rather than marks its
creation. Further evidence of this universality was stressed in 1987 by the
United Nations General Assembly Declaration on the Enhancement of the
Effectiveness of the Principle of Refraining from the Threat or Use in
International Law, which was adopted unanimously.61
As noted by Hannikainen, after an exhaustive review of jus cogens
as applied to the use of armed force, "[a]ll states are under the peremptory
obligation to refrain from the use or threat of aggressive armed force, i.e.,
armed force with an aggressive (including dictatorial) intention, against
another state .... "6
B. What is the Relationship Between the Prohibition on the Use of
Armed Force and a State's Right to Use Such Force in its defense?
Once there was general acceptance by states of limitations on their
recourse to armed force in what had, theretofore, been discretionary
policy, a use of force regime developed in which distinctions were made
whereby armed force was either justified or not; permissible or
66. Id. at 332.
67. Id. at 333. A number of UNGA Resolutions confirm the universality of the prohibition
on the use of aggressive force in interstate relations. These include the unanimous 1970
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations Among states
which interprets the principle of the prohibition of force as including the use or threat of force
and the 1974 definition of aggression, also approved by unanimity. G.A. Res. 2625, U.N.
GAOR, 25" Sess., Supp. No. 18, U.N. Doc. A/8018 (1970). G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR,
29"' Sess., Supp. No. 19, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9619 (1974).
68. HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 356. His reference to aggressive intent appears as an
effort to separate out those uses of force, such as the rescue of nationals and humanitarian
intervention which have involved the use of force in the territory of another state undertaken in
seeming violation of 2(4) yet, without any aggressive intent. While such may implicate lesser
uses of force and debate rages as to whether this is unlawful under the Charter regime, such
milder forms of force do not implicate jus cogens concerns. Id. at 336-37, 340.
He notes: "[E]ssentially my conclusion concurs with the view of the ILC regarding the
content of the peremptory prohibition of the use of aggressive armed force." See Int'l L.
Comm'n Report 1980. U.N. Doc. A/35/10, at 90-93. HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at note 114.
The elipsed section of Hannikainen's comments reflects jus cogens status to aggressive force
.within the territory of another state." This concerns the question of a state's consent to the use
of such force within its territory in a variety of contexts. Though interesting, that topic is beyond
the scope of the present paper.
For a listing of some of the writers who support the peremptory character of the prohibition
of the use of aggressive armed force, in addition to those mentioned elsewhere in this paper, see
Id. at 324, note 6.
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impermissible.0 However, that proscription upon a state's unilateral
discretion to use armed force did not apply in one situation: self-defense.70
Reviewing pre-League practice and doctrine, League Covenant
provisions, the Kellogg-Briand Pact era and thereafter, Brownlie asserts
that after 1920, when the effective legal regulation of armed force
appeared, that which became the operative international norm on armed
force in interstate relations was a regime that empowered states to use such
in reaction to an actual or imminent resort to armed force.'
Although efforts were undertaken to put regulation into the process
whereby a state had lawful recourse to engage in war under the League of
Nations, that option remained. Effectively, all the League Covenant did
was offer a series of procedural steps antecedent to the initiation of armed
force by one state against another.72
That gap was sought to be rectified with the Kellogg-Briand Pact,
a multilateral effort to make explicit the prohibition on the use of war as a
mode of settlement of international disputes.,3 Consequently, the Pact
constituted a legal regime declarative of the impermissible use of force.
The Pact process was, however, declarative of the permissible end
of the use of force spectrum as well. Specifically, a condition precedent to
the signing of the Kellogg-Briand Pact was the agreement on reservation of
69. IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES chs. XII
and XIII (1963); DINSTEIN, supra note 21, at ch. 3.
70. See infra at 21-29.
71. DINSTEIN, supra note 21, at ch. 3. BROWNLIE, supra note 70, at 216-52, 254-55
(reflecting the U.N.G.A. 6th Committee discussions on defining aggression). For an extended
discussion of the problems surrounding and the efforts to effect a definition of aggression, see
JULIUS STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER (1959); DINSTEIN, supra note 21, at 123-32;
and THOMAS & THOMAS, THE CONCEPT OF AGGRESSION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, chs. I and II
(1972).
72. ANTHONY CLARK AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE
OF FORCE 19-22 (1993).
Although arguably inconsistent with the availability of war to states under the Covenant,
article 10 provided:
The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external
aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members
of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of
such aggression, the Council shall advise upon the means by which thisobligation will
be fulfilled.
Id.
Interpretations have generally affirmed the view that article 10 was intended as subordinate
to provisions which allowed for recourse to war in the face of the inability of the Council to act.
i.e., that such force would not constitute aggression. Id. at 21-22. This view, too, supports the
notion that what is not impermissible is permissible and vice versa.
73. BROWNLIE, supra note 70, at 217-8; AREND & BECK, supra note 73, at 23.
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the right of legitimate self-defense. 1 Although Kellogg's original
conception had been for a complete renunciation of war, he assured the
French Ambassador that the renunciation of war did not deprive the
signatories of the right of legitimate defense.73 Written expressions of the
reservation of the right to self-defense were submitted by France, Great
Britain, and Japan. 6
Of decisive importance was the United States' Note of June 23,
1928." Concerning self-defense, it conveyed:
[t]here is nothing in the American draft of an anti-war
treaty which restricts or impairs in any way the right of
self-defense. That right is inherent in every sovereign
state and is implicit in every treaty. Every nation is free at
all times and regardless of treaty provisions to defend its
territory from attack or invasion; and it alone is competent
to decide whether circumstances require recourse to war in
self-defense. If it has good cause the world will applaud
and not condemn its action. Express recognition by treaty
of this inalienable right, however, gives rise to the same
difficulty encountered in any effort to define aggression. It
is the identical question approached from the other side.
Inasmuch as no treaty provision can add to the natural
right of self-defense, it is not in the interest of peace that a
treaty should stipulate a juristic conception of self-defense
since it is far too easy for the unscrupulous to mold events
with the agreed definition. 8
In their respective notifications of acceptance of a slightly revised
American draft, each of the recipient's of the United States' Note
expressly accepted or noted the interpretation put upon it in the United
States' Note.79 With these conditions, the treaty was signed without the
reservation appearing in the text. 1
74. BROWNLIE, supra note 70, at 235.
75. These assurances were made on March 1, 1928. Id.
76. Id. at 235-36.
77. That note, explaining the United States draft of April 13, was sent to Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, Great Britain, India, the Irish Free State, Italy,
Japan, New Zealand, Poland, and South Africa. Id. at 236.
78. Id. (quoting Kellogg's address to the American Society of International Law).
79. BROWNLIE, supra note 70 at 236-37.
80. Id. at 237.
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In contrast to state practice before 1920 and the writings of jurists
relative to that period, according to which the right of self-defense was
regarded as synonymous with the right of self-preservation including the
redress of wrongs, Brownlie asserts that such was not the regime that was
understood as part of customary practice after the Pact.' Rather, the
wording of the Pact and the expressed understandings of the parties about
self-defense are not reflective of such a broad scope for self-defense. 2 By
1928, the common meaning of aggression was attack or invasion or threat
thereof.'3 In the periods immediately before and after the conclusion of the
Pact the term legitimate defense appeared frequently in contexts in which it
had the sense of justified reaction to attack or threat of attack.14
With this as foundation, Brownlie notes:
[t]he legal developments of the period of the League had
the result that, while the right of self-preservation no
longer existed in its classical form some of its content was
preserved. This residual right was referred to as that of
self-defense or legitimate defense. It was understood that
this right of legitimate defense was subject to objective and
legal determination and that it was confined to reacting to
immediate danger to the physical integrity of the state itself
... . Unfortunately, the acceptance of the existence of a
legally defined right was not in fact accompanied by any
precise definition of the content of the right."
He continues:
In the period of the League the right of self-defense
commonly appeared in the context of the use of force. It
was essentially a reaction by a state against the use or
threat of force by the armed forces of another state ....
The essence of the right was proportionality to the threat
offered and this would create a presumption that force was
only lawful as a reaction against force.96
81. Id. at 240.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 240-41.
84. Id. at 241.
85. BROWNLIE, supra note 70, at 252.
86. Id.
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Additionally, he notes that, for the years 1930-1939 "[s]tate
practice .. . fairly consistently supports the view that resort to force in
collective or self-defense is a reaction to an actual or imminent resort to
force. "81
According to Brownlie, the period from 1920 through 1939 marks
the end of a broad state entitlement to use force for such matters as
protection of rights or a generalized claim to self-preservation, in the face
of the norms whereby such uses of force exceed that which would be
available to rebut impermissible uses of force against a state."
Moving ahead chronologically, he submits:
In state practice both before and after the Second World
War resort to force by virtue of the right of self-defense is
almost without exception associated with the idea of
reaction against the use of force. The concept of
aggression appeared as the right of self-preservation fell
into disrepute and in the period of the League and the
Second World War 'aggression' was synonymous with an
armed attack, the unlawful use of force, which justified
action in self-defense. 8
Consequently, self-defense had a more restricted and obvious meaning
than had existed prior to these efforts at incursions into state power to use
armed force.
For at least thirty years it has appeared in state practice
principally, though not exclusively, as a reaction to the use of force against
the territorial domain, the physical entity of a state. It is not surprising
that the draftsmen of the United Nations Charter should define it in article
51 by reference to the occurrence of an armed attack. 9
The practice of states from 1929-1945 does not suggest that self-
defense was "anything other than a reaction to force or threat of force
against the territory of a State."91
It is noteworthy that in its 1949 report on the Draft Declaration on
Rights and Duties of States, all members of the ILC regarded the right of
87. Id. at 250.
88. Brownlie does note, however, that protection of nationals may occupy a continuing
place. Id. at 250-52.
89. Id. at 255. His comments were also directed at dispelling the notion that self-defense
covers reaction to non-militarized forms of force or coercion.
90. Id. at 255-56. As his book was published in 1963, he is looking back to the early
1930s.
91. Brownlie, supra note 70, at 241, 251-52. He does note the existence of a few cases
that do not fit this general pattern.
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self-defense as exercisable through the medium of armed force only in case
of the threat of armed attack or actual armed attack. This was offered as
commentary upon draft article 12 which provided that every state has the
right of individual or collective self-defense against armed attack.Y
That such followed so swiftly upon and used the same armed
attack wording as article 51 of the United Nations Charter could well
reflect the then current understanding and intent in use of that terminology
in the Charter: retention of the right to armed self-defensive responses to
the threat or use of armed force as opposed to other coercive measures
short of military force.
What is clearly evident is that the regulation of the use of armed
force in interstate relations under international law that began in earnest
under the League system and the Kellogg-Briand Pact is that which
ultimately was incorporated and mostly recently codified in the United
Nations Charter. Presently, it is beyond challenge that the provisions of
article 2(4), prohibiting the threat or use of armed force in violation of a
state's territorial integrity and/or political independence, which necessarily
includes and incorporates the right to use such force in self-defense,
constitute still binding rules of traditional international law.
Not only was the normative regime on impermissible and
permissible armed force established prior to its incorporation into the
Charter, but the inherent nature of that regime was infused in the Charter
as well. It is one predicated upon a dyadic dynamic whereby what one
state is empowered to confront with armed force is that which, by
definition, is impermissible to the other.
92. [1949] Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 108-11, 145-47.
93. DINSTEIN, supra note 21, at 93-94; J.N. SINGH, USE OF FORCE UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW at 9-20 (1984); see also Military and Parimilitary Activities In and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, at para. 190 (June 27) (reflecting contemporaneous,
simultaneous vitality of the pre-existent norm on the use of armed force between states and the
United Nations Charter regime).
Although the I.C.J., commentators, and others may have categorized the extra-Charter use
of armed force as customary international law, this author suggests that such is not dispositive of
the normative rank to be accorded to that regime. Elevation to the status of jus cogens is effected
regardless of any prior categorization provided the normative regime fulfills the criteria identified
in article 53 of the Vienna Convention. While it is indeed unlikely that a norm could attain jus
cogens status without being considered, at a minimum, under customary international law, that
categorization is not determinative for jus cogens analysis. That assessment requires examination
into the extent of acceptance, state practice, and derogability.
Usage of the term traditional as a modifier of international law is used throughout the
original discussion presented to connote generally the extra-Charter normative regime to avoid
the confusion engendered by use of the terms customary international law and general
international law as articulated in article 53 of the Vienna Convention. See SINGH, supra note
94, at 10.
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As this was the existent regime when diplomats and scholars
referred to the impermissible use of force as the most conspicuous example
of jus cogens, this author suggests that it is that regime in its entirety, not
just one aspect of it, that is the non-derogable norm.9
C. The Dialectic Dyadic Dynamic
What is both apparent and key in this normative regime is the
inherent complementarity of the two ends of the use of force spectrum. 9
94. This does not mean that other uses of force might violate either the Charter or
customary international law norms but yet may not constitute jus cogens. This is analogous to
the I.C.J. comments in the Nicaragua case that there may well be impermissible uses of force that
do not run afoul of the customary international law prohibition against armed attack.
95. STONE, supra note 72, at 72-76. His book is generally directed at efforts to define
aggression. This sub-section, entitled The Attempted Approach to Definition through Armed
Attack, concludes that, although the term armed attack might seem to be more explicit than a
looser one such as aggression or even legitimate self-defense, no ground is effectively gained in
defining aggression by shifting the focus to the actions of the victim's permitted license of self-
defense against armed attack. Quite simply he notes:
If States generally accepted the view that all forceful self-redress by individual
Members is forbidden by the Charter exception 'self-defense against the armed attack
against a Member,' within article 51, they should certainly have rallied immediately to
the thesis that nothing more was necessary to denote" aggression' than to define 'self-
defense against armed attack'. For the concept of 'self-defense' would then not have
its vague customary law outlines but be more precisely limited by reference to 'armed
attack' as an observable phenomenon against which it reacts. Some problems would
remain . . . for instance of distinguishing what degree of violence 'armed attack' must
involve and . . . the proportionality requirements . . . . If States really accepted this
view of the Charter, indeed, the question of 'aggression' itself would become
irrelevant; the question what is 'armed attack' would have been substituted for it.
(citations omitted).
Id. at 72-73.
Further reflecting the relation between what is permissible and what is not, Stone notes the
comments of G.G. Fitzmaurice:
The whole problem is to determine when certain acts are justified and, therefore, are
not aggressive, and when they are not justified and therefore are aggressive. This
situation is one which can only be carried out in each particular case in the light of the
facts and the situation as it exists at the time, and cannot be achieved by a prior rule
laid down in advance.
Id. at 18 n.5.
An examination into the fifty-year effort to arrive at a definition of aggression, which was
purposefully not done at the time of the drafting of the Charter, is, regrettably, not feasible
within the constraints of this paper. However, it is to be noted that the result of that effort, the
U.N.G.A.R Definition of Aggression effectively recognizes the inter-relationship of the two ends
of the use of force spectrum. U.N.G.A./Agg, supra note 68. Specifically, the first use of armed
force is only prima facie evidence of aggression. The obvious result is that a state can
permissibly undertake a first strike presumably in anticipation of an armed attack and not be
deemed to have engaged in aggression.
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Evidenced in the writings of Judge Lauterpacht in 1935 and others even
before him, the notion of aggression as complementary to the notion of
self-defense, has a pedigree extending back into the pre-Charter/Kellogg-
Briand Pact regime.' Kellogg himself regarded defense as the "conjunct
of aggression. "I According to Stone, this view is very widely
acknowledged and is a correct one.9 Of equal vintage are the comments
of G. Schelle, in whose view:
The correspondence of the questions is exact, since
(matters of proportionality apart) only when aggression
occurs does the right of self-defense arise. Indeed, . . . all
that distinguishes self-defense from aggression is that the
former takes place first. So . . . when there was no legal
restraint on the license to go to war, there was also no
restraint on the right of self-defense .... [I]ndeed that is
it because "la notion de legitime defense se definit par
l'agression," that this latter notion must be defined."
More contemporary recognition that complementarity between
self-defense and aggression remains a vital notion is reflected in the
jurisprudence of McDougal and Feliciano.o° Additionally, J.N. Singh has
noted:
The existence of legal prohibition surely means the
absence of legal permission and likewise, the existence of
legal permission means the absence of legal prohibition in
regard to the same subject matter. In order to judge the
legality of a particular threat or use of force in a situation,
the examination of legal prohibitions as well as legal
permissions is necessary.101
96. STONE, supra note 72, at 75, citing: H. Lauterpacht, The Pact of Paris ... (1935) 20
TRANS. GROTIUS SOC. 178, at 199.
9'7. BROWNLIE, supra note 70, at 240.
98. STONE, supra note 72, at 75 n.182. Such a dynamic is unlikely to have been affected
by the passage of 37 years since Stone's book was published.
99. STONE, supra note 72, at 75 n. 182.
100. MYRES SMITH McDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER ch. 3 (1961). As noted by John Norton Moore, the notion of
complementarity is a refined version of the legal realists' observations that legal norms frequently
travel in pairs of complementary opposites such as self-defense-aggression. John Moore,
Prolegomenon to the Jurisprudence of Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell, 54 VA. L. REV.
662 (1968) at 656 n.20.
101. SINGH, supra note 94, at 8.
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Given this inextricable linkage of the lawful and unlawful uses of
armed force, each can only be defined in relationship to one another.
According to Dinstein, "[t]he evolution of the idea of self defense in
international law goes hand in hand with the prohibition of aggression...
. [S]elf defense as a legitimate recourse to force is inextricably linked to
the antithesis of the employment of unlawful force by. . .its opponent." ,2
What is really subject to assessment within the dynamics of the
interstate use of armed force is considering where to draw the line.103
Operationally, it is only by examining the entirety of the exercise of armed
force between states that the boundary between proscription and
permission can be determined.
As a direct consequence, the fundamental use of force
proscription, reflected in the traditional prohibition on the use or threat of
armed force against another state, necessarily implicates and defines the
countervailing permitted self defensive use of armed force as one which
encompasses the ability to defend against the use and the threat of armed
force as well.'°'
This interdependence not only effects the applicable substantive
prohibition and entitlement, but also implicates the applicable legal status
of the normative regime. Specifically, to the extent that the traditional
prohibition on the use of armed force is not jus dispositivum, but rather,
jus cogens, the integrity of the system, the maintenance of balance between
the two components of the system, mandate that its counterpart, the
permissible use of armed force be recognized as having that same
normative status.t10
V. Is The Charter Subject to Jus Cogens Proscriptions?
What impact does recognition of the jus cogens character of the
use of armed force regime have on the Charter and the use of force regime
established thereunder? Is the Charter even subject to the jus cogens
regime described in the Vienna Convention? Three factors are relevant:
1) the Charter entered into force before the Vienna Convention was even
drafted,
2) the Vienna Convention is not by its terms, retroactive, and
102. DINSTEIN, supra note 21, at 177, citing Report of the International Law Commission,
32nd Session, 1980 11 (2) Int'l L. Comm'n Y.B. 1, 52.
103. DINSTEIN, supra note 21, at 177-78.
104. SINGH, supra note 94, at 14-20. Logic compels this conclusion as well.
105. It is indeed arguable that self-defense itself manifests the four criteria of peremptory
norm status and might, therefore, constitute jus cogens separately from its linkage with the illegal
use of force.
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3) the Vienna Convention has not seen universal ratification.
The answer is, however, presaged by recognizing that what was
enshrined in the United Nations Charter reflected pre-existent norms
prohibiting the unilateral use or threat of armed force and the correlative
right to undertake measures in self-defense.
Article 4 of the Vienna Convention limits its application to only
those treaties which have been concluded after the Convention's entry into
force. This is, however, without prejudice to the application of any rules
set forth in the Vienna Convention to which treaties would be subject
under international law independently from the Convention.1' Debate at
the Vienna Conference reflected concern that the Convention provision
preserve the operation of rules of customary international law as well as
take into account general principles of law which are a separate source of
international law.101 Article 4 was inserted to preserve the application to
treaties of any pre-existent rules of customary international law and
general principles of law.'10 Determining whether jus cogens has
application to the Charter upon an international law basis other than the
Convention regime, suggests analysis on whether jus cogens constitutes a
codification of customary international law or a progressive development. 1 09
The distinction between these two categories is evinced in article
15 of the Statute of the International Law Commission. According to that
statute, progressive development of international law means "the
preparation of draft Conventions on subjects which have not yet been
regulated by international law or in regard to which the law has not yet
been sufficiently developed in the practice of states." °10 Codification of
106. Article 4 provides:
Non-retroactivity of the Present Convention
Without prejudice to the application of any rules set forth in the present Convention to
which treaties would be subject under international law independently of the
Convention, the Convention applies only.to treaties which are concluded by states after
the entry into force of the present Convention with regard to such states.
Vienna Convention, supra note 25.
107. SINCLAIR, supra note 4, at 8.
108. Id. at 249; I.C.J. Statute, art. 38(1)(b) (1945).
109. This approach is not meant to exclude consideration of jus cogens as a general
principle of law, under the theory expressed by some that it represents, on the international level,
the prohibition most legal systems recognize on the non-enforcement of contracts deemed in
violation of law and/or public policy. Considerations of space preclude an in-depth presentation
of this positivist theme as an underpinning of jus cogens. For a more detailed discussion see
SINCLAIR, supra note 4, at 204-06.
Additionally as previously suggested, assessment of a norm as customary international law
for this analysis does not preclude its promotion to jus cogens. See supra note 4, at 94.
110. SINCLAIR, supra note 4, at 11.
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international law is defined to contemplate "the more precise formulation
and systematization of rules of international law in fields where there
already has been extensive state practice, precedent, and doctrine."I'
In submitting its final set of draft articles on the law of treaties, the
ILC did not specifically categorize whether its work was either progressive
development or codification. "2  Rather, in its covering report, the
commission stated:
The Commission's work on the law of treaties constitutes
both codification and progressive development of
international law in the sense in which those concepts are
defined in article 15 of the Commission's Statute and, as
was the case with several previous drafts, it is not
practicable to determine into which category each
provision falls."3
The ILC characterized its work on jus cogens as similarly
reflecting this dichotomy. The ILC expressed the view that the draft
article on peremptory norms involved partly a codification and partly a
progressive development of international law." 4  It acknowledged that
peremptory norms exist in international law that permit no derogation and
set down a general definition of jus cogens.11, The progressive
development component would then relate to the specifics, i.e., which
norms were to be accorded jus cogens status. This the ILC left to be
worked out by state practice and the jurisprudence of international
tribunals. 1,6
That the use of force regime proposed herein as jus cogens is
declarative of a pre-existing normative regime supports the notion that the
regime is applicable to the Charter independently of the Vienna
Convention."' To the extent that these norms were pre-existent and merely
111. Id.
112. Id. at 12.
113. Int'l L. Comm'n [1966] Y.B. 177; SINCLAIR, supra note 4, at 12.
114. HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 162.
115. That definition is "[a] norm accepted and recognized by the international community of
states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified
only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character." Vienna
Convention, supra note 25, art. 53.
116. See Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 114, at 76; HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 162.
117. That the use of force regime described herein existed as a recognized normative regime
in customary international law before the Charter, has been confirmed by the I.C.J. in the
Nicaragua litigation. Military and Parimilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 126-34, at para. 175-94 (June 27). Consequently, even were the Vienna
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codified in the Charter renders the Charter subject to the operation of jus
cogens even though it came into force before the promulgation of the
Vienna Convention.",
There are effectively two prerequisites for the retroactive
application of the Vienna Convention provisions on jus cogens. The first
component, establishing that peremptory norms exist in international law,
is in this case, established and confirmed by that which would generally be
the second and more difficult hurdle of establishing what the particular
peremptory norm is.
What is at issue is the extent to which there is a regime concerning
the use of armed force in interstate relations from which states are not free
to derogate. To the extent that the Charter reflects and embodies the pre-
existent norms regulating the use of that armed force, nothing new is being
offered. The United Nations Charter regime is merely reflective of the
pre-existent norms, the customary international law, to which all member
states have signaled their acknowledgment of continuing allegiance and
obedience to.' 19
Furthermore, there is nothing novel or progressive in categorizing
the use of armed force regime as non-derogable. No restrictions upon a
state's recourse to such force which did not previously exist, would be
imposed. 20
Convention not applicable, the principles of articles 53 and 64 would be effective as customary
law. FRL, supra note 38, at 331, n.4.
118. Determining into which category a particular provision of the Vienna Convention falls
is, Sinclair suggests, effected predominantly by implication. SINCLAIR, supra note 4, at 12. The
I.C.J. in the Namibia decision, in determining whether another rule of the Vienna Convention
[termination on account of material breach] would be applicable under customary international
law independently of the Convention, noted the voting record at the Vienna Convention relating
to its adoption as relevant. Id. at 20.
119. The comments of the I.C.J. in the Nicaragua case are, again, enlightening:
[To deduce the existence of customary rules ...the conduct of States should, in
general be consistent with such rules... instances of State conduct inconsistent with a
given rule should generally be treated as breaches of that rule, not as indications of the
recognition of a new rule. If a State acts in a way prima facie incompatible with a
recognized rule, but defends its conduct by appealing to exceptions or justifications
contained within the rule itself. . . the significance of that attitude is to confirm rather
than weaken the rule.
Military and Parimilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 130,
at para. 186 (June 27).
120. Returning again to the Nicaragua case, the I.C.J. decision made clear that a breach of
this extra-Charter customary international law regime remains both cognizable and punishable.
Military and Parimilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, at
para. 126 (June 27).
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To the contrary, those who would argue that changes in the pre-
existent regime under the Charter effect a diminishment of the customary
principles are the true advocates of a progressive development.' 2'
Consequently, it would appear clear that the traditional use of armed force
regime is an independent basis for the application of the jus cogens
proscription, free from the non-retroactive provision of the Vienna
Convention.
VI. Is the Charter in Derogation of Jus Cogens?
The ultimate penalty of voidness only results if a treaty is in
derogation of jus cogens at the time of the conclusion of the treaty or as
such emerges thereafter.In Consequently, the question is whether articles
2(4) and 51 of the Charter conform to the jus cogens armed force regime.
This task obviously requires interpretation of the Charter. Attention,
therefore, needs to be turned to interpretive modalities and materials to
determine the consistency of the Charter with the jus cogens regime
proposed herein as well as the absence of any newly emerged norm.
A. How is the Charter to be Interpreted?
Naturally, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides rules
for interpretation. These include:
Article 31. General Rule of Interpretation
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accord and
with the ordinary meaning to be given the terms of the
treaty in their context and in the light of its objects and
purpose ....
121. There are two simultaneous, yet independent regimes concerning the use of armed
force; one under the Charter and the other under pre-existing norms. Id., at 126-34, para. 175-
194. In addition to finding that the Charter itself explicitly referenced pre-existent customary
international law by referring to the inherent right of self-defense in article 51, the Court referred
to two pre-Charter documents in finding the opinio juris supporting the customary international
law regime on the prohibition of force reflected in article 2(4). Id. at 127, para. 176 and at 130-
32, para. 186-89. Consequently, assuming a different, more restrictive regime under the Charter
does not mean, absent evidence of state practice and opinion juris, that such has altered
customary law. As the customary regime remains, treaty based restrictions have not effected a
progressive development. Although new peremptory norms can emerge (i.e. progressively
develop) there is no evidence that a new normative regime, in contradistinction to the Charter
regime, has deprived the traditional regime on the use of armed force of its abiding existence,
applicability, and vitality.
122. The remedy for the violation differs slightly if a new norm emerges after the treaty.
Vienna Convention, supra note 25, art. 53, 64, 71.
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3. There shall be taken into account, together with the
context: ....
(b) Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty
which established the agreement of the parties regarding its
interpretation;
(c) Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the
relations between the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is
established that the parties so intended.
Article 32. Supplementary Means of Interpretation
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of
interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty
and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to
confirm the meaning resulting from the application of
article 31, or to determine the meaning when the
interpretation according to article 31: (a) Leaves the
meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) Leads to a result
which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
These provisions have been referred to as a general expression of
the principles of customary international law of treaty interpretation12 3
Pre-dating the Convention regime and still evident in its terms are three
primary schools of thought concerning the aim and goal of treaty
interpretation. As reflected in the writings of Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice:
[tlhere are today three main schools of thought on the
subject, which could be conveniently called the 'intentions
of the parties' or 'founding fathers' school; the 'textual' or
'ordinary meaning of the words' school; and the
'teleological' or 'aims and objects' school. The ideas of
these three schools are not necessarily exclusive of one
another, and theories of treaty interpretation can be
constructed and are indeed normally held compounded of
all three. 24
123. SINCLAIR, supra note 4, at 153.
124. Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice:
Treaty Interpretation and Certain Other Treaty Points, 28 BRITISH YEAR BOOK OF
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All three approaches, individually or as components within the
Vienna Convention approach, retain import in efforts to interpret the
Charter.'2 ' What will become apparent in the subsequent analysis is that,
regardless of which modality is selected, the same outcome is obtained:
the Charter's consistency with the jus cogens use of armed force regime
proposed in this paper.
Equally clear is the place and import to be given to examination of
the relevant travaux preparatoires in efforts to determine the meaning of
the text, the intention of the parties, and the object and purpose of the
United Nations Charter, notwithstanding any counterassertions predicated
upon the Vienna Convention provisions. '2
As Sinclair notes:
[t]he question of recourse to travaux preparatoires has
often been regarded as the touchstone which serves to
distinguish the adherents of the 'textual' approach from the
adherents of the 'intentions' approach .... In any event,
it is clear that no would-be interpreter of a treaty,
whatever his doctrinal point of departure, will deliberately
ignore any material which can usefully serve as a guide
towards establishing the meaning of the text with which he
is confronted. 12
Such investigative options as are provided by the travaux and other
extrinsic material are not cast aside by the Vienna Convention. The rules
for interpretation set forth in the Vienna Convention do not, according to
Sinclair, establish a fixed, inflexible hierarchy between the general rule set
forth in article 31 and supplementary means of interpretation provided for
in article 32.'2' Rather, the would-be interpreter is still expected to have
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1951), cited in DAN CIOBANU, IMPACT OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF
THE CHARTER UPON ITS INTERPRETATION 31, in CURRENT PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(Antonio Cassese ed. 1975); SINCLAIR, supra note 4, at 115.
125. According to Sinclair, the Vienna Convention's rules on interpretation constitute an
economical code of principles which nonetheless have their value.
By placing emphasis on the key elements of treaty interpretation, and on the
relationship between these elements, the Convention rules establish a set of guidelines
which are not only firmly grounded in antecedent state practice and international case
law but which serve to indicate to the would-be interpretor the relative weight which.
. would be attribute[ed] to each of those elements.
SINCLAIR, supra note 4, at 153-54.
126. SINCLAIR, supra note 4, at 115-16.
127. Id. at 116.
128. Id. at 117.
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recourse to all the materials that will provide evidence relative to the
meaning of the text when confronted with a question concerning treaty
interpretation which ex hypothesi, involves an argument as to the meaning
of the text.,29
Most enlightening and indicative of the synthetic approach to be
taken in interpretative efforts concerning the United Nations Charter and
the continuing relevance of the travaux, are the comments of Goodrich and
Hambro on the then new Charter.
In interpreting the Charter, we encounter one very special
problem of treaty interpretation, namely, that of the weight
to be attached to preparatory work (travaux preparatoires).
The general principle to be followed seems reasonably
clear. In the words of the Permanent Court of
International Justice 'there is no occasion to have regard to
preparatory work if the text of a convention is sufficiently
clear in itself.' But the practice of the Permanent Court
seems clearly to support the view that preparatory work
should be consulted with a view to determining the true
intent of the parties where there is any doubt as to the
meaning of the words used. We would thus seem to be
justified in making extensive and fairly detailed reference
to the discussions that took place in UNCIO, not only to
give some understanding of the play of forces that
occurred, but also to throw light on the actual meaning of
the Charter. ,10
Given the extent and virulence of the debate on such issues as the
meaning of article 2(4) and that of the terms armed attack and the inherent
right of self-defense articulated in article 51 of the United Nations Charter,
significant questions of interpretation remain. Even under the arguably
more strictly defined and structured Vienna Convention interpretation
regime, this obviously implicates recourse to the travaux in an effort to
interpret both articles 2(4) and 5 1.
129. Id.
130. LELAND M. GOODRICH & EDVARD HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS:
COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 48-49 (1946) [hereinafter GOODRICH & HAMBRO]. UNCIO
refers to the United Nations Conference on International Organization held in San Francisco from
April 25 through June 1945, when the Charter was signed. Id. at 11.
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B. What Limitations Are There in the Charter on the Legitimate
Right of Self Defense ?
Before beginning that specific inquiry, it seems appropriate to be
mindful of the comments of the Rapporteurs of Subcommittee 1/1/A and
Committee I of Commission I:
The provisions of the Charter, being in this case indivisible
as in any other legal instrument, are equally valid and
operative. The rights, duties, privileges, and obligations
of the Organization and its members match with one
another and complement one another to make a whole.
Each of them is construed to be understood and applied in
function to the others. 131
Turning first to the Charter restriction on a state's unilateral
recourse to force ultimately contained in article 2(4), the reports of the
subcommittee and committee on its content clearly show that no
interference was intended or anticipated in a state's inherent right to
engage in legitimate self-defense.
The original proposal in the Dumbarton Oaks proposal made no
mention of either territorial integrity or political independence.1 2
However, the subcommittee unanimously approved an Australian
amendment which added this phraseology and passed the resulting article
on to the committee as a new paragraph.'33 That amendment effectively
wrote the article as it would appear in the Charter.'3'
131. Subcommittee I/I/A and Committee 1 of Commission 1 were responsible for drafting
the Preamble, Principles and Purposes of the Charter. Id. at 12. Their reports are published in
volume 6 of the official multivolume series entitled, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. Doc. 723, I/llA19, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Does. 696 (1945)
[hereinafter Subcommittee I/l/A].
132. Chapter II. Principles: (4) "All members of the organization shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the
purposes of the organization." Do. 1, G/I, 3 U.N.C.1.O. Does. 3 (1945).
133. Commission I, Committee 1, Report of Rapporteur Subcommittee 1/1/A to Committee
I/1, Doe. 739, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Does. 720 (1945) [hereinafter Doe. 739].
134. Committee Il, Appendix to Rapporteur's Report, Doe. 908, I/l/34(a), 6 U.N.C.I.O.
Does. 404 (1945). As adopted by the subcommittee and approved by the Committee, the
provision read that "[aill members [of the Organization] shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any [member or] state or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United
Nations." Id.
The differences between this draft and the final provision are merely editing variations
deleting the words in brackets.
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Although other amendments had been proposed and rejected by the
subcommittee, one by the Norwegian Government had proposed that no
force should be used if not approved by the Security Council. As
discussion of this amendment helped to "clarify the Australian amendment
itself," and "helps to explain the present text," the Subcommittee
Rappporteur offered the following few words in his report to the
committee: "I
The sense of approval was considered ambiguous because
it might mean that approval before or after the use of
force. It might thus curtail the right of states to use force
in legitimate self-defense, while it was clear to the
subcommittee that the right of self-defense against
aggression should not be impaired or diminished. It was
on these understandings that the subcommittee voted the
text submitted to you.' 36
At the subsequent meeting of the committee, attention was focused on the
proposed new paragraph 4 including the words of the Australian
amendment which had been accepted by the drafting subcommittee.'"7 This
amendment provoked considerable discussion." That discussion reflects
the following:
The Delegate of New Zealand said that though he would
vote for the text including the Australian amendment...
his Delegation did not regard this text as an adequate
substitute for the original suggestion by New Zealand...
relating to a collective undertaking to resist aggression. 9
The Delegate of Brazil said that the change, made in the
text to incorporate the Australian amendment, had not
removed the element of ambiguity . .. and he suggested
135. Doc. 739, supra note 134, at 720-22.
136. Id. at 721. These understandings also included a note that "there will be no legitimate
wars in any sense." Id. (emphasis added).
137. Summary Report of Eleventh Meeting of Committee I/1, Doc. 784, I/1/27, 6
U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 331 (1945) [hereinafter Committee I/1].
138. Id. at 334.
139. New Zealand had submitted an amendment, reflecting a "notion found in many other
amendments" that read: "[A]II members of the Organization undertake collectively to resist
every act of aggression against any member." That amendment was rejected by a majority not
reaching two-thirds primarily because: "(1) The key-note for collectivity is found in the opening
words of this Chapter .... (2) The amendment limits itself to the collective resistance of every
act of aggression, aggression not being defined." Doc. 739, supra note 134, at 721.
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that, apart from the use of legitimate self-defense, the text
as it stood at present might well be interpreted as
authorizing the use of force unilaterally by a state,
claiming that such action was in accordance with the
purposes of the Organization. He suggested that it was
essential to clarify this by some wording as "all members
of the Organization shall refrain from the threat or use
of force unless such action was being taken according to
procedures established by the Organization and in
accordance with its decisions."°
The Delegate of Norway said that the committee should
reconsider the present language which did not seem to
reflect satisfactorily its intention, and thought that in any
case it should be made very clear in the Report to the
Commission that this paragraph 4 did not contemplate any
use of force, outside of action by the Organization, going
beyond individual or collective self-defense. He was
himself in favor of omitting the specific phrase relating to
"territorial integrity and political independence" since this
was, on the one hand, a permanent obligation under
international law and, on the other hand, could be said to
be covered by the phrase sovereign equality, as suggested
in the commentary by the Rapporteur.
The Delegate of the United Kingdom said that he did not
dissent from the reasoning of the Norwegian Delegate, but
he thought that the wording of the text had been carefully
considered so as to preclude interference with the
enforcement clauses of chapter VIII of the Charter.'4
The Delegate of the United States made it clear that the
intention of the authors of the original text was to state in
the broadest terms an absolute all-inclusive prohibition; the
140 Id.
141. This numbering reflects the original Dumbarton Oaks proposal. The United Nations
Dumbarton Oaks Proposals for a General International Organization, 3 U.N.C.I.O. 12-19, Doc.
G/I (1945). Entitled "Arrangements for the Maintenance of International Peace and Security
Including Prevention and Suppression of Aggression," then chapter VIII included Security
Council authority over the pacific settlement of disputes, determination of threats to the peace and
acts of aggression, as well as provisions relating to regional arrangements. These provisions
were separated into different chapters and articles in the final United Nations Charter.
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phrase or in any other manner was designed to insure that
there should be no loopholes. 14 2
In recommendations to the commission, the committee Rapporteur
noted the subcommittee's preliminary report had "received in full
committee an adequate general acceptance which allows it to remain an
element of the preparatory work that led to the committee's- final
recommendations. "'3
Concerning this new paragraph 4, the committee report reflects:
The committee decided to include the Australian
amendment so that the paragraph comes before you under
a new text.
The committee likes it to be stated in view of the
Norwegian amendment to the same paragraph that the
unilateral use of force or similar coercive measures is not
authorized or admitted. The use of arms in legitimate self-
defense remains admitted and unimpaired.14'
In connection with paragraph 4, a motion was considered
which the committee wishes to see mentioned in this
report. It was to add after paragraph 4 the following text:
"[A]Il members of the Organization undertake collectively
to resist any act of aggression against any member."
That motion, the committee wishes to state, had twenty six
votes in favor and eighteen against. 4 5
Clearly, there was every indication that the delegates recognized
such a prohibition as that contemplated in new paragraph 4 could impact
on self-defense and thus specifically rejected the notion that the proposed
regime was intended to interfere, interrupt, or compromise legitimate self-
142. Committee I/1, supra note 138, at 334-35. (Emphasis added).
What is noteworthy in the recorded debate is the absence of any opposition to the comments
stating that the right to legitimate self-defense was clearly excluded from the use of force
proscription. Given such explicit acceptance and lack of challenge, it was clear that such were to
remain intact.
143. Report of the Rapporteur of Committee 1 to Commission I, Doc.885, 6 U.N.C.I.O.
Docs. 387 (1945) [hereinafter Committee 1, Doc. 885].
144. The Norwegian amendment, which was not approved by the subcommittee had sought
to prohibit the use of force if not approved by the Security Council. See supra note 39.
145. Thus the motion failed to meet the two-third majority required for passage. Discussion
appears at Committee 1, Doc. 885, supra note 144, at 400.
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defense in any way. Nor was there any notation or intimation that this
self-defense entitlement was not to apply to a threat of force as well. As is
evident, article 2(4) was intended to reflect the dialectic dynamic in the use
of force regime: On the one hand, the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity, political independence of another state is not permitted
while, on the other, the protective response mechanism, self-defense,
remains inviolate.
Obviously, the content of that right was that which was existent at
the time of the drafting efforts, otherwise the use of the word that remains
in the discussions would have been nonsensical. However, more in-depth
corroboration for that conclusion lies in an examination of the travaux for
what has become article 51, the only article in the Charter that specifically
refers to self-defense.
The discussion of self-defense arose in conjunction with the
concerns of the Latin American countries to insure the freedom of action
of their regional arrangement, most recently expressed and envisioned in
the Act of Chapultepec, to provide collective self-defense yet remain
within the United Nations framework. '4
The principal debate upon this provision at the UNCIO occurred in
commission III, committee 4 and subcommittee 111/4/A.' 4 7 Provisions for
regional arrangements had appeared in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals as
section C of chapter VIII, but made no reference or provision for general
collective self-defense efforts by such entities. 48
146. GOODRICH & HAMBRO, supra note 131, at 175-83.
147. See generally 12 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 663-866 (1945).
148. The Dumbarton Oaks proposal read as follows:
Section C. Regional Arrangements. 1. Nothing in the Charter should preclude the
existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to
the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional
action, provided such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with
the purposes and principles of the Organization. The Security Council should
encourage settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such
regional agencies, either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from
the Security Council.
2. The Security Council should, where appropriate, utilize such arrangements or
agencies for enforcement action under its authority, but no enforcement action should
be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization
of the Security Council.
3. The Security Council should at all times be kept fully informed of activities
undertaken or in contemplation under the regional arrangements or by regional
agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.
Dumbarton Oaks Proposal, Doc. 1, 3 U.N.CI.O. Docs 18-19 (1945).
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The provision reflecting self-defense was a new paragraph
recommended for inclusion by the unanimous vote of subcommittee
111/4/A to committee 111/4. '49 That new paragraph read as follows:
Nothing in this Charter (shall) impair(s) the inherent right
of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack
occurs against a member (of the United Nations) state,
until the Security Council has taken (the) measures
necessary to maintain international peace and security.
Measures taken in the exercise of self-defense shall be
immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not
in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the
Security Council under this Chapter to take such action as
it (may) deem(s) necessary in order to maintain or restore
international peace and security.ln°
The subcommittee was unanimous in recommending this text to the
committee.'"' At its fourth meeting committee 111/4 considered the
recommendations of the subcommittee.- 2  The new paragraph was
approved unanimously."
Debate, as there was on this provision, is instructive for what it
did not reflect: there was no evident intent to change the pre-existent self-
defensive regime notwithstanding the usage of the term armed attack nor
any indication that a state's right to self-defense was extinguished at any
time prior to the existence of a peace available to be maintained by the
Security Council.
As the discussion below reflects, however, there was provision for the use of force by the
European states against the enemy states outside the Security Council context, which precipitated
much of the debate.
149. Interim Report To Committee 111/4 by Subcommittee III/4/A on the Amalgamation of
Amendment, Dr. V.K. Wellington Koo, Doc. 533, 12 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 533, 848 (1945)
[hereinafter Interim Report/533].
150. Id. at 849. The words in parenthesis reflect changes, either additions or deletions, that
were made in the proposal and reflected in the final article. The only modification that would
appear to have substantive implications is the deletion of the word from its place immediately
preceding measures necessary in the first sentence.
151. Id., at 849. Issue was joined concerning the proper placement of the article within the
Dumbarton Oaks proposal. Id. This debate was more heated and extensive than that concerning
the text of the article itself. See Summary Report of Fourth Meeting of Committee 111/4, Doc.
576, 12 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 682-84 (1945) [hereinafter Committee 111/4, Doc. 576]; Draft Report
of Dr. V.K. Wellington Koo, Rapporteur of Committee 111/4, to Commission III, Doc. 891, 12
U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 724 (1945) [hereinafter Committee 111/4, Doc. 891].
152. Committee 111/4, Doc. 576, supra note 152, at 679.
153. Id. at 680.
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The discussion reflects, in pertinent part, the following:
In connection with this decision, the Chairman, speaking
as the Delegate of Columbia, made the following
statement:
The Latin American Countries understood, as Senator
Vandenberg had said that the origin of the term 'collective
self-defense' is identified with the necessity of preserving
regional systems like the Inter-American one. The
Charter, in general terms, is a constitution, and it
legitimizes the right of collective self-defense to be carried
out in accord with the regional pacts so long as they are
not opposed to the purposes and principles of the
Organization as expressed in the Charter. If a group of
countries with regional ties declare their solidarity for their
mutual defense, as in the case of the American states, they
will undertake such defense jointly if and when one of
them is attacked. And the right of defense is not limited to
the country which is the direct victim of aggression but
extends to those countries which have established
solidarity, through regional arrangements, with the country
directly attacked. This is the typical case of the American
system. The Act of Chapultepec provides for the
collective defense of the hemisphere and established that if
an American nation is attacked all the rest consider
themselves attacked. Consequently, such action as they
may take to repel aggression, authorized by the article
which was discussed in the subcommittee yesterday, is
legitimate for all of them. Such action would be in accord
with the Charter, by the approval of the article, and a
regional arrangement may take action, provided it does not
have improper purposes as, for example, joint aggression
against another state. From this, it may be deduced that
the approval of this article implies that the Act of
Chapultepec is not in contravention of the Charter.
The Delegates of Mexico, Costa Rica, Paraguay,
Venezuela, Chile, Ecuador, Bolivia, Panama, Uruguay,
Peru, Guatemala, El Salvador, Brazil, Honduras, and
Cuba associated themselves with this statement ....
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The Delegate of Argentina associated himself with the
statement of the Chairman ....
The Delegate of France expressed his desire to give
utterance to the voice of Europe amidst the general concert
of the Latin American nations. In his opinion, the formula
approved by the Committee extended in general to cases of
mutual assistance against aggression.
The Delegate of Czechoslovakia expressed his satisfaction
that the text approved effectively reconciled the right of
self-defense, individual, and collective, with the
maintenance of a central authority capable of dealing with
the problems of security as they arose.
The Delegate of Egypt observed that the principle involved
in the new text should certainly extend to the League of
Arab States. The delegate for Australia said that, in
supporting the amendment, . . . the phrase "individual or
collective security" was regarded by the Australian
Delegation as sufficiently wide to cover that part of the
Australian amendment referring to the right of the parties,
in certain circumstances, to adopt necessary measures to
maintain international peace and security in accordance
with any arrangements consistent with the Charter. 154
The Delegate of New Zealand expressed apprehension lest
regional arrangements tend to produce conflict between
regional groups. His delegation attached primary
importance to the supremacy of the world Organization.
155
During the discussion on the operation and interaction between the
provisions concerning pacific settlement of disputes, regional arrangements
and the Security Council, the Chairman of Committee 111/4 stated:
[I]f at any time an armed attack should ensue, that is, an
aggression against a state which is a member of a regional
group, self-defense, whether individual or collective,
154. Reference to security was subject to a subsequent Corrigendum noted at 12 U.N.C.I.O.
Doc. 689 (1945).
155. Committee 111/4, Doc. 576, supra note 152, at 680-82.
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exercised as an inherent right, shall operate automatically
within the provisions of the Charter, until such time as the
Security Council may take appropriate punitive measures
against the aggressor state.
In the case of the American states, an aggression against
one American state constitutes an aggression against all
the American states, and all of them exercise their right of
legitimate defense by giving support to the state attacked,
in order to repel such aggression. This is what is meant by
the right of collective self-defense. ' -6
No challenge, repudiation or objection was noted in the travaux to
this view.' 7  There is, consequently, no evidence in these recorded
discussions of any debate on or intent to include norms in the Charter to
compromise, change or impact upon the pre-existent prohibition on the use
of armed force and the correlative right to self-defense.
There is, however, additional documentation reflecting discussion
during the San Francisco Conference amongst members of the United
States delegation, the other sponsoring states and France, as well as other
national representatives, outside the reported subcommittee and committee
meetings that are crucial to an understanding of events and decisions that
occurred during the Conference and are, thus, highly relevant to assessing
the content, definition and intent behind article 2(4), the self-defense
entitlement in article 51 and the role of the Security Council.
For the United States delegation, discussion on self-defense arose
early, in connection with consideration of that provision of the Dumbarton
Oaks proposals that would find final form as article 2(4). On April 26,
1945, discussion at the 18th meeting of the United States Delegation
reflects concern over a proposed amendment to chapter II, 4 of the
Dumbarton Oaks proposals. 58  That proposed amendment read: "[a]ll
members of the organization shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the
purposes and principles of the Organization and the provisions of the
Charter. "59
156. Id. at 685-87 (emphasis added).
157. Id. at 684-88.
158. 1 Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers (1945), General: The
United Nations (1967), at 425-29 [hereinafter Foreign Relations of the United States ]. The
original proposal appears at note 133.
159. Foreign Relations of the United States, supra note 159, at 426. The delegation decided
against supporting this amendment, preferring the original language. Id. at 427.
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Senator Vandenberg said he "was nervous about the problem of
self-defense in view of the long arguments that had occurred in the Senate
when the Kellogg-Briand Pact came up. The Foreign Relations Committee
of the Senate had never been willing to yield until a reservation on the
subject of self-defense was made." 10
The question was posed why it would not be advisable to include
the qualification about self-defense in the Charter, as there was concern
that if no mention was made in the Charter, the Senate would make a
reservation. Mr. Stassen specifically asked what would be the
disadvantage of including an explicit statement in the Charter that "nothing
in the Charter takes away the right of self-defense."'
As ultimately approved, article 2(4) contained no explicit reference
to self-defense. The Committee of five recommended that the Dumbarton
Oaks proposal be amended by the inclusion of an Australian amendment
adding the language "against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any member or state."6 2 Described as a statement
regarding the preservation against external aggression of the territorial
integrity and political independence of members, Dean Gildersleeve, the
United States delegate to the relevant Committee, pointed out the
importance of this provision to the smaller nations who wanted this
specification to make them feel more secure. Additionally, approval of
this amendment needed to be considered against a New Zealand
amendment seeking to guarantee territorial integrity that was receiving
considerable backing. 163
Although an explicit reference to self-defense was not inserted into
article 2(4), the issue was far from dead. It resurfaced in the course of the
extended debates on regional arrangements and the use of armed force
from which article 51 ultimately resulted. In fact, the central figures in the
process by which self-defense became the means to resolve the problem of
regional arrangement authority, were those who had earlier suggested
including a specific reservation of the right to self-defense in the Charter
itself.
Extensive documentation exists on the drafting history of article 51
in the United States Foreign Relations documents. Recourse to these
materials has a special significance in this particular area, as it was the
160. Foreign Relations of the United States, supra note 159, at 426-27. Vandenberg
repeatedly voiced concern about Senate ratification were no express reservation of the right of
self-defense was included in the Charter. Id. at 594.
161. Id. at 428.
162. Id. at 747.
163. Id. at 726.
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United States that bore the task of accommodating the desires of the Latin
American States to the demands of the other sponsoring powers and
participating states. As events reflect that what became article 51 was
adopted by the Subcommittee and Committee without amendment in the
form presented to them by Senator Vandenberg, the drafting efforts and
negotiations that preceded the submission of the proposal offer invaluable
insight.
On May 4, 1945, the United States delegates met and discussed the
problem concerning the relationship of the security provisions of the
general organization to hemispheric defense, particularly in relation to
Chapter VIII, Section C, of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals dealing with
regional arrangements.' According to these provisions, no enforcement
action could be undertaken by a regional organization without the
authorization of the Security Council.'"6 The Dumbarton Oaks proposals
contained no agreement on voting arrangements.'" That agreement,
subsequently reached at Yalta, provided for the veto power. Such, it was
feared, could render regional action subject to the veto of any one state. 1 6,
In commentary, Senator Vandenberg noted that the proposals "spelled the
end of the Monroe Doctrine."'" As French and Soviet proposals provided
that action in Europe could be taken under bilateral treaty without any
intervention or authorization by the Security Council it was, therefore,
considered "extremely important to protect our concept of preclusive
rights in this hemisphere." 6 9
Delegate Stassen was noted to comment:
[i]t was essential to permit the Security Council to
authorize enforcement action .... On the other hand, we
retained the essential right of self-defense. We could act if
we were attacked, but we then would have to begin
immediately presenting to the Security Council what we
were doing in our own defense. 170
Senator Vandenberg, again recalling the debates on self-defense
that occurred in connection with the Kellogg-Briand Pact, asked whether
there was any way to express the right to self-defense which was claimed
164. Id. at 588-97. The initial Dumbarton Oaks Proposal appears supra note 148.
165. Foreign Relations of the United States, supra note 159, at 591.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 592.
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as inherent, yet not throw the door open to individual action. In response,
Mr. Stassen noted that there should be no effort to define the right of self-
defense because "to define it simply raised the question as to what
constitutes self-defense." 171
Excerpts of a report from the Acting United States Secretary of
State to Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics provide a
brief overview of events during the San Francisco Conference through
mid-May 1945, concerning the evolving regional organization conundrum.
The question of the relation of regional arrangements to the international
organization passed through two phases at the San Francisco Conference.
In the first phase it was raised by the Russians, with the strong
support of the French and the tacit support of the British, in relation to the
bilateral pacts negotiated among European states and directed against
enemy states in the present war. To this [a Soviet amendment to Chapter
VIII, Section C, of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposal] the United States
presented a counterproposal to which the Soviets, after considerable
debate, finally agreed. That counterproposal read as follows:
No enforcement action should be taken under regional
arrangements or by regional agencies without the
authorization of the Security Council with the exception of
measures against enemy states in this war provided for
pursuant to Chapter XII, Paragraph 2, or, in regional
arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy
on the part of such states, until such time as the
organization may, by consent of the governments
concerned, be charged with the responsibility for
preventing further aggression by a state now at war with
the United Nations ....
An indirect result of the presentation of this four power
amendment was unfortunately to open the second phase of
the problem of regional arrangements at the conference by
giving a considerable number of the Latin American
delegations the impression that European regional
arrangements were being removed from the control of the
Security Council whereas the much older and better-
established regional system of the Western Hemisphere
would be subjected to the domination of the Council.
They were particularly fearful that, in view of the veto
171. Foreign Relations of the United States, supra note 159, at 593.
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power exercised by each of the permanent members of the
Council, a non-American state would be able to prevent
enforcement action of any kind under the Act of
Chapultepec ....
The United States delegation found itself faced by most
difficult alternatives ....
Various compromises were discussed. The Australians
and the French suggested that it might be possible to
authorize enforcement action under regional arrangements
if the Security Council in a particular case did not find
itself able to agree upon effective action on its own
account.'7
[t]he American delegation finally came to the
conclusion that the best solution lay in an explicit statement
in the charter of that inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense ....
Credit for re-framing the issue from one of exempting the Western
Hemispheric regional arrangement to that of self-defense would apparently
go to Mr. Stassen who had, in connection with article 2(4), previously
suggested the advisability of an explicit reference to self-defense in the
Charter.
Stassen's idea was presented at the 35th meeting of the United
States delegates on May 10, 1945. Notes of that meeting reflect:
Mr. Stassen stated that he had another idea in
connection with the regional question ....
[He] pointed out that he had heard over and over
again that the basic objection to the present plan was the
inability of a regional organization to act in the event of an
arbitrary veto of one of the major powers. He said that he
had come to the conclusion that it might be best to spell
172. A French amendment to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals that received much support
read: "Should the Council not succeed in reaching a decision, the members of the organization
reserve to themselves the right to act as they may consider necessary in the interests of peace,
right and justice." U.N.C.I.O., supra note 133, at 385. It is important to note that this
approach, which would hinge a state's self-defensive actions to Security Council inaction, was
ultimately rejected.
173. Foreign Relations of the United States, supra note 159, at 831-34.
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out in the Charter the right of self-defense, in order to
meet the recurrent criticism on this question.
Mr. Stassen then read the following memorandum:
'Memorandum to U.S. Delegates and Advisors'
On the basis of suggestions and discussions these past few
days with a number of our delegates and advisors it
appears to me that the following would be the best answer
to our regional problems and it would at the same time
meet other problems ....
VI-E Self-Defense
1. Nothing in this Charter shall be construed as abrogating
the inherent right of self-defense against a violator of this
Charter .... 74
By 2:30 p.m. the next afternoon, a new draft article was presented
for discussion at the United States delegation meeting.1 75 The draft to be
added was a new paragraph 12 to Chapter VIII, Section B. It provided:
In the event of an attack by any state against any member
state, such member possesses the right to take measures of
self-defense. The right to take measures of self-defense
against armed attack shall apply to arrangements, like
those embodied in the Act of Chapultepec, under which all
members of a group of states agree to consider an attack
against any one of them as an attack against all of them.
The taking of such measures shall not affect the authority
and responsibility of the Security Council under this
Charter to take at any time such action as it may deem
necessary in order to maintain or restore international
peace and security.",
During discussion on that draft within the United States delegation,
Senator Connally asked whether the Security Council could take
cognizance of a situation in which there had been an attack followed by a
counterattack by other states acting in self-defense. After receiving an
affirmative answer, Mr. Dulles noted that states were, however, not
174. Id. at 658-60.
175. Id. at 663-64.
176. Id. at 664, 674.
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obligated to discontinue their countermeasures taken in self-defense.
Rather, there was "concurrent power."'"
Senator Vandenberg pointed out a bit of potential confusion with
the use of and distinction between the term attack in the first sentence and
the term armed attack in the second. Mr. Dulles explained it was done
deliberately to maintain consistency with the usage of the Monroe Doctrine
which covers two situations, overt attack and "political efforts from
outside the continent to effect the overthrow of the political institutions of
the American Republics."178
A drafting change was suggested by Mr. Pasvolsky (State
Department) to insert the word inherent before the phrase right to self-
defense.'7'9  Additionally, the words "be reported immediately to the
Security Council" and "shall not in any way" were to be added before the
phrase "affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council."1lw
According to Senator Connally, "it was clear that this addition did not
mean that the attacked states should stop fighting before the necessary
countermeasures were taken by the world organization. ""'
The British and French objected to the draft as written. The
United States delegation worked out a compromise reflecting an earlier
French draft that hinged unilateral action upon the lack of a decision by the
Security Council.1 2 That draft read:
[s]hould the Security Council not succeed in preventing
aggression, and should aggression occur by any state
against any member state, such member state possesses the
inherent right to take necessary measures for self-defense.
The right to take such measures for self-defense against
armed attack shall also apply to understandings or
arrangements like those embodied in the Act of
Chapultepec, under which all members of a group of states
agree to consider an attack against any one of them as an
attack against all of them. The taking of such measures
shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and
shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility
177. Id. at 666.
178. Id. at 677.
179. Foreign Relations of the United States, supra note 159, at 670. The word was added
without any apparent debate on the connotation, intent, meaning, or implication of the insertion.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 683. See also supra note 172.
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of the Security Council under this charter to take at any
time such action as it may deem necessary in order to
maintain or restore international peace and security. 83
When this draft was presented at the third Five-Power Informal
Consultative Meeting on May 12, 1945, the British reacted very
unfavorably.'1 Representatives of the United Kingdom and the United
States met to attempt to resolve differences. In the course of that effort,
Mr. Dulles noted that "the United States proposal attempted to define
aggression in terms of 'armed attack' and in this way it was hoped to avoid
the problem of trying to define aggression as such."1 85  In reply, Sir
Alexander Cadogen repeated his belief that "the Security Council should
have the opportunity to determine the circumstances of an armed attack
without trying to write any such close definition into the provisions. "186
183. Foreign Relations of the United States, supra note 159, at 834. Nowhere in the
discussion of the United States delegation was there any particular attention paid to the use of and
any necessary distinctions to be made between the terms aggression, armed attack, or attack even
though all three were included in the draft. One intriguing question that went unanswered was
that of Mr. Bloom who inquired whether the intent was to include the threat of aggression or
merely actual aggression. Id. at 679.
184. Id. at 691-98. Mr. Eden's challenge was not on the question of what armed attack
meant, but his fear of regionalism impairing the effectiveness of an international organization.
Id. at 695-96. In expressing his intense dislike, Eden did note that no one had been able to define
aggression in 30 years. Id. at 692. The only discussion of armed attack arose when Mr. Stassen,
explaining sentence two of the draft, said "the right of collective or group action comes into
operation in the event of an armed attack." Within the context, the obvious implication is an
effort to clarify that armed force was to be available to confront armed not unarmed force.
To Eden's protestations that the proposal empowered regional organization action outside
the sway of the Security Council, Senator Connally noted:
The United States proposal was not greatly at variance with the Anglo-Soviet and the
Franco-Soviet treaties. Under these treaties, as in the case of the Act of Chapultepec,
an attack against one is treated as an attack against all parties to the agreement. In both
cases the treaties were aimed at resistance to armed aggression. The United States
draft enlarges the scope but not the principle of the exception already agreed upon with
respect to Chapter VIII, Section C, Paragraph 2.
Id. at 694.
Stassen went on to note:
[The] United States draft would not give the regional organization freedom of action.
It was not as broad as . . . Chapter VIII, Section C, Paragraph 2 [directed against the
renewal of aggression by the enemy states]. Under that formula the parties to the
treaties could take enforcement action against enemy states. Under the United States'
draft there is no right of enforcement. There is only the right of action in self-defense
against armed attack.
Foreign Relations of the United States, supra note 159, at 695.
185. Id. at 700.
186. Id.
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According to Dulles, it was not merely a question of an option for
Security Council action, rather it was a question of:
[T]he United States carrying forward within the world
organization its traditional policy of the Monroe Doctrine
as expanded and further defined in modern times; that the
Unites States now regards an attack on any of the
American Republic as an attack upon the United States and
in that event, the United States wished to exercise
collectively, its right to self-defense. 17
An alternate text was agreed upon and subsequently presented to the Five
Powers at another informal consultative meeting.' It read:
nothing in this Charter impairs the inherent right of self-
defense, either individual or collective, in the event that
the Security Council has failed to maintain international
peace and security and an armed attack against a member
state has occurred. Measures taken in the exercise of this
right shall be immediately reported to the Security Council
and shall not in any way affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security Council under this charter to
take at any time such action as it may deem necessary in
order to maintain or restore international peace and
security. ,19
Initially, all but the British seemed generally comfortable with the
proposal. Mr. Eden subsequently accepted the draft as it appears in the
main text. Ambassador Gromyko indicated this draft came closer to his
understanding of the principles and purposes of the organization, but
additional time to study it was necessary. The Chinese Ambassador (Koo),
reacted favorably, noting "out of this draft . . . we might be able to get
something ... acceptable." Mr. Bidault, the French representative, noted
"the draft said something that was self-evident. In case of aggression any
state has the right of self-defense.'10
187. Id. The discussants recalled Eden's point that "self-defense in modem Europe was a
difficult term to define, and that attempts to specify in the Charter those conditions under which
such self-defensive measures could be taken would raise many difficult issues." Id. At 703.
188. Id. at 705-07.
189. Foreign Relations of the United States, supra note 159, at 705.
190. Id. at 706.
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On May 14, the matter was taken up with the chiefs of the
principal Latin American delegates.' 9' Discussion focused on the apparent
deletion of any reference to the Act of Chapultepec in the proposed drafts.
None of the discussion related to the content of the inherent right nor to
the intended purpose or meaning of the term armed attack. Rather, it was
to assure the Latin American representatives that the Act of Chapultepec
and the regional organization would be viewed as consistent with the
Charter and, therefore, not subjected to prior approval by the Security
Council. '9
At the next Five Power Informal Consultative Meeting only one
minor change was made to proposed paragraph 12, the deletion of the
word fail in connection with Security Council action.' 9 The remainder of
the discussion dealt with other proposed changes concerning the operation
of the regional organizations themselves. 1'
At an executive session of the United States delegation held at
noon on Sunday, May 20, 1945, discussion turned to a new Russian draft
of paragraph 12.'19 It read:
[n]othing in this Charter impairs the inherent right of self-
defense, either individual or collective, if prior to
undertaking the measures for the maintenance of
international peace and security by the Security Council an
armed attack against a member state occurs. Measures
taken in the exercise of this right shall be immediately
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way
affect the authority and responsibility of the Security
191. Id. at 835.
192. Id. at 712-18. The attendees at that First Informal Consultative Meeting With
Chairman of Delegations of Certain American Republics, included the United States, Brazilian,
Chilean, Cuban, Colombian, Mexican, Peruvian, and Venezuelan delegations. This was the first
of three such informal consultative meetings with the Latin American diplomats held between
May 14-20, 1945. Id. at 712.
Their second meeting focused entirely on the questions concerning the Act of Chapultepec,
relating to a draft article under chapter VIII, section A, paragraph 3, not the provision relating to
self-defense which was denominated new paragraph 12, under chapter VIII, section B. Id. at
730-36.
193. Foreign Relations of the United States, supra note 159, at 737.
194. Id. at 737-39. Under discussion was the proposals on chapter VIII, section A,
paragraph 3, and section C. Id. The Russians were apparently concerned that collective action
could be taken on the basis of previous agreements. At the 44th meeting of the United States
delegation on May 17, 1945, Mr. Pasvolsky noted that to quell these concerns he "gave an
explanation of the Monroe Doctrine and the right of collective measures in defense." Id. at 778,
781-82.
195. Id. at 813-20.
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Council under this Charter to take at any time such action
as it may deem necessary in order to maintain or restore
international peace and security.1'9
Following additional discussion amongst members of the executive
group, a new draft was circulated.9 It read:
[niothing in this Charter impairs the inherent right of self-
defense, either individual or collective, if an armed attack
occurs against a member state before the Security Council
has taken adequate measures to maintain international
peace and security. Measures taken in the exercise of this
right shall be immediately reported to the Security Council
and shall not in any way affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security Council under this Charter to
take at any time such action as it may deem necessary in
order to maintain or restore international peace and
security. '"
Finally, a question was directed to the term armed attack.
Delegate Hackworth expressed the view that the draft greatly qualified the
right of self-defense by limiting it to the occasion of an armed attack. Mr.
Stassen replied that "this was intentional . . . we did not want. exercised
the right of self-defense before an armed attack had occurred."'"
196. Id. at 813.
197. See Foreign Relations of the United States, supra note 159, at 824..
198. Id. at 817.
199. Id. at 818. This comment was made in an executive session of the United States
delegation. Even assuming that the clear intent was to limit any armed response until after a first
strike, there is no reflection that this view was shared with and by any other state delegation.
Debate in the Subcommittee and Committee on this draft, which was ultimately approved and
included in the Charter, reflects no discussion on this question. Such a non-event can hardly
support the proposition that inclusion of the term constituted a new norm inserted with the intent
to create a new regime.
It still remains questionable whether Stassen's comment was not intended to differentiate
between an attack as referenced under the Monroe Doctrine and Act of Chapultepec. This could
well contemplate non-military attacks from military (armed) attacks rather than confining self-
defense to an armed response to a first strike which would, effectively, repudiate the pre-existing
regime under the Caroline Doctrine. To the contrary, the interchangeable reference to armed
attack and aggression in the Subcommittee and Committee discussions as well as the use of
aggression arnee in the equally authoritative French version of the Charter, strongly evidence a
focus on armed force in contradistinction to non-armed force rather than a first strike regime.
That no such new bright line test was intended is supported by the decision not to include a
definition of aggression in the Charter itself and the 50 year struggle to arrive at a definition of
aggression. For additional comments see STONE, supra note 72, at 72-73.
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In response to another question by the Subcommittee of Five, a
slightly modified draft was produced. At 6:00 p.m. that evening, it was
presented at the seventh Five-Power Informal Consultative Meeting on
Proposed Amendments.m As then formulated, the proposal read:
[n]othing in this Charter impairs the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack
occurs against a member state, until the Security Council
has taken the measures necessary to maintain (or restore)
international peace and security. Measures taken in the
exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way
affect the authority and responsibility of the Security
Council under this Charter to take at any time such action
as it may deem necessary in order to maintain or restore
international peace and security.20'
Subsequent discussion by the Five Powers reflected no discussion on the
term armed attack.
At 9:00 p.m. the next evening, this proposal was presented to the
Ambassadors of Certain American Republics.m "The Latin American
Ambassadors expressed enthusiastic support for these drafts and indicated
their appreciation of the efforts made by the United States delegation in
reaching these agreements. No dissent from the drafts was expressed."203
As discussed above, the record of discussion and passage in the
subcommittee or committee reflected no changes to this draft prior to
approval.2
From this record is there evidence that a new norm was intended
or had emerged? Specifically, does it appear to have been the widespread
understanding and intent that inclusion of the term armed attack in the
Charter was to effect a limitation or modification of the pre-existent norm
of self-defense by rendering impermissible an armed response until a state
had suffered a first strike?
200. Foreign Relations of the United States, supra note 159, at 818, 823-26. The reasons
for the modification concern use of the words "maintain or restore international peace and
security."
201. Id. at 823-24.
202. Id. at 825-26.
203. Id. at 826.
204. HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 42-47.
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Hardly. The record of proceedings in Subcommittee III/4/A and
Committee 4 clearly reflect no evident intent to do that," '  In fact,
throughout the discussion on article 51, in which armed attack is
mentioned, the delegates use of the term attack, armed attack, and
aggression interchangeably.2
The traditional self-defense right continues to exist outside what
may be a more restrictive standard under the Charter and contemplates
more than a response to a first strike appears recognized by the I.C.J. in
its Nicaragua decision.n7 As noted by Schachter, "in my view it is not
clear that article 51 was intended to eliminate the customary law right of
self-defense and should not be given the effect. "m
As there has been little apparent effective change in the states'
unilateral recourse to force, it would appear to be problematic to assume
that state practice manifests widespread recognition and acceptance of such
a normative change, reducing the sphere within which they can act in
armed self-defense. The change has been more linguistic than
substantive.210
If anything, the failure of the anticipated collective machinery
envisioned in the United Nations system and the evolving practice of
member state authorizations has reinforced the import and necessity of
individual and collective self-defense .2 1 As Dinstein suggests,
[a]s long as the Charter's scheme of collective security
fails to function adequately, states are left to their own
devices when confronted with an unlawful use of force.
Again and again, they invoke the right of (individual or
205. Foreign Relations of the United States, supra note 159, at 826. There was, however,
one statement by Mr. Stassen to Mr. Bloom, another United States delegate, during an executive
session, stating that it was the intent to have armed attack restricted to an attack that had
occurred. Assuming for the moment that it meant to eliminate the traditional content of self-
defense, which does not require the completion of a first strike, rather than narrowing the broad
sway of the Monroe Doctrine and the attack language of the Act of Chapultepec which could be
understood to contemplate unarmed as well as armed attack. The absence of any record of
multilateral discussion and agreement that such a restricted meaning of armed attack should
hardly support the notion of widespread understanding and acceptance that the term was intended
to limit self-defense.
206. HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 44-47.
207. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 134, paras. 175-90, 193-94 (June 27). See also supra note 58.
208. Oscar Schacter, International Law: The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH.
L. REV. 1620, 1634 (1984).
209. DINSTEIN, supra note 21, at 310.
210. Id.
211. Id.
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collective) self-defense in response to an armed attack.
Thus, instead of being a provisional interlude pending the
exercise of collective security, self-defense . . . has
virtually taken the place of collective security. The very
'centre of gravity in the United Nations has swung from
article 39 to article 51.'212
Schacter, too, notes: "[w]e are bound to conclude that the
collective security system of the United Nations Charter has now been
largely replaced by the fragmented collective defense actions and alliances
founded on article 51. "213
VII. What is the Relationship Between a State's Inherent Right of
Self-Defense and Security Council Action?
What was the intended relationship between the authority of states
to engage in armed self-defense and the authority of the Security Council
to undertake measures in the case of such occurrences?
The Charter scheme for this interplay reflects and confirms the jus
cogens status of the regime. This result obtains as the Charter clearly
reflects that the exercise of this right is immune from derogation or
interference by the Security Council. The focus here is on that portion of
article 51 whereby a state's inherent right to self-defense continues "until
the Security Council takes measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security. "214
That a state's right to engage in self-defense is not dependent upon
the action or inaction of the Security Council is clear from an examination
of the evolution of article 51. No consideration of this question appears in
the reported subcommittee or committee discussions on article 51
published in the multi-volume UNCIO report .2 1  However, as with the
other aspects of article 51, there was discussion of this question by the
Five Powers prior to the finalization of article 51 in the form in which it
212. Id.
213. Schachter, supra note 209, at 1639.
214. There is a second component to Security Council authority in article 51 which reads:
Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence . . . shall not
in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the
present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to
maintain or restore international peace and security.
U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
As discussed below, this applies concurrently with, not instead of, the exercise of self-defense.
215. See generally supra notes 42-47 and 147.
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was submitted to and unanimously approved by Subcommittee 111/4/A and
Committee 4.216
A Russian draft, examined in an executive session of the United
States delegation on May 20, 1945, was understood to preclude
interference with a state's exercise of self-defense "during the period
elapsing between the attack and the time the Security Council takes
adequate measures to restore international peace and security. " 217
A question arose amongst the Committee of five whether the
phrase maintain or restore and maintain international peace and security
was more appropriate, given that an attack constituted a breach of the
peace.218 During discussion, the view was expressed and agreed upon that
the right of self-defense continued until such time as the Security Council
took effective action. 19 That discussion, resulted in the production of the
draft presented at the seventh Five-Power Informal Consultative Meeting
on Proposed Amendments. 0
Discussion on this draft by the five delegations focused on only
one issue: whether to include the term restore. The British urged
retention of the term to reflect that the right of self-defense should continue
during the period of restoration as well as up to the point at which the
Security Council was taking action to restore the peace.2' The United
States accepted the elimination of the term although it was quite willing to
have it retained.2n The Soviet delegation thought the term maintain
encompassed the term restore rendering it unnecessary. To this Lord
Halifax replied, "you can't maintain what isn't there."22 The Chinese
delegation preferred retaining the term.- Ultimately, the British ceded
their concern in the interests of not splitting the delegation, although it was
216. As indicated above, the drafting of article 51 was effected by the Five Powers in
consultation with representatives of some Latin American Republics. Once the language was
agreed upon, the article which was submitted for consideration by the subcommittee and
committee, was approved without amendment or modification. See generally supra notes 47-59.
Consequently, this drafting history is especially illuminating and relevant.
217. Id. at 816-17.
218. Foreign Relations of the United States, supra note 159, at 818.
219. Id. at 817.
220. Id. at 823-26.
221. Id. at 824.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Foreign Relations of the United States, supra note 159, at 824.
225. Id.
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more logical to retain the term.2 6 All agreed to the term maintain. The
plan was for the text to go to Committee the next day without the term
restore.*28 The Soviet Government was to be informed of the three to five
agreement on the utility of including the term. 9 However, if the Soviet
government did not agree on its inclusion, Lord Halifax would not press
the issue.2" No discussion is reflected at that meeting on the term armed
attack.
There was no discord, question or comment made on this language
by the ambassadors of the American Republics or the members of the
Subcommittee and Committee who reviewed it prior to its unanimous
approval.23'
The travaux, then, confirm the place for unilateral armed self-
defense within the Charter system; the right was to remain unimpaired
during the restoration phase. There are no contrary or countervailing
indications in the reported discussions of the subcommittee or committee
that even suggested any other intent or interpretation.
The structure intended under article 51 contemplated two
responses in the event of an armed conflict between states. The Security
Council is empowered to take any measures against the aggressor state(s)
in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Simultaneously, the victim state retains its right to engage in armed force
for self-defense. 2  Presumably, had the United Nations available to it the
intended police force, the actions of the victim state in self-defense and the
United Nations in collective security would be consistent, complementary,
and co-existent.
The drafting history reflects the clear de-linkage between self-
defense and actions by the Security Council. " To avoid the suggestion
that the Security Council remained completely disempowered to act while
a state was engaged in armed self-defense, the second sentence of article
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Foreign Relations of the United States, supra note 159, at 824.
231. See generally supra notes 42-47, 57, 59-60, 190.
232. This obviously puts the obligation upon the Security Council to make a determination
of aggression and responsibility. That it may refuse or be unable to do so, given the veto system
and the political dynamic, was the impetus for the concern of the Latin American states that
found eventual resolution through explicit reservation of the right to self-defense. See supra
notes 51-52.
233. See supra notes 57-58, 172. concerning the French proposal and other drafts pegging
unilateral action to Security Council inaction. All these were jettisoned in the drafting process.
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51 was added.2 14  Clearly, the Security Council must remain fully
empowered to act against an aggressor.
The second phase would begin once peace had been restored,
when the focus would shift to its maintenance. At that point, there would
no longer be any necessity for self-defense. Unilateral armed efforts in
self-defense would not be permissible and would be subject to Security
Council mandate as there would be no existent threat or use of force.
Reflecting on the relationship between a state's self-defensive
rights and the legitimacy, propriety, and authority of Security Council
action, Dinstein, notes:
[t]he modes of action open to the Council are manifold.
Inter alia, the Council can .. .insist on the cessation of
the unilateral action of the defending state, supplanting it
with measures of collective security ... or ... decide that
the state engaged in a so-called self-defense is in reality the
aggressor. rn
Eugene Rostow states the situation even more explicitly:
[w]hat the Charter prescribes . .. [is] that the aggrieved
state and its friends and allies may decide for themselves
when to exercise their rights of individual and collective
defense until peace is restored or the Security Council, by
its own affirmative vote, decides that self-defense has gone
too far and has become a threat to the peace.236
VIII. What are the Implications for Enforcement Actions Imposed by
the Security Council?
Effectuating the Charter goal of preventing international armed
conflict was not, then, to have been at the expense of a state's pre-existent
234. SCHOCHTER, supra note 214.
235. Emphasis added. DINSTEIN, supra note 21, at 207. The absence of such collective
security capability would obviously eliminate the basis for such interference by the Security
Council in the unilateral action by the defending state. Theoretically, the Security Council could
announce a multilateral cease-fire. If enforceable and enforced to end hostilities between
opposing states, this would not necessarily interfere with self-defense.
236. Eugene V. Rostow, The Gulf Crisis in International Law and Foreign Relations Law,
Continued: Until What? Enforcement Action or Collective Self-Defense, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 506,
510 (1991). In support of his thesis, Rostow refers to D.W. Bowett's rejection of the view that
Security Council consideration of a conflict can effectively be deemed to suspend the injured
party's rights of self-defense. Rather, for Bowett, the aggrieved state may act even in conflict
with the Security Council. Id. at 511.
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right to engage in armed self-defense. No interference with a state's
inherent right to defend itself was intended because Security Council action
is not authorized until there is a peace to be maintained.
What implications does this regime have upon the authority of the
Security Council to undertake binding measures against states engaged in
armed self-defense? Is the Security Council empowered to undertake any
measures it deems appropriate in efforts to resolve an ongoing armed
conflict? Dinstein suggests:
[a]pparently it is not enough (under article 51) for the
Security Council to adopt just any resolution, in order to
divest member states of the right to continue to resort to
force in self-defense against an armed attack. The only
resolution that will engender that result is a legally binding
decision, whereby the cessation of the (real or imagined)
defensive action becomes imperative. Short of such a
measure, the member state engaged in self-defense is not
obligated to desist from the use of force. However, the
defending state still acts at its own risk, perhaps more so
than before. Continued hostilities may precipitate a
decision by the Council against a self proclaimed victim of
an armed attack.37
This author suggests that if such action interferes with a state's
inherent right of armed self-defense, it implicates jus cogens.
Consequently, not even the Security Council can institute measures that
prevent a state from availing itself of that right as the state sees fit.238
The strictures of jus cogens and its effect is not limited solely to
conflict between a peremptory norm and the prohibition or invalidation of
a treaty. 3 9  Rather, as clearly expressed by the ILC in its 1966
commentary: "a rule of jus cogens is an overriding rule depriving any act
237. DINSTEIN, supra note 21, at 208-09. The earlier version of his book had the following
as the concluding portion of that sentence: "[That a breach of international peace has been
committed, thus laying the ground for the introduction of enforcement action." Id. at 196-97.
For the one qualification, imperative, Dinstein cites to C.H.M.Waldock, The Regulation of
the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law, 81 R.C.C.D.I. 451, 495-96 (1952).
238. A state's unilateral decision to engage in self-defense remains, however, subject to
review by the international community through, for example, the political or legal branches of the
United Nations organization and application of the traditional requirements: necessity and
proportionality.
239. HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 6.
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or situation which is in conflict with it of legality. "m The effect of a jus
cogens violation extends to acts and renders them unlawful .14 The
outcome of a jus cogens regime, then, is the comprehensive prohibition of
all acts contrary to the peremptory norm implicated. 242
Additionally, pertinent evidence exists in state practice,
international jurisprudence and doctrine that the prohibition of derogation
which is a component of the article 53 definition of jus cogens, is to be
understood to prohibit any acts conflicting with a given norm.23
The clear import of the preceding analysis is to suggest that
binding measures imposed by the Security Council that interfere with a
victim state's inherent right to engage in armed self-defense, even if such
are equally imposed upon the aggressor state, violates jus cogens. Such
measures are nullities which no state can be compelled to comply with,
without itself engaging in an agreement and acts that violate the most
widely recognized and fundamental peremptory norm for the maintenance
of world order."
To the extent that this inherent right of self-defense is a
peremptory norm, not even the Security Council can institute mandatory
measures such as an arms embargo, imposed on all the reputed parties to
an ongoing armed conflict, as such effectively undermines the ability of a
240. Emphasis added. Int'l L. Comm'n Report, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev.1, p. 89 (1966).
This comment was made in connection with draft article 61, which became article 64 in the final
text (conflict with newly emerging norms).
241. Id.
242. Id. The logic is clear. Without this expansive coverage, peremptory norms would be
rendered meaningless as states need only avoid including problematic provisions in treaty form to
remain empowered to act in derogation of jus cogens. Id. Allowing such an end run around jus
cogens would undermine the fundamental policy for such norms: ensuring that certain norms,
considered essential for world public order, that protect vital interests and values of the
international community of states, not merely the interests of some, remain inviolate.
HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4.
243. HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 7. He notes that this interpretation is consistent with
the presumed purpose of international jus cogens: to protect the international community from all
acts contrary to peremptory norms. id.
Because peremptory norms protect overriding interests and values of the international
community, states owe peremptory obligations to that community not to individual states. One
such obligation erga omnes, in the protection of which all states can be held to have a legal
interest, as such is necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security, is the
prohibition of the use of aggressive force between states. Barcelona Traction, supra note 58, at
32. See also HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 5.
244. Even were there evidence in the Charter travaux that states intended to surrender their
otherwise more extensive rights to engage in self-defense to the international organization,
anticipating a global police force to confront aggression in their stead, the failure of the bargain
or arrangement to have occurred would render such self-defensive entitlements necessary.
STONE, supra note 72, at 96, 100-01.
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victim state to engage in self-defense and, thereby, prevents a state from
availing itself of that right. While any state remains free to choose not to
supply arms, a mandatory prohibition violates jus cogens.
While some may suggest that this implicates a regime whereby the
use of force is unrestrained and, therefore, antithetical to the intended
United Nations Charter regime, that is not quite the scenario. Other legal
requirements still remain relevant. For example, states remain obligated to
pursue pacific settlement before using force, to support the claimed
necessity for engaging in self-defense and comply with Charter
obligations. 5 Ultimately, if the determination is made that a state,
claiming to be acting in self-defense is found not to be by the Security
Council, it remains empowered to call such continuing actions threats to
the peace or aggression and institute enforcement measures accordingly.
These same options exist if a state's reputed self-defensive measures fail to
comply with the customary restrictions in that they are neither necessary or
proportionate.24 In the final analysis, recognition of the peremptory status
of a states right to engage in armed self-defense does not signal the end of
the Charter system for the regulation of the interstate use of armed force.
Rather, recognition of the status which self-defense was to hold from the
outset, merely returns to the original framework.
That the envisioned Security Council force has not come to pass,
necessitates recognition that unilateral self-defense remains essential to
confront the threat to world welfare posed by armed aggressors. This
social concern in preventing and confronting aggression is the final
justification to confirm the jus cogens status of the traditional self-defense
regime. Given the incapacity of the United Nations to field its multilateral
force, the only remaining option is that of a state victim, and others
responding to its call, to confront that armed aggression by armed force.
The use of force regime proposed herein, which includes the right
to engage in armed self-defense, protects an overriding interest or value in
the international community of states. That community would be seriously
jeopardized by derogation therefrom. Rather than producing any negative
evidence, this regime remains, however regrettable, affirmatively
245. While it must be noted that pacific measures can not be imposed in derogation of a
state's jus cogens entitlement to use self-defense, whether or not recourse has been had thereto
may be highly relevant to a determination that such self-defensive measures were not necessary,
246. While a sanction, such as an arms embargo might be imposed at this juncture, that
does not legitimize doing so earlier, while a victim state is engaged in self-defense. As
demonstrated by the Nicaragua litigation, the I.C.J. may have a place in this regulatory process
as well.
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necessary. Consequently, the peremptory status of the norm may be
presumed.241
247. This is the fifth criteria suggested by Hannikainen. HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at
12-13.
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I. Two PROVERBS AND INTRODUCTION
The thesis of this article is that the commonality of challenges
facing both inter-governmental negotiators and international business
negotiators is more predominant than the differences in these two
situations. The importance of recognition of this commonality is due to the
prevalent interchangeability between diplomats and actors in the business
world, the closer identification between international politics and
international economics, and the need for formulating courses in
negotiation from which both the diplomat and the business person would
draw nearly equal benefits.
In the course of the research, two proverbs were discovered which
are used here as a prologue to the body of this article. The wisdom
conveyed by these proverbs, which underlie the entire purpose of
negotiation, is of equal benefit to both the governmental negotiator and the
private intercontinental transactional negotiator. The first of the two
proverbs is a Kikuyu (African) adage which states: "To be hard does not
mean to be hard as a stone, and to be soft does not mean to be soft as
* Adjunct Professor of Law, Cardozo School of Law. The author is an attorney at
Spector & Feldman in New York City. He was formerly a Principal Officer of the United
Nations.
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water."' The other is a common Chinese proverb which is highly
applicable to the two different contexts of negotiation, however, it is non-
attributable. This proverb states: From listening comes wisdom, and from
speaking, repentance.
Before proceeding to the presentation and analysis of the shared
concerns of both the inter-goyernmental negotiator and the transnational
business negotiator, reference should be made to the main differences
between the contexts within which these two actors operate. For case of
reference, this article uses the shorthand of diplomat (D) and business
person (B) within the arena of international negotiations. One of the
essential differences between D and B is that the former, as a
representative of sovereignty, has a pressure tool which is unavailable to B
as a negotiator. 2 That tool is the "mobilization of domestic political
support." 3 However, B is endowed with an advantage that D does not
have in most negotiating situations, B can proceed with negotiations
without having to let the public in on it. B's secrecy cannot, under most
circumstances, be called into question, while D, especially in democratic
societies, "cannot develop a negotiating position on a major issue without
letting the public in on some of the internal controversies. "4
Nonetheless, an advantage accrues to D, which generally is either
irrelevant or unavailable to B, the availability of international force and
institutions for settling of controversies. The United States, for example,
can resort to the United Nations Security Council as a means of putting
pressure on the Haitian military government; but a United States business
person cannot use this instrumentality in negotiations with a Haitian
counterpart.
The pendulum of advantages swings again in the direction of B
over D in a very important respect in the analysis of differences between
these two international actors. When B enters in negotiation with his/her
counterpart, the intent is certainly to reach a mutually-agreed settlement if
at all possible. This certainty of intent, however, is at times lacking in the
case of D. Sometimes a government "enters negotiations simply to deflect
domestic opposition to its militant policy or to forestall domestic pressures
to make a unilateral conciliatory move." President Nixon's first trip to
1. TRENHOLME J. GRIFFIN & W. RUSSELL DAGGATr, THE GLOBAL NEGOTIATOR:
BUILDING STRONG BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD 20 (1990).
2. FRED CHARLES IKLE, How NATIONS NEGOTIATE 26 (1987).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 226.
5. LouIs KRIESBERG, INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION - THE U.S.-USSR AND
MIDDLE EAST CASES 121 (1992).
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China falls within this category. In addition, D is sometimes faced with
inherently unsolvable disputes, such as those "involving ethnic issues,
minorities, [and] ideology ... "6 In spite of these differences, the
challenges which are common to D and B as negotiators predominate.
II. NATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS AND NEGOTIATION STYLES
The above two elements are intertwined and represent the core of
the commonality of challenges facing both D and B within the international
negotiators context. Both D and B, in negotiating with their American or
Soviet counterparts, have to be aware of a major difference in negotiating
styles which is attributable to the difference in national characteristics.
Whereas the American negotiator looks upon negotiation as a hurdle to be
overcome, the Soviet negotiator looks upon it as a power play. President
Carter expressed this crucial difference aptly when he said:
[t]o Americans, a negotiation is most often looked upon as
an obstacle to be overcome in order to reach a desired
goal. For the Soviets ... the same negotiation was almost
an end in itself X a ritual that demonstrated to the world
that they were equal in status to the United States.,
The Soviet's perception of negotiation as primarily a power tool,
not a means to conflict resolution on the basis of shared interests, is
articulated as "preoccupation with authority, avoidance of risk, [and an]
imperative need to assert control.-"
Thus it is of primary importance for both D and B to bear the
symbiosis between national characteristics and negotiation styles in mind.
In fact, when we look further into the scope of this common challenge
facing both D and B equally, we discern an interesting variance. National
negotiating styles vary for the same national group depending on whom is
facing that national group in negotiations. Taking Egypt as an example,
former United States Ambassador to Israel, Samuel Lewis observed the
following: "Egyptian negotiation behavior varies from region to region.
"9
The same relationship between nationality and negotiation style
confronts B in a more direct way than in the case of D. While treaties and
6. HUGH MIALL, THE PEACEMAKERS: PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES SINCE
1945 185 (1992).
7. JIMMY CARTER, NEGOTIATION: AN ALTERNATIVE TO HOSTILITY 16 (1984).
8. RAYMOND COHEN, NEGOTIATING ACROSS CULTURES: COMMUNICATION
OBSTACLES IN INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY 13 (1991).
9. Id.
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other international inter-state instruments vary between general and
detailed, depending on the issues and circumstances, business agreements
drafted by Americans give the impression of being over-negotiated. In
drafting contracts, which an American B is likely to propose to a foreign
B, the drafter "often attempt[s] to deal with every possible contingency.' 0
This is in contrast to the practice of most foreign Bs who "generally tend
to prefer more broadly framed agreements and to deal with the details of
implementation as they arise.""
Returning to the broad characteristic of nationality as an indicator
of negotiation style, irrespective of whether the negotiators are Ds or Bs,
we find that the French tend to be "prone to elaborate historical-
philosophical themes," while the Germans, like the Americans, place
"greater emphasis on legal aspects. "12
The relationship between nationality and style is quite
understandable in terms of the impact of culture on negotiation as a means
of conflict resolution. Culture and national background influences differing
negotiating styles' 3 and should therefore rank high among the common
challenges facing both D and B as they consider their best alternative to
negotiated agreements and how to prepare their pre-negotiation steps.
III. THE PRE-NEGOTIATION STAGE
Another important challenge which is common to both D and B as
negotiators is the preparation for the pre-negotiation stage. The
importance of this stage, described sometimes as "the diagnostic phase"
4
stems from the fact that it is largely subjective. Here the parties, each for
themselves, determine whether the issue is negotiable. Therefore, "if the
opponent refuses even to consider that a mutually agreeable solution may
be possible, of course it is not possible."'" The Asian-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) forum held in Seattle, Washington, in late November
1993 offers an example. At that summit, it was clear to President Clinton,
before he held his meeting with the Chinese Prime Minister, that the issue
of China's respect for human rights within its borders was non-
10. GRIFFIN & DAGGATr, supra note 1, at 109.
11. Id.
12. IKLE, supra note 2, at 225.
13. I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN & MAUREEN R. BERMAN, THE PRACTICAL NEGOTIATOR 10
(1982).
14. Id. at 42.
15. Id.
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negotiable.16  This was a pre-negotiation determination. Though it is
presumed that the President raised it, the Prime Minister skirted the issue
by talking about the virtues of "non-interference in the internal affairs of
other [states]."
Thus it could be seen from the APEC example that among the
benefits of the pre-negotiation stage to both D and B are: a) to hear "the
other party's point of view[,J"s and b) to signal a change in the
relationship between the two parties which may bring about "a
reassessment of alternatives and add negotiation to the strategies of conflict
management that are seriously considered." 9  However, there is an
additional advantage to the pre-negotiation stage for both D and B,
namely, crisis avoidance. In this regard, the pre-negotiation stage has a
tendency to take the opposing parties to the edge of the precipice which
generally triggers an inclination in favor of conflict resolution. The phase
of Egyptian-Israeli relationship which preceded Camp David negotiations
in 1978 is instructive. The United States felt that "the status quo was
inherently dangerous; the Egyptian authorities perceived the gathering of a
storm if progress was not made before the expiration of the second
disengagement agreement;" and the leaders of Israel "faced an intensifying
domestic crisis. "2 The perception on the part of D or B of what Professor
Zartman describes as "the conjunction of threat and opportunity " 2' not only
enhances the attractiveness of the negotiation option, it also helps the
parties in the collection of relevant information about their adversary's
position, enables leaders to prepare for what Harold Saunders calls
"arranging the negotiation,"" and sets or delimits "the agenda for
negotiation. "23
In combining these benefits of the pre-negotiation phase, benefits
which are common to D and B as international negotiators, (especially the
benefit of early information gathering), another advantage emerges in
lowering what Professor Scardilli aptly describes as a "premium on
16. R. W. Apple, Jr., The Pacific Summit: 'Dialogue Is Begun As Clinton Meets With
China's Chief, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1993, §1, at 1.
17. Id.
18. ZARTMAN & BERMAN, supra note 13, at 85.
19. JANICE GROSS STEIN, GETTING TO THE TABLE: THE PROCESSES OF INTERNATIONAL
PRE-NEGOTIATION 239 (1989).
20. Id. at 243.
21. Id. at 245.
22. Id. at 248.
23. Id. at 254.
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competition. "I In this connection, the pre-negotiation phase which
constitutes a common challenge to both D and B, contributes to the
betterment of fact-finding and lowers the cost of "our confrontational
adversary system of trials. "25 Once negotiations are entered into, other
challenges emerge of a practical nature which confront either the inter-
governmental diplomatic negotiator (D) or the international business
negotiator (B) and are presented in the balance of this article.
IV. THE CULTURAL GAP AND ITS IMPACT
By their adoption of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) in November 1993, the United States House of Representatives,
and later the Senate, seems to have given a green light to the Executive
Branch to globally pursue the liberalization of trade through the lowering
of tariff barriers. Hence it was not surprising that the momentum seemed
to propel United States negotiators, including President Clinton, at the
APEC forum (discussed in Section III above) as well as at the General
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) negotiations. The global
character of these negotiations brings forth the challenge of the cultural
gap which confronts both D and B negotiators. This cultural gap, although
an aspect of national characteristics discussed in Section II above, is
distinct from those characteristics as it has to do with the creation of a
chasm between two multinational sets of negotiators.
In taking five nationalities as examples of producing cultural gaps
in international business negotiations X equally applicable to diplomatic
negotiators X the case of the commonality of the challenge of the cultural
gap between negotiators is made. Examples of these are the Chinese, the
Soviets, the Japanese, the French, and the Egyptians. In this sense,
culture has to be understood in its larger framework which includes:
civilization, history, values, political systems, and the national perception
of the nation's place in the world. Keeping this in mind, the Chinese, as
negotiators "tend to stress at the outset their commitments to abstract
principles and will make concessions at the eleventh hour after they have
fully assessed the limits of their interlocutor's flexibility." 26 Unlike the
Chinese, the Soviet negotiator makes concessions slice by slice much like
salami-slicing tactics. A quid pro quo is expected for each concession."
24. Frank J. Scardilli, Law, Lawyers and the Tyranny of Illusion, HUMANIST, Sept./Oct.
1981, at 24.
25. Id.
26. HANS BINNENDUK, NATIONAL NEGOTIATING STYLES vi (1987).
27. Id.
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The Japanese look upon negotiations as "a form of social conflict" where
the personal relationship with the opposite negotiator is emphasized.
These relationships are "of value to the Japanese negotiator for informal,
frank discussions where social conflict is minimal and progress can be
made on a pragmatic basis. "2
In contrast to the Chinese, Soviet, and Japanese negotiators, the
French and the Egyptians are described as suspicious of international
negotiations, but for different reasons. This is, in part, reflected in French
negotiators reliance on "highly rational abstract logic and general
principles,"' 9 and Egyptian negotiators historic fear of "collusion and
intervention of external powers" through the process of negotiation °
Exemplifying the role of the cultural gap in international
negotiations is the attitude adopted by a Japanese firm in negotiating a joint
venture with a United States firm?' Progress was being made until the
arbitration clause was reached and resulted in an impasse.2 The Japanese,
for reasons of national pride and convenience, wanted the arbitration to
take place in Japan; the United States firm wanted it to be located outside
Japan.3 The stalemate persisted until the Japanese asked their American
counterparts whether they had ever participated in arbitration.4 Upon
receiving the American response in the negative, the Japanese sensed that
neither side would ever resort to it, and quickly proposed that arbitration
would take place in Hawaii."
Now with NAFTA promising to bring American and Mexican
business negotiators together more frequently in the future, it is worth
examining the cultural gap in such business situations which are akin to
those faced by diplomats. In their seminal article on inter-cultural
communication, Hall and Whyte 6 outline a number of cultural variables,
among which the following may be noted as important in international
negotiations:
a) punctuality is interpreted differently;
28. Id. at vi-viii.
29. Id. at vii-viii.
30. Id.
31. GRIFFIN & DAGGATT, supra note 1, at 18.
32, Id.
33, Id.
34. Id.
35, Id. at 19.
36. Hall & Whyte, Intercultural Communication: A Guide to Men of Action, 19 HUM.
ORG. 320 (1960).
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b) Latin Americans "don't usually schedule appointments
to the exclusion of other appointments;"3 7
c) whereas in the United States, discussion "is a means to
an end,"38 in Latin America, "discussion is a part of the
spice of life;"39 and
d) the phrase come any time to a Latin American really
means what it says; to an American, it is "just an
expression of friendliness. You are not really expected to
show up unless your host proposes a specific time. "40
These are only but a few of the many examples which highlight the
impact of different national customs on the outcome of negotiations. With
this in view, one could expect discrepancies between a negotiations matrix
drawn up by a non-American D or B and one outlined by an American D
or B with regards to the shared, independent, or conflicting needs of the
respective parties on the famous scale of "essential, important and
desirable.", Nonetheless, the cultural gap still faces both D and B, from a
common culture, in their negotiations with their D and B counterparts from
a different cultural environment.
V. THE ROLE OF LANGUAGE
In spite of the presumed growth of what may be termed a universal
language of negotiation, the direct role of language in influencing the
outcome of negotiations should be recognized as a challenge to the
international negotiator, regardless of whether he/she is a D or a B.
Quoting Lorand Szalay, Raymond Cohen reiterates that:
the idea itself does not really travel, only the code, the
words, [and] the patterns of sound or print [travel]. The
meaning that a person attaches to the words received will
come from his mind. His interpretation is determined by
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Videotape: Primer on Negotiation (Barbara Britzke and Joseph D. Harbaugh 1988) (on
file with the law library at Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center).
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his own frame of reference, his ideas, interests, past
experiences, etc ..... ,,,2
On that basis, the international negotiator, who is the product of a
culture different from that of his counterpart, is faced not only with a
cultural gap but with a linguistic gap which reflects an "inter-cultural
dissonance." 3 In that context, the role of language in negotiation is not
only the transmission of information from one negotiator to another, but it
is also "a social instrument - a device for preserving and promoting social
interests. ""
The inter-cultural dissonance represented by inter-cultural and
cross-linguistic communication is further magnified by the needs of D and
B negotiators to rely on interpretation. Experience in multi-lingual
organizations, such as the United Nations, where negotiations involve a
large number of parties hearing one another in one of six official languages
(Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish) demonstrate the
magnitude of this problem. The same dissonance may apply even when
the negotiator is using, not his/her, but a second language which is the
mother tongue of his/her counterpart. The import of this is that
"negotiators not only have to question whether their meaning will be
transmitted through interpretation and translation, but also whether it will
be communicated when the respondent is speaking the negotiator's own
language as a second language."4
Both D and B face the linguistic challenge from another
perspective: "[w]hat will happen in interpretation if an idea or concept
does not exist in the other culture?" 46 When Japan was exposed to the
West, there was no word for democracy. The Anglo-Saxon notion of fair
play has no precise equivalent in either French or Spanish. Obviously in
these circumstances, the interpreters "supply their own assumed
meaning[s], '"47 despite the possible damage which may be inflicted on
communications. In fact, it is reported that Edmund Glenn, former chief
of the Language Services Division at the United States Department of
42. COHEN, supra note 8, at 19-20.
43. Id. at 19.
44. Id.
45. GLEN FISHER, INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION: A CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE
62 (1980).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 63.
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State, insists that "interpreters often do have difficulty in transmitting the
logical thrust of key statements."41
In certain situations, reliance by the negotiators on interpreters
may blunt the edge of confrontations. But by the same token, it could
produce a very different and negotiable result. The interpretation
dilemma; which some negotiators try to mitigate by speaking slowly,
providing a text to the interpreter, writing out the figures for the other
party to see, and/or by briefing the interpreter in advance of the subject of
negotiation; is compounded when the speaker uses idioms that have no
equivalents in the other language. This may have given rise to the
statement by James Evans that "[t]o work through an interpreter is like
hacking one's way through a forest with a feather. 4 9 On the humorous
side of this linguistic dilemma, it is reported that the phrase "'out of sight,
out of mind' was once translated into Russian and back to English as
'invisible maniac.""' Even Presidents are not immune to interpretation
mishaps. When President Carter visited Poland in 1977, the President's
phrase "desires for the future" was translated as his "lusts for the future."'
VI. INTERESTS, NOT POSITIONS, As Focus
As negotiators, successful diplomats, like successful businessmen
and businesswomen, are constantly challenged by the notion that "behind
opposed positions lie shared and compatible interests. "12 The inter-
governmental, as well as the transnational business negotiators, need to
find shared interests with their counterparts. In order for them to succeed
they have to explain, not coerce or argue. Both D and B have to be
attentive to the adage pronounced by Oliver Wendell Holmes: "Deep-
seated preferences cannot be argued about - you cannot argue a man into
liking a glass of beer. '" 3 D and B's goal identical: "to create a solution
that is acceptable from two different perspectives by reconciling
interests. "s' This is the reason why successful negotiators, in their attempt
to increase the flow of information from the other side and to "keep the
relationship mutually beneficial,"" use questions "beginning with 'what'
48. Id. at 64.
49. GRIFFIN & DAGGATr, supra note 1, at 39.
50. Id. at 43.
51. Id. at 44.
52. ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT
WITHOUT GIVING IN 43 (1991).
53. GRIFFIN & DAGGATT, supra note 1, at 99.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 163.
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rather than 'why.'"s1 Such well-formulated and conciliatory questions, not
only increase the informational flow, they help uncover shared interests.
In an article in Forbes, the game theory, as applied to successful
business negotiations, was revisited." Under the heading How To Succeed
In Business by Being Nice To Your Competitors, the author cites several
examples of big United States businesses that discovered that self-interest
does not lie in killing the competition.,, The strategy used by Philip
Morris in its price war against RJR Nabisco was to "inflict pain on RJR,
not to destroy RJR, but to persuade it to stop cutting prices on discount
cigarettes." 59 This approach is analyzed in the article under the heading, of
Evolutionary Economics.' The article expounds on the evolution of this
"altruistic behavior," which "can be used to craft optional business
strategies, "61 using recent examples of Wal-Mart, Japanese car
manufacturers' use of voluntary export restraints, IBM, Merck & Co.,
United States West, and Time Warner. The article's main conclusion is
that "in cooperation lies survival."6 The article justifies this conclusion on
the basis of a novel merger of biology and economics. The author states:
"Both disciplines are concluding that nature is not entirely tooth and claw
and that the ability to cooperate may be one of mankind's tools for
evolutionary survival X and business survival, too."63
From the above, it becomes clear that the tenet of modem
negotiation, that interests, not positions, should be the central focus, has
much in common with Evolutionary Economics." Here it should be
recognized that B has a better advantage over D who may be under strict
instructions from his diplomatic superiors that sovereignty, for example,
cannot be subject to negotiation. One may safely presume that the Syrian
negotiators in their current dialogue with the Israelis in Washington, D.C.,
and elsewhere, regarding the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, could not
bargain away Syria's claimed sovereignty over that territory. B
negotiator, in most instances, would not face this dilemma of non-
negotiable issues as would D in certain circumstances.
56. Id. at 120.
57. Rita Koselka, Evolutionary Economics: Nice Guys Don't Finish Last, FORBES, Oct.
11, 1993, at 110-14.
58 Id.
59. Id. at 112.
60. Id. at 111.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 114.
63. Koselka, supra note 57, at 112.
64. Id. at 110.
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However, both D and B share in their common concern for
establishing and maintaining good personal relations with the other
interlocutors. Fostering good personal relations in the course of
negotiations may be accomplished through a variety of means: arguing for
interests not positions; debating some aspects of positions, not
personalities; "setting the opening negotiating position to support a
mutually acceptable agreement and concessions at an appropriate rate[;]J "
"putting aside difficult items for later trading[;]" 6 and, promoting
agreement through the creation of "timely deadlines for completing
negotiations." 67
Regardless of the tactics used by either D or B, the over-arching
strategy for successful international negotiations is to focus on shared
interests with the other party.
VII. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The thesis of this article is that in spite of obvious differences
between the position of an inter-governmental political or diplomatic
negotiator and that of a transnational business negotiator, there is a great
deal of commonality among the challenges facing both of them. The
interchangeability of personnel between the worlds of international
business and international diplomacy, and the accelerating identification of
international business with the political affairs of states, heighten the need
for recognition of these common challenges. Since the basic skills of the
negotiator, whether a D or a B, are primarily the same, such skills and
strategies will have to be employed in the context of national
characteristics dictating negotiation styles.
This article's selection of a few, though important, common
challenges is meant to support the theme of the existence of a commonality
of challenges. It goes without saying that a resourceful D or a resourceful
B would quickly recognize that the options available within the diplomatic
context may vary from those present in the context of international
business. As an example, the options available to Americans negotiating
on behalf of GM for a joint venture with Toyota Japanese negotiators may
perceive a broader spectrum of options available to them, as compared to
the options available to Russian diplomats negotiating with the Japanese
foreign ministry for an aid package for Moscow. Nonetheless "bargaining
65. KRIESBERG, supra note 5, at 124.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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success is contingent on resourcefulness"" in either of these two scenarios.
From the pre-negotiation stage to the eventual successful conclusion of
negotiations, transcending the cultural gap and the linguistic interpretation
gaps, the most critical question which either D or B should keep in mind
is: "What can help craft cooperative solutions that create a continuing
incentive to maintain and enhance the relationship."6 9
68. CHARLES LOCKHART, BARGAINING IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS 133 (1979).
69. GRIFFIN & DAGGATT, supra note 1, at 21.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On Wednesday, July 12, 1995, for the first time in the 150-year
colonial history of Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Legislative Council
(Legco) voted on a motion of no-confidence against its British-appointed
Governor, Chris Patten.' "If passed in a conventional parliament, such a
motion would bring down the government. "2 However, the no-confidence
motion had no binding effect on the Governor., Nonetheless, the
Democratic Party, chaired by Martin Lee made the motion to indicate its
stern disapproval over the agreement of the Court of Final Appeal (CFA)
reached between Britain and the People's Republic of China (China) in
June 1995.4 The motion was defeated by a two-to-one margin.5
Formal negotiations between Britain and China over the reversion
of Hong Kong in 1997 from Britain to China began in the early 1980s.
Criticism against the motivations, procedures, and outcomes of these
negotiations has been abundant, but none has amounted to a formal
objection as severe as a vote of no-confidence on the Hong Kong Governor
himself. What is in the CFA agreement that triggered such a hostile
response? Lee called the agreement a "landmark sellout, a landmark
betrayal. "6 Was it? Or did the agreement provide sufficient safeguards to
ensure an independent judicial system and the continuation of rule of law
in Hong Kong after 1997, as claimed by Barrie Wiggham, the
Commissioner of Hong Kong Economic and Trade Affairs?7
The first part of this paper gives a brief background of Hong Kong
as a British colony and its judicial system. Next, the sources and the
events leading up to the CFA agreement is examined. Following this, is a
description of the CFA agreement and three major controversial issues
regarding the CFA. Next, a prediction about the independence and
operation of the CFA is presented and finally, a summary is presented of
the CFA issue in Hong Kong.
1. Martin Lee, No Confidence in Hong Kong's Highest Court, ASIAN WALL ST. J., July
12, 1995, at 10.
2. Id.
3. Legco Supports Patten In Confidence Vote, ASIAN WALL ST. J., July 13, 1995, at 8.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Peter Stein, Hong Kong Court Pack Has Mixed Appeal, ASIAN WALL ST. J., June 12,
1995, at 1.
7. Barrie Wiggham, No Legal Vacuun in Hong Kong, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 1995, at
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II. BRIEF BACKGROUND OF HONG KONG AS A BRITISH COLONY AND
ITS JUDICIAL SYSTEM
Hong Kong can be divided into three areas geographically: Hong
Kong Island, the Kowloon Peninsula and the Stonecutters Island, and the
New Territories which border mainland China. These three areas became
British colonies at different times. When Britain defeated China at the end
of the Opium War in 1842, China ceded Hong Kong Island in perpetuity to
Britain in the Treaty of Nanking.' Eighteen years later in 1860, more
conflicts between Britain and China led to the signing of the Convention of
Peking in which the Kowloon Peninsula and the Stonecutters Island were
ceded to Britain, again in perpetuity. 9 Nearly four decades later, based on
the Convention of 1898, China agreed to lease the New Territories to
Britain for a period of ninety-nine years, commencing on July 1, 1898.10
Therefore, the reversion of Hong Kong to China in 1997 technically
concerns only the New Territories." However, the three areas,
"collectively referred to as 'Hong Kong,'" have since 1898 functioned "so
interdependently as one economic unit that any partition would threaten the
viability of the colony itself. Therefore, the transfer must include the
entire territory." 2 Consequently, Hong Kong is used in this paper to refer
to all three areas.'3
After colonizing Hong Kong in 1842, Britain simply imported the
bulk of the common law of England into Hong Kong."1 Hong Kong
received its constitution, including primarily the Letters Patent and the
8. Nancy C. Jackson, The Legal Regime of Hong Kong after 1997: An Examination of
the Joint Declaration of the United Kingdom and the People's Republic of China, 5 INT'L TAX &
Bus. L., 379-80 (1987).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. China basically considers all the three treaties mentioned above invalid because they
are all "unequal treaties" signed when China was helpless against western aggression. Therefore,
it can be said that China's position was that there was no need to terminate the treaties because
they were never in effect. The negotiation with Britain was political rather than legal. Lawrence
A. Castle, Comment, The Reversion of Hong Kong to China: Legal and Practical Questions, 21
WILLAMETrE L. REV. 327, 328-33 (1985).
12. Jackson, supra note 8, at 380 (citing Davies, How Britan Fell for the Peking Game
Plan, FAR E. ECON. REV., June 21, 1984, at 44).
13. For a detailed account of how Hong Kong became a British colony, see Susan L.
Karamanian, Comment, Legal Aspects of the Sino-British Draft Agreement on the Future of Hong
Kong, 20 TEX. INT'L L.J. 167, 168-70 (1985).
14. Daniel N. Abrahamson, Capital Punishment in Post-Colonial Hong Kong: Issues,
Answers, and Options, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1219, 1221 (1992).
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Royal Instructions, from the British Government. , Further, Hong Kong
obtained a ready-made judicial system with all cases going to the Privy
Council in London for final appeals.16 However, the Privy Council is a
court of limited jurisdiction over Hong Kong, and it only hears cases from
Hong Kong which raise new points of law.7 The Hong Kong Supreme
Court retains final jurisdiction over all other cases. 8 Government figures
show that in the last three years the Privy Council spent seven to nine
weeks each year hearing cases from Hong Kong.' 9
III. THE COURT OF FINAL APPEAL
A. Sources
When China resumes sovereignty over Hong Kong on July 1,
1997,2 Hong Kong will become a Special Administrative Region of the
People's Republic of China (HKSAR) pursuant to article 31 of the
Constitution of China. 2' For obvious reasons, the Privy Council will no
longer be able to serve as the place of final adjudication for Hong Kong
cases. Another body is needed to take this role.
Britain and China issued the Joint Declaration, the first formal
agreement between Britain and China concerning the future of Hong
Kong, in 1984.2 The Joint Declaration states that the HKSAR will be
vested with "executive, legislative and independent judicial power,
including that of final adjudication. 23 Further, the Joint Declaration states
that "[tihe power of final judgment of the [HKSAR] shall be vested in the
15. A. Chen, Hong Kong's "Basic Law" from the Perspective of Comparative
Constitutions, N.Z. L.J. 383, 384-85 (1989).
16. Id.; Frankie Fook-Lun Leung, Hong Kong's Transition: Some Noticeable Changes, 12
Loy. L.A. INT'L & CoP. L.J. 51, 53 (1989). The courts in the colonial era in America were
also "set up by the same British colonial authorities who set up the Hong Kong Supreme Court,
and colonies' final appeals went to the same Privy Council in London from the beginning in 1683
until the American Revolution in 1776." Paul Kerson, Grounds for Appeal in China, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Apr. 25, 1995, at 19.
17. Susan Noakes, Final Appeal Court Assures Stable Legal System, FIN. POST, Nov. 4,
1995, at 48.
18. Id.
19. Court "To Sit Two Months A Year," S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 27, 1995, at 5.
20. JOINT DECLARATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT
BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA ON THE QUESTION OF HONG KONG, at 1, Dec. 19, 1984 [hereinafter Joint Declaration];
XIANFA [Constitution], ch. 1, art. 31 (1982) (P.R.C.).
21. Id.
22. Joint Declaration, supra note 20.
23. Id. at 3(3); see id. at annex I, § III.
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court of final appeal in the [HKSAR]. . . . "24 Hence, a Court of Final
Appeal is to be established to replace the Privy Council.
The Joint Declaration promised that the National People's
Congress of the People's Republic of China (NPC) would enact a Basic
Law for the HKSAR. 25 The Basic Law intends to reflect the policies
adopted by the Joint Declaration and serve as a miniconstitution for the
HKSAR. 21 Accordingly, the Basic Law, which was adopted by the
Seventh NPC at its third session on April 4, 1990, also provided for the
establishment of the CFA. 21 Similarly, the CFA is to be vested with the
"power of final adjudication. "29
B. Events Leading to the CFA Agreement
A Sino-British Joint Liaison Group (Joint Liaison Group) was set
up pursuant to and to implement the Joint Declaration.30 The Joint Liaison
Group presented a proposal on the CFA to China for the first time in
1988.31 Before an agreement was reached, the demonstration of Chinese
students in Tinnamen Square took place which climaxed with the massacre
on June 4, 1989.12 The massacre substantially increased the mistrust of the
people in Hong Kong towards China. This feeling was, however, mutual
with the Chinese Government. Alarmed by Hong Kong's open support of
the student demonstration in Tinnamen Square and severe criticism against
the June 4th massacre and the defection of China's own people to Hong
Kong following the massacre, China became "apprehensive about Hong
Kong becoming a subversive base against China . . . ."14 Since the
massacre in 1989, the "Chinese population of Hong Kong have been
apathetic toward the Draft Basic Law, or anything proposed by the Beijing
24. Id. at annex I, § III, & 4.
25. Id. at 3(12) and annex I, § I, 1.
26. Id.
27. Abrahamson, supra note 14, at 1226.
28. The Basic Law Of The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Of The People's
Republic Of China, Adopted by the Seventh National People's Congress at its Third Session, Apr.
4, 1990, ch. IV, § 4, art. 81. (Apr. 4, 1997) <http://www.cityu.edu.hk/BasicLaw/cp4-4.htm>.
29. Id. at § 4, art. 82.
30. Joint Declaration, supra note 20, at annex III.
31. Noakes, supra note 17.
32. HSIN-CHI KUAN, HONG KONG AFrER THE BASIC LAW 16 (1990).
33. Id.
34. Id.
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government."" This attitude certainly did not facilitate any cooperation
between Britain, China, and Hong Kong. In fact, in October 1989 the
NPC expelled two Hong Kong residents, Lee and Szeto Wah, from the
Drafting Committee for the Basic Law because of their leading roles in
supporting the democratic movement in China. 36  The mistrustful
atmosphere continued, and it is easy to understand that the Legco would
flatly reject the first draft of the CFA Bill in 1991.17 The rejection was
grounded mainly on the Bill's allowance for only one foreign judge on the
five-member CFA bench.3 8
Legco's rejection of the first CFA agreement in 1991 brought an
abrupt end to any further negotiation on the CFA issue. Indeed, in 1992
the focus of Britain and China was on the electoral reform package
introduced by Governor Patten, which broadened Hong Kong's democratic
system3' by extending the franchise of functional constituencies to 2.7
million.- China responded to the legislative reform violently, accusing
Patten of breaching the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law and
threatening to disband the legislature elected under the reform.41 Talks
broke down between Britain and China on Hong Kong's electoral reform
in July 1993, which was followed by NPC's passing a resolution to
disband the three tiers of government after the handover in 1994.42 Despite
China's threat, Hong Kong's electoral reform became law the same year.4 3
In other words, the relationship between China and Britain had been
antagonistic since 1992." As a result, virtually nothing took place on the
CFA negotiation from 1991 through 1994.41
35. Berry F. Hsu & Philip W. Baker, The Spirit of Common Law in Hong Kong: The
Transition to 1997, 24 U.B.C. L. REv. 307, 313 (1990).
36. Id.
37. Noakes, supra note 17.
38. Robin Fitzsimons, Is Hong Kong Facing a Legal Sell-out?, TIMES (London), Aug. 1,
1995, available in 1995 WL 7687409; see Noakes, supra note 17.
39. Associated Press, Britain, China Agree to Save Hong Kong's Legal System, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC, June 10, 1995, at A22.
40. Chronology, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 4, 1995, at 3, available in 1995 WL
7536827.
41. Associated Press, supra note 39.
42. Chronology, supra note 40.
43. Id.
44. Louise do Rosario, Future Imperfect: Lawmakers Approve Post-1997 Court Despite
Flaws, FAR E. ECON. REv., Aug. 10, 1995, at 26.
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The CFA agreement was so crucial to Hong Kong's future" that
Britain could no longer merely react to China's threat. The CFA had to be
in place. Therefore, in April 1995 Britain forced China to reopen the
negotiation on the CFA by threatening to act unilaterally in the formation
of the CFA.4" The negotiation finished on May 30th,'48 and the current
CFA agreement was reached in June 1995.49 Although the CFA agreement
was heavily criticized,50 Legco passed it thirty-eight to seventeen, with five
abstentions. , '
C. The Agreement
The CFA Bill is long and complex, but the agreement reached in
June 1995 on the CFA consisted of only five paragraphs, which aimed to
clarify ambiguous or undecided points from the past. The most important
aspects of the agreement are found in paragraph 3: The British side agrees
to amend the Court of Final Appeal Bill to include the formulation of acts
of state in article 19 of the Basic Law and to provide that the Court of
Final Appeal Ordinance shall not come into operation before June 30,
1997.52 In other words, the CFA will not operate until China resumes its
sovereignty of Hong Kong on July 1, 1997. Further, the CFA will be
precluded from hearing cases concerning acts of state. The full text of the
June agreement can be found in Appendix A. Although not contained in
the June agreement, China's insistence on allowing only one foreign judge
on the CFA was also incorporated into the CFA Bill.5 3 In conjunction with
this agreement, Governor Patten presented it to Legco for consideration.
45. Peter Stein & Marcus W. Brauchli, London and Beijing Agree on High Court for Hong
Kong, WALL ST. J. EUIR., June 12, 1995, at 2.
46. Consul General Richard W. Mueller, America's Long-Term Interest in Hong Kong,
Transcript, Vol. 6, No. 21, ISSN: 1051-7693; May 2, 1995, DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, May 22,
1995, available in 1995 WL 8643565.
47. Noakes, supra note 17.
48. Id.
49. Chronology, supra note 40.
50. Chris Yeung et al., Fight Not Over, says Martin Lee, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July
27, 1995, at 1.
51. World Politics and Policy: Three Singapore Leaders Awarded Record Damages in
Libel Case, ASIAN WALL ST. J., July 27, 1995, at J5, available in 1995 WL 8779320.
52. See infra, Appendix A, § 3.
53. Louise do Rosario, A Court Too Far: 'Democrats Vow to Reject Sino-British Accord,
FAR E. ECON. REV., June 22, 1995, at 20.
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The transcript of his official statement with respect to the CFA Bill and
agreement is available in Appendix B.1
IV. CONCERNS OVER THE CFA AGREEMENT
A. The Significance of the CFA in Hong Kong's Future
The Basic Law guarantees that HKSAR will "exercise a high
degree of autonomy . . . and independent judicial power."" The legal
system of HKSAR will, to a large extent, decide the degree of autonomy
HKSAR will enjoy as a part of China. 6 The CFA is the center of the legal
system in Hong Kong. Whether Hong Kong will truly be vested with the
final adjudication power as stated in the Basic Law will depend on the
independence and jurisdiction of the CFA. 7 In addition, the independence
of the CFA is paramount to the continuation of the rule of law in
HKSAR." Hong Kong's success has been based on its fair, efficient, and
independent legal system under which businesses flourish.1 Business has
come to Hong Kong because of its legal system and the rule of law.6
Indeed, Senator Craig Thomas warned that if the rule of law were to give
way to "family or party connections," businesses will become "skittish and
pull out." 61 If Hong Kong were to remain as a world's leading financial
center, the rule of law must continue to exists because:
business people must be able to rely on the courts'
upholding the sanctity of contracts and on the impartial
enforcement of commercial laws and regulations. In this
connection, the establishment of a court of final appeal
54. Governor Patten's statement contains succinct accounts of the difficulties on reaching
the CFA agreement and the official views and explanatory notes with respect to the CFA
agreement.
55. The Basic Law Of The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Of The People's
Republic Of China, Adopted by the Seventh National People's Congress at its Third Session, Apr.
4, 1990, ch. I, art. 2. (Apr. 1, 1997) <http://www.cityu.edu.hk/BasicLaw/cpl.htm>.
56. Jackson, supra note 8, at 381.
57. The Basic Law Of The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Of The People's
Republic Of China, Adopted by the Seventh National People's Congress at its Third Session, Apr.
4, 1990, ch. I, art. 2. (Apr. 1, 1997) <http://www.cityu.edu.hk/BasicLaw/cpl.htm>.
58. Hsu & Baker, supra note 35, at 329-31.
59. Johannes Chan, A Bill of Rights for Hong Kong, in CIVIL LIBERTIES IN HONG KONG
72, 87 (Raymond Wacks ed., 1988); see Louis Kraar, The Death of Hong Kong, FORTUNE, June
26, 1995, at 118.
60. Editorial, Courting Disaster: Britain and China Agree on Court of Not-Quite-Final
Appeal, FAR E. ECON. REV., June 22, 1995, at 5.
61. Louise do Rosario, Courting Disaster?, FAR E. ECON. REV., July 6, 1995, at 61.
62. Mueller, supra note 46.
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before 1997 would be a crucial step in maintaining
confidence in Hong Kong's ability to operate an effective
legal system after the transition and to avoid damaging
legal gaps. 63 Even the public at large is concerned with the
continuation of the rule of law. People . . . must feel
secure about the protection of their basic rights. People
who look over their shoulder for fear of arbitrary arrest or
detention, or who fear they cannot get a fair trial in the
event they are charged with an offense, are not the kind of
people who built Hong Kong."
Therefore, unlike other issues relating to the reversion of Hong
Kong in 1997, the CFA issue directly affects the future existence of the
rule of law in Hong Kong, which is determinative of Hong Kong's
continued prosperity after 1997.
Since so much is at stake on the CFA, its formation is closely
scrutinized by anyone who has interests in Hong Kong's future. The
concerns over the CFA agreement are primarily in three areas:
1) the exclusion of the CFA's jurisdiction over acts of state and the
ambiguity of what constitutes acts of state;
2) the scheduled date of the opening of the CFA on July 1, 1997, the date
on which China assumes sovereignty over Hong Kong;
3) the permission of only one foreign judge sitting on the five-member
CFA bench.
B. Acts of State
The June agreement on the CFA explicitly precludes the CFA
from hearing cases concerning acts of states" by incorporating article 19 of
the Basic Law. Article 19 consists of three arguably inconsistent
paragraphs.67  The first paragraph grants HKSAR the power of final
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Fitzsimons, supra note 38.
66. See infra, Appendix A.
67. The full text of art. 19 of the BASIC LAW is:
The [HKSARJ shall be vested with independent judicial power, including that of final
adjudication.
The courts of the [HKSAR] shall have jurisdiction over all cases in the Region, except
that the restrictions on their jurisdiction imposed by the legal system and principles
previously in force in Hong Kong shall be maintained.
The courts of the [HKSAR] shall have no jurisdiction over acts of state such as defense
and foreign affairs. The courts of the Region shall obtain a certificate from the Chief
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adjudication. The second paragraph authorizes HKSAR to hear "all cases
in the Region." However, HKSAR courts, including the CFA, cannot
hear cases for which they have not had jurisdiction under the British rule.
Conceptually, such limitation could take away the HKSAR's final
adjudication power after 1997 because the Privy Council in London
possesses the power of final adjudication for Hong Kong cases. Further,
all cases does not really mean all cases. Paragraph 3 explains that
HKSAR "shall have no jurisdiction over acts of state such as defense and
foreign affairs. "69
The Joint Declaration contains a similar phrase: "[tihe [HKSAR]
will enjoy a high degree of autonomy except in foreign and defense affairs
which are the responsibilities of the Central People's Government.""
However, the Joint Declaration does not qualify the meaning of final
adjudication when mentioning the CFA in the HKSAR. In this respect, the
Basic Law is not true to the spirit manifested in the Joint Declaration.
Conversely, it could be argued that the provision in the Basic Law on
limiting the CFA's jurisdiction outside acts of state is consistent with the
Joint Declaration because the phrase "foreign and defense affairs" in the
Joint Declaration modifies the entire administration of the HKSAR, thus
including the CFA. These two polar interpretations on whether the CFA
agreement is in harmony with the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law are
evident in the attitudes of the supporters7' and opposers72 of the CFA
agreement.
Entrusting China with the responsibilities of handling defense and
foreign affairs of Hong Kong is actually common in autonomous
Executive on questions of fact concerning acts of state such as defense and foreign
affairs whenever such questions arise in the adjudication of cases. This certificate shall
be binding on the courts. Before issuing such a certificate, the Chief Executive shall
obtain a certifying document from the Central People's Government.
The Basic Law Of The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Of The People's Republic Of
China, Adopted by the Seventh National People's Congress at its Third Session, Apr. 4, 1990, ch.
II, art. 19, (Apr. 1, 1997) <http:/Iwww.cityu.edu.hk/BasicLaw/cp2.htm>.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Joint Declaration, supra note 20, 3(2).
71. Hong Kong Attorney General Jeremy Matthews claimed that the CFA's jurisdictional
limitations on acts of state should not be considered a concession because the CFA agreement
merely reflects what is already in the Basic Law, noting: "It is strange that when we propose to
align the court on this point with the Basic Law, we are accused of kowtowing. But when others
propose to amend the bill to align it with the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law then that
becomes a matter of principle." Matthews Strikes at Opposition, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
June 15, 1995, at 6.
72. Michael C. Davis, A Common Law Court in a Marxist Country: The Case for Judicial
Review in the Hong Kong SAR, 16 DENy. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 4 (1987).
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arrangements. 7  However, excluding the CFA from hearing cases
concerning acts of states without clearly defining the scope of acts of state
is disturbing. Act of state is not defined in the Basic Law. The words
defense and foreign affairs do not define acts of state but merely give
examples to what may be acts of state. But what else may be considered
acts of state by the Chinese government? Acts of state in common law
"typically relate to the making of treaties with foreign countries,
declarations of war, and the seizure of land or goods in right of
conquest. "7 Attempts to amend the CFA Bill to restrict acts of state to its
common law definition were unsuccessful.15 Therefore, the bottom line is
that CFA cannot hear cases on acts of state, but no one is sure what that
means.
The potential problems with a loose definition of acts of state are
alarming. The United Nations recently warned that the ambiguity of acts
of state may give China the chance to curtail the CFA's power. 6 In fact,
the entire judiciary of HKSAR will be affected." Acts of state could mean
different things on any given occasion. Even worse is that the power of
interpretation of the Basic Law, including the meaning of acts of state,
ostensibly rests in the hands of the Standing Committee of the NPC. 78 Will
China deem the following events acts of state:
73. Roda Mushkat, Hong Kong as an International Legal Person, 6 EMORY INT'L L. REV.
105, 138 (1992).
74. Simon Holberton, Hong Kong Law Under Chinese Law. The Interface Between Basic
and Common Law, FIN. TIMES, June 12, 1995, at 3; see Frank Ching, Agreement on Court of
Final Appeal Raises New Questions, FAR E. ECON. REV., June 29, 1995, at 36.
75. Clause Raises Worries on Human Rights after '97, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 27,
1995, at 5.
76. Bruce Gilley, Hold your Ground: Colony Protests at China's Efforts to Trim Bill of
Rights, FAR E. ECON. REV., Nov. 16, 1995 at 36.
77. Mushkat, supra note 73, at 138.
78. The Basic Law Of The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Of The People's
Republic Of China, Adopted by the Seventh National People's Congress at its Third Session, Apr.
4, 1990, ch. VIII, art. 158. (Apr. 1, 1997) <http://www.cityu.edu.hk/BasicLaw/cp8.htm>.
The Chinese Constitution of 1982 does not subscribe to the concept of separation of powers.
Instead, all powers are unified in the NPC. The Central People's Government and the Judiciary
are formed by and accountable to the NPC. The NPC, however, meets only once a year for a
few days and its great size makes it unwieldy. Thus, its Standing Committee has assumed all
practical importance. It enjoys exclusive right to interpret the Constitution and the laws and
shares with the NPC the right to supervise the implementation of the constitution. It can also
enact laws not specifically reserved for the NPC. When the NPC is not in session, the Standing
Committee approves plans and government budgets, appoints and removes ministerial personnel
and decides on the composition of the National Military Commission, upon the recommendation
of its chairman. KUAN, supra note 32, at 4.
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1) The suppression of protest or the arrest of dissidents; 9
2) a commercial dispute involving a state-owed enterprise such as the
Bank of China;w
3) any allegedly unlawful acts committed by China's State Security
Ministry officials in HKSAR;8"
4) taking of land by the People's Liberation Army? 82
The list can go on. In fact, it has been suggested that the meaning of acts
of state is simply going to be a variable after 1997; China's attitudes and
interpretations towards acts of state "will depend on the political situation
in Hong Kong at the time, the degree of confidence Beijing has in the
Chief Executive, and the nature of cases coming before the courts."83
These uncertainties, however, are unacceptable in the rule of law system
because, "the legal system which exemplifies or proclaims the Rule of
Law as an ideal is characterized by its neutrality, rationality, formality,
impartiality, and impersonality: a government of laws, not of men, of
rules rather than discretion, of preordained result in preference to intuitive
justice. "
Further, the role of the Chief Executive ' in the interpretation of
acts of state is questionable. Article 19 directs the HKSAR courts to
obtain a binding certificate from the Chief Executive on questions of fact
concerning acts of state such as defense and foreign affairs whenever such
questions arise in the adjudication of cases. Before issuing such a
certificate, the Chief Executive shall obtain a certifying document from the
Chinese Government.6 Why will the future HKSAR courts need to obtain
a questions of fact certificate from the Chief Executive where the current
judicial practice is for the courts themselves to decide whether they have
79. Holberston, supra note 74, at 36.
80. Connie Law, Appeal Court Deal Salvaged, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 27, 1995,
at 2.
81. Holbertson, supra note 74.
82. Id.
83. Holberton, supra note 74, at 3.
84. Peter Wesley-Smith, Protecting Human Rights in Hong Kong, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN
HONG KONG 17, 19 (Raymond Wacks ed., 1992). Professor Smith qualifies the meaning of the
rule of law in terms of six overlapping principles, which are reprinted in full text in Appendix C.
85. The Chief Executive will be the head of the HKSAR. Appointed by the Chinese
Government, the Chief Executive will serve in a similar capacity like the British Governor today.
The Basic Law Of The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Of The People's Republic Of
China, Adopted by the Seventh National People's Congress at its Third Session, Apr. 4, 1990, ch.
IV, § 1, art. 43-58. (Apr. 1, 1997) <http://www.cityu.edu.hk/BasicLaw/cp4-1.htm>.
86. See supra note 66.
[Vol. 3:843
Leung
subject matter jurisdiction?"' And what is the function of this questions of
fact certificate which the Chief Executive cannot issue without first
consulting with the Chinese Government? Responding to the accusations
that such a certificate will subject the CFA's jurisdiction under the
arbitrary decisions of the Chief Executive, the Hong Kong Attorney
General explains that this certificate "relates only to facts, not the
interpretation of what is or is not an act of state.""
This argument is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, the effects
for the Chief Executive to issue a certificate on purely questions of facts
may well be the same as one on questions of law with respect to the
jurisdiction of the CFA. This is because the statement of facts of a case
can be so phrased that it will lead itself into a conclusion of the law. For
example, if the Bank of China is sued for breach of contract, it is within
the Chief Executive's power to issue a certificate of facts stating that the
Bank of China acts in this particular case strictly as an agent of China, thus
rendering the action an act of state. Similarly,
it is not difficult to imagine that many cases touching the
powers of the post-1997 Hong Kong Government will be
said to concern its relationship with the central authorities
in Peking. If that were claimed, no one could dispute it;
for it is a question of fact on which . . . the CFA must
obtain a certificate from the Chief Executive. 1
Secondly, the only place where the Basic Law addresses the scope of the
acts of state is in article 19. If the Chief Executive does not decide what
acts of state are, who does? It cannot be the CFA itself because its
decisions are not final since the court is bound by the question of fact
certificate. Therefore, the most logical reading of article 19 is that it gives
the decision of what constitutes acts of state to the Chief Executive, whose
decisions are contingent upon China's approval, noting again that the NPC
has the ultimate power to interpret the Basic Law.10 Therefore, it seems
apparent that by agreeing to incorporate article 19 into the CFA
agreement, Britain has given to the Chief Executive and China control
over the jurisdiction of the CFA.
87. Mushkat, supra note 73.
88. Jeremy Matthews, Letter to Ed., Hong Kong Rule of Law, TIMES (London), July 25,
1995, available in 1995 WL 7686246.
89. Geoffrey Lewis, Letter to Ed., Hong Kong Rule of Law, TIMES (London), Aug. 14,
1995, available in 1995 WL 7690169.
90. The Basic Law Of The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Of The People's
Republic Of China, Adopted by the Seventh National People's Congress at its Third Session, Apr.
4, 1990, ch. VIII, art. 158. (Apr. 1, 1997) <http://www.cityu.edu.hk/BasicLaw/cp8.htm>.
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Encircled by these limitations, is the CFA really a misnomer?
More importantly, has the rule of law been lost in the future HKSAR over
the CFA agreement? Lee believes it has.9' He considers that "Britain has
handed China a more effective and less obvious tool for manipulating
[Hong Kong's] legal system before the verdict, when political authorities .
• . [NPCI may decide which cases involve acts of state and are thus out of
judicial bounds."9
Perhaps it is not this uncommon at all for the central government
to have final jurisdiction on certain issues over its autonomous entities.91
"When appropriately constrained, this jurisdiction does not inevitably
threaten the judiciary's right of final adjudication. "1 However, as noted
above, the language of the CFA agreement certainly does not appropriately
constrain China in its exercise over the meanings of acts of state. Will
China voluntarily constrain itself and not abuse its power? Lee does not
count on it.95 If the CFA were to begin hearing cases prior to the
transition, it may help shape the interpretation of acts of state under British
rule and set up some precedents. However, this is out of the question now
as the CFA is scheduled to begin operation on July 1, 1997.
C. CFA to Start on July 1, 1997
The CFA is scheduled to begin operation on the first day China
resumes sovereignty over Hong Kong. However, the target date for the
establishment of the CFA was at one time in 1992.9 Although this proved
to be impossible when Legco rejected the first CFA agreement in 1991," at
the time Britain and China reached the CFA agreement in June 1995, they
could have arguably scheduled to open the CFA before the reversion.
Why did they not?
The judicial development in Hong Kong before China resumes
sovereignty is vital to the "successful maintenance of the common law
judicial system." 8 Establishing the CFA before July 1, 1997, would have
allowed the court to gain precious experience and avoid any potential
91. Jonathan Mirsky, Hong Kong QCDefies China Ban, TIMES (London), Aug. 15, 1995,
available in 1995 WL 7690312.
92. Lee, supra note 1.
93. Brian Z. Tarnanahah, Post-1997 Hong Kong: A Comparative Study of the Meaning of
"High Degree of Autonomy, " 20 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 41, 54-55 (1989).
94. Id.
95. Lee, supra note 1.
96. Leung, supra note 16.
97. Noakes, supra note 17.
98. Hsu and Baker, supra note 35, at 308.
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problem for legal vacuum. More importantly, the early establishment of
the CFA could ensure a strong legal framework ready to take Hong Kong
through the transition and minimize China's opportunity to meddle with
the CFA.1 Hong Kong government officials' desire to set up the CFA
before 1997 was nearly unanimous even days before reaching the CFA
agreement with China.100 The CFA agreement thus evidences an important
compromise on Britain's part.
The choice of setting up the court in July 1997 is poor. Even over
the controversial issue concerning acts of state, one can still find positive
reviews of the issue. However, not a single article or comment exists
which compliments the choice of July 1, 1997, as the date on which the
CFA will start hearing cases. To the contrary, some consider "Britain's
biggest failure in the talks was its inability to convince China to allow the
court to be set up before 1997."111 Some criticize that if Britain were to
make concession after concession over the CFA issue, it should have at
least insisted on setting up the CFA while it is still in power, thus ensuring
its proper formation.,02
It has been reported that China requested the CFA be set up after it
has regained sovereignty over Hong Kong.103 China wants to be seen as
the party who bestows judicial independence on the HKSAR.101 As much
as Britain wanted to set up the CFA prior to 1997 so that it would have
time to observe its operation or even mold its shape to its liking, China,
probably for the same reasons, resisted an early establishment of the
CFA.10 1 "From Beijing's point of view, it did not design a way of keeping
Hong Kong's court system on a tight leash only to let Mr. Patten - not
their favorite governor - introduce some slack into the system just before
the handover of sovereignty.' 0
It is not difficult to imagine that China might have deliberately
delayed the establishment of the CFA in order to increase its control over
it. China spent 1993 getting upset at the electoral reform introduced by
99. Id.
100. What They Said Before, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 10, 1995, at 3.
101. Holberton, supra note 74, at 3.
102. Connie Law & Catherine Ng, Legal Profession, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 10,
1995, at 3.
103. Graham Hutchings, International: Hong Kong Rages Against New Court, SUNDAY
TELEGRAPH LONDON, June 11, 1995, at 25.
104. Id.
105. Holberton, supra note 74, at 3.
106. Id.
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Governor Patten and refused to consider the CFA issue in most of 1994.107
July 1, 1997, can arguably be a logical date for the CFA to start operating
since the Privy Council will stop hearing cases from Hong Kong on June
30, 1997.1' However, if there are aspects of the CFA which are
inconsistent with the agreement and the Basic Law, could one rely solely
on the good faith of China to make any needed correction? It is anybody's
guess now.
D. The Four To One Fornula
Both the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law allow the CFA to
invite "judges from other common law jurisdictions to sit on the [CFA]. "'0
Legco rejected the 1991 CFA agreement largely because it allowed only
one foreign judge to be on the CFA bench."'0 However, the June 1995
CFA agreement mirrored that of 1991 in the ratio of judges for the CFA:
"[The CFAI would consist in each sitting of the Chief Justice, three
permanent Hong Kong judges and one non-permanent judge, who could be
from Hong Kong or from another common law jurisdiction. The
permanent and non-permanent Hong Kong judges could be either local or
expatriate.""' The Chief Justice of the CFA must be a Chinese citizen
who is a permanent HKSAR resident with no right of abode in any foreign
country."2
There are primarily three concerns over allowing only one foreign
judge in the CFA. First, the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law allow the
invitation of judges to sit on the bench. The plural form is indicative of
more than just one. Therefore, the CFA agreement's limitation of only
one judge is allegedly in violation of the Joint Declaration and the Basic
Law." 3 Secondly, the reason for appointing a foreign judge in the CFA is
to increase CFA's independence." 4 The more foreign judges on the bench,
107. Fitzsimons, supra note 38.
108. See No Kwai-Yan, Pledge on Handover of Appeals, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug.
17, 1995, at 4.
109. Joint Declaration, supra note 20, at annex I, § III, 4; The Basic Law Of The Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region Of The People's Republic Of China, Adopted by the Seventh
National People's Congress at its Third Session, Apr. 4, 1990, ch. IV, § 4, art. 82. (Apr. 1,
1997) <http://www.cityu.edu.hk/BasicLaw/cp4-4.htm>.
110. Fitzsimons, supra note 38.
111. See infra Appendix B.
112. The Basic Law Of The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Of The People's
Republic Of China, Adopted by the Seventh National People's Congress at its Third Session, Apr.
4, 1990, ch. IV, § 4, art. 90. (Apr. 1, 1997) <http://www.cityu.edu.hk/BasicLaw/cp4-4.htm>.
113. Dick Thornburgh, A Blow to Hong Kong's Future, WASH. POST, July 30, 1995, at C9.
114. Rosario, supra note 53, at 20.
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the more resistant the CFA will be against China's influence.' " Thirdly,
limiting the bench to only one foreign judge also means that four judges
must be chosen from a limited pool of judges "potentially susceptible to
Chinese government influence" and thereby compromising the
independence and efficiency of the CFA. 116 Some worry that Hong Kong
does not "have enough legal talent available to give the court the stature it
needs to win the confidence of international investors."" 7 In addition,
despite the criteria listed in the Joint Declaration which states that "judges
shall be chosen by reference to their judicial qualities,""'  China has
already expressed its desire to pick judges "for their political reliability
rather than their knowledge of colonial laws."" 9
It is important to note that only the Chief Justice needs to be Hong
Kong Chinese. The three other permanent judges may be of any
nationality. 2 o Further, article 92 of the Basic Law authorizes recruiting of
even permanent judges from other common law jurisdiction.
Consequently, it is possible to have a CFA bench consisting of only one
Hong Kong Chinese (the Chief Justice), three British expatriate permanent
judges, and a foreign non-permanent judge. On the other hand, all five
members of the bench may be of Chinese ancestry. Therefore, the
combination of the CFA is actually quite flexible. It is somewhat
remarkable that China would let any foreign judge be on the bench at all
because "China believes allowing the court to be transposed from London
to Hong Kong rather than to Beijing, and allowing any foreigner at all to
sit on the bench, are major concessions of Chinese sovereignty."'' Given
these considerations, the limitation of only one foreign judge on the CFA
bench is perhaps not unreasonable.1'2
It is beyond dispute that the quality of the CFA bench controls the
independence of the CFA. 12 The permission to allow expatriates to be
permanent judges in the CFA offers reasonable safeguards to their qualities
115. Thornburgh, supra note 113, at C9.
116. Rosario, supra note 44, at 26.
117. Mike Steinberger, Companies Ring-Fence Assets in Hong Kong Twilight Raid, TIME
(London), Aug. 4, 1995, available in 1995 WL 7688478.
118. Joint Declaration, supra note 20, at annex I, § I1, & 3.
119. Gilley, supra note 76, at 36.
120. Noakes, supra note 17, at 48.
121. Wing Kay Po, The Sound and the Fury of the Court of Final Appeal, E. EXPRESS, May
3, 1995, at 15.
122. Fitzsimons, supra note 38.
123. Wai-Kong Fung, Legal Councillor in Neutral Stance, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept.
28, 1995, at 6.
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and impartiality. On the five-member bench, unless there are three or
more foreign justices coming from other jurisdictions not susceptible to
China's influence, there is a potential that the CFA is under, even
indirectly, the influence of China. In this limited sense, the CFA is never
sure to be totally neutral. China obviously will not allow more than one
foreign judge to be in the CFA, let alone three. Since the HKSAR will
after all be a part of China, and the CFA will be the highest court in the
region, China's concession of allowing one foreign judge on the CFA
bench is not entirely unjustified. Arguing in favor of the combination of
the CFA, Commissioner Wiggham of Hong Kong Economic & Trade
Affairs questioned: "[c]an you imagine a law requiring a foreigner on the
U.S. Supreme Court?" 1'2 Although the analogy is not completely correct,
the argument may be applicable with respect to the CFA.
E. China Dropped Demand on Post-Verdict Remedial Mechanism
Britain claimed that China also made compromises on the CFA
agreement. China had insisted on the CFA agreement giving the Chief
Executive the power to overturn CFA decisions, although this would have
been in violation of both the letter and spirit of the Joint Declaration and
the Basic Law.1 5 China had wanted this post verdict remedial mechanism
based on the fear that the CFA might render erroneous decisions which
would leave it with no recourse.
The June CFA agreement addressed this issue in paragraph 2,
which reads:
[t]he Chinese side agrees to the British side amending the
Court of Final Appeal Bill to make it clear that Section
83P of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance applies in a case
where an appeal has been heard and determined by the
Court of Final Appeal, and that there is therefore no need
for further legislative or other provisions in relation to the
power to inquire into the constitutionality of laws or to
provide for post-verdict remedial mechanisms. 1 26
Applying section 83P of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance to the CFA
means that the Chief Executive may direct the CFA to retry a case upon
124. Wiggham, supra note 7, at A16.
125. China's Day in Court, TIMES (London), June 10, 1995, at 18, available in 1995 WL
7674680.
126. See infra, Appendix A.
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receiving new and relevant evidence.121 This provision is a lesser evil than
granting the Chief Executive an outright power to overturn CFA cases, but
it nonetheless leaves the door ajar for interference from the Chief
Executive.'1 The comforting thoughts are that the Chief Executive's
power to reopen cases under this provision is limited to only criminal cases
and contingent upon the discovery of new and relevant evidence. Lee did
not consider the dropping of the post-verdict remedial mechanism as a
concession for China because such mechanism was unnecessary in light of
the CFA agreement; China has already gained the power to remove any
cases from the jurisdiction of the CFA before the verdict under the acts of
state clause. 29 Lee's positions may be extreme but are valid interpretations
of the CFA agreement.
V. THE DEGREE OF INDEPENDENCE OF THE CFA AND THE
SURVIVAL OF RULE OF LAW IN HONG KONG
The CFA agreement has concluded, and Britain and China are on
their way to organizing the court. Will the CFA be able to ensure the
continuation of rule of law in Hong Kong? Will China refrain from
interfering with the decisions of the CFA given the holes in the CFA
agreement? The author proposes to answer these questions by examining
China's internal and external restraints on exercising controls over the
CFA.
A. China's Internal Restaint - its Respect for Rule of Law
Rule of law, as the contemporary world knows it, was not a
prominent part of Chinese history. In fact, "part of China's tradition
includes a hostility to law and to lawyers.",'n The Confucians believed that
people ought to govern themselves "in a general code of morality and
ritual and strongly opposed publicly promulgated laws."'' In conjunction
with this sentiment towards law, China was, for a long time, ruled by
emperors. The emperors and their officials, without exception, had "an
absolute right to rule and the people were under an absolute obligation to
obey. There was no conception of government powers being limited by
127. No Kwai-Yan & Quinton Chan, Jurisdiction, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 10,
1995, at 3.
128. Id.
129. Lee, supra note 1, at 10.
130. Michael H. Armacost, The People's Republic of China: Economic Reform,
Modernization and the Law, 3 CHINA L. REP. 153, 157 (1986).
131. Id.
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law ... ",32 Law was only viewed as the means of "dealing with crime
and punishment. . . .-,"
Today's Communist Chinese attitudes concerning the rule of law
do not deviate substantially from its Confucian tradition. The Central
Government controls all phases of the country's operation, and every
person and organization must obey the centralized leadership of the
Communist Party. ,'4 Appointed government officials often assume both the
executive and judicial roles." The law, including the Chinese
Constitution, is malleable by the leaders and subject to change at any given
time. 1 6  Important policies can be made in China absent any statutory
authorities.' 7 Although the development of the Chinese legal system has
been remarkable and rapid,'3 the legal system is still only developing.' 39
Some judges in China can still be bought.' ' ° Chinese courts that are
supposedly independent are not really independent because of the
"complete and well-entrenched executive bureaucracy" and "an
incomplete and tentative legal system."' 4' Additionally, there are those
who stand to lose under rule of law because the current state of law in
China allows them to "punish political dissenters, intimidate critics, take
care of their friends and enrich their families without fear of lawsuits." 2
Rule of law, therefore, is not a concept commonly practiced in China.
132. Albert H. Y. Chen, Civil Liberties in China: Some Preliminary Observations, in CIVIL
LIBERTIES IN HONG KONG 107, 108 (Raymond Wacks ed., 1988).
133. Id. at 109.
134. A BASIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA 71 (Norman
Bethne Institute trans., 1976).
135. Armacost, supra note 130, at 158.
136. David A. Jones, Jr., A Leg to Stand On? Post-1997 Hong Kong Courts as a Constraint
on PRC Abridgment of Individual Rights and Local Autonomy, 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 250, 265-66
(1987); Editorial, Whose Law in Hong Kong, WASH. POST, June 12, 1995, at A18.
137. For example:
[t]he fact that Deng Xiaoping is the highest decision-maker in China today cannot be
derived from the constitution of the PRC. And the crucial decision to suppress the
students' prodemocracy movement of April-June 1989 was not in reality made by any
of the state organs provided for in the constitution.
Chen, supra note 15, at 384.
138. See Gan Chongdou, Open Policy Updates China's Legal System, 3 CHINA L. REP.
163, 163 (1986).
139. Jamie P. Horsley, Comments on Laws and Legal Developments Affecting Foreign
Investment in China, 3 CHINA L. REP. 175, 176 (1986).
140. Noakes, supra note 17, at 48.
141. Stephen G. Wood & Liu Chong, China's Adminstrative Procedure Law: An English
Translation with Comments, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 89, 93 (1991).
142. Jones, supra note 136, at A18.
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What do all these mean to the CFA and the rule of law in
HKSAR? First, it is very unusual for the centralized Chinese Government
to grant so much autonomous power to a region, as Hong Kong will soon
enjoy. "One country, two systems""4 3 is a novel idea that poses a certain
degree of threats to some leaders in China.'" Not everyone in China was
happy about the Joint Declaration and how the reversion of Hong Kong
would take place.'15 Ji Pengfei'"4 understood these China's concerns.
When he presented the Draft Basic Law to the NPC in 1990, he carefully
explained the decision of vesting the HKSAR with the power of final
adjudication;
[t]he draft vests the courts of the [HKSAR] with
independent judicial power, including that of final
adjudication. This is certainly a very special situation
wherein courts in a local administrative region enjoy the
power of final adjudication. Nevertheless, in view of the
fact that Hong Kong will practice social and legal systems
different from the mainland's, this provision is
necessary. 14
Will China be content with the power that it has given to Hong
Kong? Keeping in mind that the Chinese government can easily bypass its
own law to achieve its objectives in China, one could imagine it must be
tempting for China, after 1997, to exert its power over the HKSAR and
taint the rule of law system so carefully preserved by the Basic Law.
Secondly, it is natural to equate the Basic Law as Hong Kong's
mini-constitution.'" However, it is a bad idea if China does so. China
views its constitutions differently from the west. Instead of treating its
constitutions as the "embodiments of unchanging principles binding on the
government," China has changed its constitutions frequently since the PRC
was formed. 4 9  Therefore, it is more accurate to characterize these
143. The Basic Law Of The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Of The People's
Republic Of China, Adopted by the Seventh National People's Congress at its Third Session, Apr.
4, 1990, preamble. (Apr. 1, 1997) <http://www.cityu.edu.hk/BasicLaw/preamble.htm>.
144. Jones, supra note 136, at A18.
145. Hsu & Baker, supra note 35, at 321-22.
146. Chairman of the Drafting Committee for the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China.
147. BASIC LAW, supra note 28, at App. (Explanations on "The Basic Law of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China (Draft)" and Its Related
Documents, Mar. 28, 1990, at 71, 79).
148. See Abrahamson, supra note 14.
149. Jones, supra note 136, at 265-66.
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documents as "descriptions of prevailing policy aspirations.' China's
cavalier attitude towards its constitutions is reflective of its treatment to
rule of law. Therefore, as the CFA agreement has incorporated article 19
of the Basic Law, the CFA agreement can be modified by amending the
Basic Law, which is within the power of the NPC.'5 ' Although the Basic
Law states that "[n]o amendment to this Law shall contravene the
established basic policies of the [PRC] regarding Hong Kong,"'5 2 this is
really not much of a safeguard given that the Standing Committee of the
NPC has the power to interpret the Basic Law.' 3 For these reasons,
China's internal restraint, which is its respect to rule of law, may not be
sufficient to prevent it from interfering with the CFA.
B. China's External Restraint - Reactions of Business in Hong Kong
and the World Towards an Ineffective CFA
China's interests in the continued prosperity of Hong Kong are
substantial. '5 Despite Shanghai's development, Hong Kong will remain
China's most important financial center after 1997.11, Hong Kong serves
as a gateway for foreign investment in China, and China has no rational
reasons to tamper with that.' 6  In fact, the success of China's rapid
economic development depends on the support of Hong Kong.' 7
Consequently, "[e]ven the pessimists ... in Hong Kong don't express the
fear that China will suddenly impose an iron hand on Hong Kong or seek
to punish it for its success."I'
Business thrives under the current Hong Kong legal system. The
business world responded favorably to the CFA agreement because the
agreement eliminated a lot of uncertainties with respect to the post-1997
150. Id.
151. The Basic Law Of The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Of The People's
Republic Of China, Adopted by the Seventh National People's Congress at its Third Session, Apr.
4, 1990, ch. VIII, art. 159 (Apr. 1, 1997) <http://www.cityu.edu.hk/BasicLaw/cp8.htm>.
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154. Sean Kennedy, A-Plus Rating for "Goose's Golden Eggs," S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Aug. 11, 1995, at 10.
155. Karen E. House, Why Hong Kong Must Remain Hong Kong, WALL ST. J., June 6,
1995, at A18.
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judicial system in Hong Kong.1S9 Hong Kong's credit rating raised as a
result of the agreement."
However, it is evident that investors are cautious about the
agreement. Since the negotiation between Britain and China began over a
decade ago, 261 of the 529 listed companies in Hong Kong have shifted
their legal domiciles to Bermuda and another fifty to the Cayman Islands. 16
Both places' courts of final appeal are the Privy Council in London.'16
These companies have not relocated back to Hong Kong because of the
CFA agreement. Further, some companies have even attempted to bypass
Hong Kong's legal system by either putting arbitration clauses in their
contracts' 3 or by stipulating the governing law of their contracts not be
Hong Kong's nor China's.' Some believe that these companies have not
lost faith in Hong Kong's future but are merely handling uncertainty in a
harmless way.'6 However, the measures taken by these companies clearly
demonstrate that they are willing and prepared to pull out of Hong Kong if
it becomes necessary.
Investors are not the only group whose interests are at stake on the
CFA issue. Taiwan also watches the situation closely. The way China
handles Hong Kong will set a precedent for its ability to respect the rule of
law and the one country, two systems idea.'66
In short, Hong Kong's prosperity and status as a financial center
are crucial to China's economy. Investment may stop if investors believe
that the Hong Kong legal system has become a lottery after 1997.167 China
knows it. In today's electronic age, money that flows into a region or
country overnight can leave just as quickly. '16 Further, if China is serious
about attracting Taiwan for reunification, its treatment towards Hong Kong
will speak louder than any treaties than can be conceived. These are the
external restraints faced by China in how it will handle the CFA. They are
strong and very real.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The CFA agreement reflects two competing interests. The Basic
Law guarantees that "the socialist system and policies shall not be
practiced in the [HKSAR], and the previous capitalist system and way of
life shall remain unchanged for fifty years." 19 Therefore, it is in the
interest of Hong Kong to carve out a specific and explicit CFA agreement
that establishes the precise jurisdiction and power of the CFA.7 0 On the
other hand, the last thing that China wants is a CFA agreement that is too
restrictive, leaving no wiggle room at all for China. 7' China needs
flexibility and the ability to interfere with the operation of the CFA
"without violating its international obligations."'
Britain considered the CFA agreement to be the best it could be
under the circumstances.3 It was either the June agreement or no
agreement at all.'7 4 The CFA agreement has its weak points, but it did
remove some uncertainty about Hong Kong's future judicial system and
revealed how much control China really wants over the CFA. Blatant
violation of the CFA agreement and the rule of law by China is unlikely
because of the potential reactions from the business community and its
possible far-reaching repercussions on China's own economy and the
Taiwan issue.
The CFA agreement is a compromise. China has obtained the
control that it needed to remove important cases from the jurisdiction of
the CFA under the acts of state clause. It is uncertain, however, how
frequently, and under what circumstances, China will exercise this power.
Excess exercise of this power will render CFA's final adjudication power a
nullity. However, discretion over acts of state on China's part also means
there is room for negotiations and restraints. Therefore, mature and
skilled diplomatic relationships and negotiation with China, ironically, may
better ensure Hong Kong's continuation of rule of law.", A statement
made by Alice Tai, Hong Kong Judiciary Administrator, about the CFA
perhaps most succinctly captures the author's feeling towards the CFA
agreement and the future rule of law of the HKSAR:
169. The Basic Law Of The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Of The People's
Republic Of China, Adopted by the Seventh National People's Congress at its Third Session, Apr.
4, 1990, ch. I, art. 5 (Apr. 1, 1997) <http://www.cityu.edu.hk/BasicLaw/cpl.htm>.
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[p]redictions of a doomsday scenario after 1997 did
nothing but damage . . there were bound to be teething
problems as the Judiciary adapted to changing
circumstances and the setting up of the Court of Final
Appeal. During these years we may well be gritting our
teeth. But so long as we are confident, then our courts
will mature and we will have a conduit for success . . a
certain amount of skepticism among Hong Kong people
was understandable because they had the most to lose. But
if there was only criticism and talk of the system of justice
not working, it would lead to people becoming
disheartened .... 176
When Lee moved for the no-confidence vote against Governor
Patten, was he really making a no-confidence vote on the future of Hong
Kong? When Legco defeated the no-confidence vote and supported
Governor Patten, did the Legco at the same time indirectly cast a
confidence vote on the CFA and the future rule of law in Hong Kong?
The author has confidence in Hong Kong's future rule of law and the
CFA, not because of the CFA agreement, but because of the ability of the
people in Hong Kong to turn a bad situation around and make the best out
of it.
APPENDIX A
THE CFA AGREEMENT, reprinted in S. CHINA MORNING POST, June
10, 1995, at 2.
THIS is the full text signed between the senior British and Chinese
representatives of the [Joint Liaison Group]:
AFTER full consultations, the two sides of the Sino-British Joint
Liaison Group have reached the following agreement on the question of
the Court of Final Appeal in Hong Kong:
1. The British side agrees to amend the Court of Final Appeal Bill
on the basis of the eight suggestions published by the Political Affairs Sub-
group of the Preliminary Working Committee of the Preparatory
Committee of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region on May 16,
1995.
2. The Chinese side agrees to the British side amending the Court
of Final Appeal Bill to make it clear that Section 83P of the Criminal
176. Cliff Buddle, Doomsayers 'Hurt Faith in Legal System " S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Sept. 24, 1995, at 4.
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Procedure Ordinance applies in a case where an appeal has been heard and
determined by the Court of Final Appeal, and that there is therefore no
need for further legislative or other provisions in relation to the power to
inquire into the constitutionality of laws or to provide for post-verdict
remedial mechanisms.
3. The British side agrees to amend the Court of Final Appeal Bill
to include the formulation of acts of state in Article 19 of the Basic Law
and to provide that the Court of Final Appeal Ordinance shall not come
into operation before 30 June, 1997.
4. The Chinese side agrees that, after the Chinese and British
sides reach this agreement, the legislative procedures for the Court of
Final Appeal Bill, on which the two sides have reached a consensus
through consultation, will be taken forward immediately to enable them to
be completed as soon as possible before the end of July 1995. The
Chinese side will adopt a positive attitude in this regard.
5. The Chinese and British sides agree that the team designate of
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall, with the British side
(including relevant Hong Kong Government departments) participating in
the process and providing its assistance, be responsible for the preparation
for the establishment of the Court of Final Appeal on 1 July, 1997 in
accordance with the Basic Law and consistent with the provisions of the
Court of Final Appeal Ordinance.
APPENDIX B
Statement about the Court of Final Appeal in the Legislative Council on
June 9, 1995
The following is the transcript of the Governor, the Right
Honorable Christopher Patten's statement about the Court of Final Appeal
in the Legislative Council on June 9, 1995:
Mr. President, I would like to make a statement about the Court of
Final Appeal.
Late last night, the British and Chinese experts in the Joint Liaison
Group reached agreement on the establishment of the Court of Final
Appeal. The agreement was signed by the Senior Representatives to the
[Joint Liaison Group] at 2:30 p.m. this afternoon, following endorsement
of its terms by the Executive Council this morning.
Members have before them the text of the agreement, which we
are of course publishing in full. It is an agreement which I am entirely
satisfied is in the interests of Hong Kong. It carries the full support of the
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British, Chinese and Hong Kong Governments and I recommend it to this
Council.
Accordingly, we are getting the draft Bill on the Court of Final
Appeal this afternoon, and will introduce it into this Council on June 14.
Before coming to the terms of the agreement itself, let me remind
Honorable Members briefly of the history of the Court of Final Appeal
issue.
Both the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law provide for Hong
Kong to have its own Court of Final Appeal to fill the role now performed
by the Judicial Committee the Privy Council after the transfer of
sovereignty on June 30, 1997. In September 1991, Britain and China
reached agreement in the [Joint Liaison Group] on the early establishment
of the CFA, and on its composition. It would consist in each sitting of the
Chief Justice, three permanent Hong Kong judges and one non-permanent
judge, who could be from Hong Kong or from another common law
jurisdiction. The permanent and non-permanent Hong Kong judges could
be either local or expatriate.
In December 1991, however, this Council passed a motion seeking
greater flexibility in the appointment of overseas judges than was provided
for in the 1991 agreement. Subsequently, the Chinese side made it clear
that they were not prepared to re-negotiate the agreement or allow a CFA
set up on any other basis to survive 1997. So the only effect of the Legco
vote was to oblige the Hong Kong Government to delay the introduction of
the CFA Bill into Legco.
We nevertheless began to draft the Bill, which Members will soon
see is a long and complex one. In May 1994, we handed the draft Bill to
the Chinese side for comments. The Chinese asked for expert talks in late
March this year, and since then there have been four rounds, which
culminated in the agreement we reached last night.
The agreement means that we can now be certain that the CFA to
be set up on July 1, 1997 will be a proper Court of Final Appeal that will,
subject to the Basic Law, have the same function and jurisdiction as the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. It also means that our CFA Bill
will provide the legislative basis for establishing the Court in Hong Kong
on July 1, 1997. Our aim is to enact the Bill before the end of the current
legislative session.
Let me now take Honorable Members through the five key points
of the agreement in slightly more detail.
Point one sets out our agreement to amend the CFA Bill on the
basis of the eight suggestions made by the PWC Political Affairs Sub-
Group on May 16. As Honorable Members will know, we have
previously agreed to incorporate most of these points into the CFA Bill.
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We sought clarification from the Chinese side on the two points about
which we had reservations. These were related to the procedure for
appointing the Chief Justice and the question of the extension of the term
of judges beyond retirement age. We are now satisfied that they are
consistent with the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law.
On the first point, the Chinese side clarified that the independent
Commission referred to in Article 88 of the Basic Law will be chaired by
the Chief Justice after the first SAR Chief Justice has been appointed. The
recommendation in respect of the appointment of the first Chief Justice
will be made by the other members of the Commission. The Chief
Executive will conduct this meeting of the Commission, but will take no
part in making the recommendation. There is therefore no question of the
independence of the Commission being undermined; and once the first
Chief Justice has been appointed, the Chief Executive will have no further
role in the conduct of Commission meetings.
On the second point we were concerned that the PWC suggestion
that extensions of service beyond retirement age should be made by the
Chief Executive in accordance with the recommendations of the Chief
Justice was inconsistent with the provision in Article 88 of the Basic Law
that judges should be appointed by the Chief Executive in accordance with
the recommendation of the independent Commission. However, the
Chinese side pointed out that there is no specific reference in the Basic
Law to the procedure for extending the term of judges beyond retirement
age. The fact that at present the JSC advises on these extensions is a
procedure, rather than a legal requirement. So we agree that this
suggestion would not be a violation of the Basic Law. The Chief Justice,
in making recommendations to the Chief Executive, would of course not
be precluded from seeking advice from the Commission.
Point 2 of the Agreement sets out our agreement to make a
consequential amendment to the CFA Bill to put beyond doubt that section
83P of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance will also apply to an appeal
which has been heard and determined by the CFA. This section provides
that the Governor may refer a case to the Court of Appeal when, for
example, new evidence comes to light which shows that a conviction was
unsafe. It applies at present to a Hong Kong appeal which has been heard
and determined by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.
The latter part of Point 2 of the Agreement sets out the Chinese
side's agreement that there is no need for any further legislative or other
provisions in relation to the power of the courts to inquire into the
constitutionality of laws or to provide for post-verdict remedial
mechanisms. We consider this an extremely important point, as it will
ensure that the jurisdiction of the CFA will, subject to the provisions of the
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Basic Law, be the same as that of the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council.
Point 3 of the agreement contains our agreement that the CFA
Ordinance shall not come into operation before June 30, 1997. On this
basis, we have agreed to include in the CFA Bill the formulation of acts of
state in Article 19 of the [Basic Law], which will in any case apply as from
July 1, 1997.
Point 4 is important in that it makes clear that China agrees with
the CFA Bill and is content that it should be taken forward immediately.
The early enactment of the CFA Bill will ensure that the CFA to be set up
on July 1, 1997 will be based on the principles and practices of the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council and that it will be a genuine Court of
Final Appeal.
The preparations for the setting up of the CFA on July 1, 1997 are
set out in Point 5 of the Agreement. This will be undertaken by the team
designated for the SAR, with the participation and assistance of the British
side, including the relevant Hong Kong Government departments. The
Chinese side have told us that the term team designate refers to the Chief
Executive (designate) and the principal officers (designate) of the SAR
Government, together with others qualified to take part in the
establishment of the SAR. Once the CFA Bill has been enacted, we will
be discussing with the Chinese side the modalities of this cooperation.
Honorable Members and the business community have
understandably been concerned about the possibility of a judicial vacuum
in the hiatus between the end of the role of the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council and the establishment of the Court of Final Appeal. This
agreement will avoid any question of a judicial vacuum in 1997. It will
not occur before July 1, 1997, because the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council will keep its jurisdiction to hear appeals from Hong Kong courts
until June 30, 1997. We have obtained the British Government's
assurance that the Privy Council will continue to hear appeals from Hong
Kong up until the last possible date, and will make every effort to ensure
that outstanding business from Hong Kong is dealt with before July 1,
1997. And there will not be a vacuum after July 1, 1997, because the
CFA will be operational on that date, all the necessary preparations having
been made beforehand. The CFA Bill contains sensible transitional
provisions for any outstanding cases to be transferred from the Privy
Council to the CFA. We will be discussing with the Privy Council and the
team designate practical arrangements for putting these provisions into
effect.
As Honorable Members know, in 1991 our aim was to establish
the Court as soon as possible to give it time to build up experience before
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the transfer of sovereignty. In my view it would plainly have been better
had we been able to set the Court up earlier than 1997. That has always
been my preference. But Members made it clear in 1991 that they did not
wish to proceed on the basis of the 1991 agreement.
Until very recently, we were facing the unenviable choice of either
introducing the CFA Bill into Legco without Chinese agreement and no
guarantee that any Court set up as a result would survive 1997, or leaving
the establishment of the Court to the [HKSAR] after July 1, 1997. The
agreement we have now concluded gives us, gives this Council, the means
by which we can guarantee the nature of the CFA to be set up on July 1,
1997, guarantee its establishment in accordance with a Bill passed by this
Council this year, and guarantee that it will endure.
For too long there has been uncertainty about the CFA. As
Honorable Members know, the people of Hong Kong and international
investors want to know now how the Court will be set up, when it will be
set up and what sort of Court it will be. By enacting the Bill that we will
introduce next Wednesday, this Council can answer these questions.
You have before you what I believe to be a good agreement. It is
an agreement which provides for a Court to be set up entirely in
accordance with the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law, ready to start
work on July 1, 1997. It offers the prospect of a Court that will, subject to
the Basic Law, have precisely the same function and jurisdiction as the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. It offers the certainty of
continuity because the Court will be set up with unequivocal Chinese
support. It offers certainty about the terms of the Court because this
Council will be able to pass the necessary legislation to set those terms in
concrete before the end of July. I recommend this agreement to the
Council and I very much hope that Honorable Members will support the
Bill when it is introduced into the Council.
APPENDIX C
Rule of Law Defined. Peter Wesley-Smith, Protecting Human Rights in
Hong Kong, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN HONG KONG 17, 18-19 (Raymond
Wacks ed., 1992).
The Rule of Law can be explained in terms of six overlapping
principles. First legal doctrine is a formal and rational system: its
precepts are self-consistent and generalized, made by persons with
acknowledged lawmaking competence in accordance with a regular, open
procedure. This means that the law can be described and known and acted
upon independently of its political and economic context; its institutions,
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its methodology, and its personnel are autonomous vis-a-vis other areas of
social life. Law can be ascertained in an impartial manner by anyone
trained in its techniques. This requires that all law is published and
available and that the relationship between different types of law is settled.
Judges, who ultimately identify and apply law, have very little discretion,
and thus they dispense a kind of justice which can be described as formal--
resulting from the regular application of pre-existing doctrine to neutrality
ascertained facts--rather than substantive or intuitive. The law is therefore
certain and predictable and applied equally to all persons.
Secondly, law is the antithesis of arbitrary power. It does not
depend on whim or caprice but on fixed rules existing prior to conduct
which is subject to their standards; it is prospective in operation, not
retrospective. No person ought to be condemned by the legal system
except for a breach of established law ascertained by the law's impartial
tribunals, whereas the exercise of arbitrary power (that is, behavior which
is indifferent to the law) can be prevented or subsequently condemned by
agents of the legal system.
Thirdly, the law applies equally to all persons, whatever their
social status, rank, class, political influence, physical strength, wealth,
ideological commitment, race, nationality, or sex. Even government
officials, lawmakers, and judges are subject to the general law in the same
manner as ordinary citizens. The law is no respecter of persons; it is
capable of being applied impartially by independent judges and officials
acting in obedience to judicial and legislative commands.
Fourthly, judges are independent of political and personal
pressure; their duty is to make findings of fact and to ascertain and apply
the law in a neutral manner without regard to the wishes of the executive
arm of government. They are experts (in the "artificial reason of the
law") whose independence is institutionally guaranteed and who may
review the legality of all behavior, including the fashioning of law and its
execution. They may not, however, have a personal interest in
proceedings; they are bound to decide in accordance with law, not
personal preference. Lawyers, too, are obliged to present cases to the best
of their ability, regardless of their own views as to the moral or political
worth of their clients. All citizens are entitled to equal access to the legal
system through remedies which relate to their rights, and to be heard, to
know the allegations against them, and to have their conduct assessed by
impartial judges.
Fifthly, law is capable of guiding an individual's behavior. Its
purpose is to provide a measure for the conduct of human affairs, and thus
it is general rather than particular, and it is published, prospective,
19971 873
874 ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law [Vol. 3:843
comprehensible, consistent, constant, fairy administered, and able to be
obeyed.
Finally, law is advantageous to the individual: it stabilizes social
relationships, providing a settled framework for social intercourse; it
promotes order and personal security and an environment conducive to
economic welfare; it respects human dignity and individual autonomy; and
it ensures a reliable, predictable kind of justice. Without these virtues the
systematic provision and maintenance of civil liberties would be
impossible.
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In the early morning hours of September 3, 1996, the United
States conducted military strikes against an old foe., Once again United
States guns were discharging upon the nation of Iraq and its obstinate
leader, Saddam Hussein. In addition to striking at Hussein's defenses,
President Bill Clinton extended the already existing no-fly zone south of
the thirty-second parallel to the thirty-third parallel. 2 The strikes were not
only to punish Hussein for his incursion into the northern Kurdish conflict
plaguing Iraq since the end of the Gulf War, but to, "protect the safety of
our aircraft enforcing this [extended] no fly zone." 3
The United States' military strikes were unquestionably unilateral
and stirred unprecedented wavering responses from the international
community, especially, the Gulf War Coalition [hereinafter the Coalition].
Many question the legality of President Clinton's extension of the no-fly.
This comment will examine the illegality of the extension of the southern
no-fly zone in light of United Nations Security Council Resolutions
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1998, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center. The author would like to thank
his family, and especially Jacqueline Rodriguez, for their support and encouragement.
1. Bradley Graham, U.S. Launches More Cruise Missiles Against Iraq; Air Defenses Near
Baghdad Hit; No-Fly Zone Extended in South, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 1996, at Al.
2. Id.
3. Letter Dated 3 September 1996 from the Charge D'Affaires A.1. of the Permanent
Mission of the United States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the
Security Council, U.N. SCOR, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/1996/711 (1996) [hereinafter Letter dated 3
September 1996].
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[hereinafter Resolutions] as well as offer some counter-arguments that may
provide satisfactory justification for this United States unilateral response
to Hussein's intervention in the northern Kurdish conflict. The first part of
this comment shall address Saddam Hussein's actions after the Gulf War
and the incessant testing of the United States, the United Nations, and the
Coalition's resolve to enforce Resolutions, as well as international law and
recognized international behavior.
The second part will examine at the United States unilateral
response to the Iraqi intervention in the Kurdish civil disturbances in
northern Iraq and the Clinton Administration's reasoning for the extension
of the thirty-second parallel. The third portion will examine the original
creation and imposition of the Iraqi no-fly zones and their probable
illegality, as well as its legal relationship to the current extension by the
Clinton administration. The final portion of the comment will establish the
probable illegality of the current extension, but will present some viable
arguments for its necessity in light of the unprecedented international legal
quandary offered by the current Iraqi conflict.
I. THE ROAD TO THE PRESENT CONFLICT
Since the end of hostilities in the Gulf War, Iraq has tested the
resolve of both the United Nations and the Coalition. The situation in the
Middle East and Iraq following the cease fire was "far from peaceful. "4
One example is the conflict which arose between the International Atomic
Energy Agency [hereinafter IAEA] and Iraq over nuclear inspections
mandated by Resolution 687.1 Iraq has repeatedly hindered nuclear
weapons inspections conducted by the IAEA. Following the Gulf War, the
IAEA was aware of Iraq's possession of nuclear material that was in a
"readily nuclear-weapons-usable form," or "direct-use material. "6 Due to
the presence of these volatile materials, the United Nations mandated
inspections to ensure that Iraq would not develop weapons of mass
destruction.' From the very beginning, Iraq's compliance was
unsatisfactory. Iraq repeatedly concealed evidence on uranium enrichment
and nuclear weapons development.' It denied access to agency teams and
4. Alan D. Surchin, Terror and the Law: The Unilateral Use of Force and the June 1993
Bombing of Baghdad, 5 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 457, 459 (1995).
5. U.N. DEP'T OF PUB. INFO., U. N. AND THE IRAQ-KUWAIT CONFLICT 1990-1996 at
367, U.N. Doc. S/23295, U.N. Sales No.E.96.I.3 (1996).
6. As of December 17, 1991, 400 grams of unirradiated high-enriched uranium remained
in Iraq. Id. at 368.
7. Id. at 367.
8. Id.
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even detained them on one occasion, confiscating their documents.9 In
addition, Iraq occasionally denied aerial inspections of its territory as
required by the IAEA and Resolution 687.10
By 1992, the Security Council acknowledged Iraq's "lack of
indication of how the government of Iraq intends to comply with the
resolutions of the Council.",, In fact, Iraq had frustrated the Security
Council with "baseless threats, allegations, and attacks launched against
the Security Council by the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq.""' As late as
November 1993, Iraq's declarations regarding nuclear materials in its
possession were still incomplete.'3 Iraq's relationship with the IAEA since
the inspections began was characterized as a "rocky road of
cooperation. "'4
In June 1993, the United States, acting unilaterally, bombed an
Iraqi Intelligence building in Baghdad in retaliation for an alleged
assassination plot against former President George Bush.'" United States
Intelligence officials had informed President Clinton about the plot, which
allegedly had been masterminded by Saddam Hussein.16 Some, including
Great Britain, found this assassination plot to be a violation of Resolution
687, where Iraq promised an end to Iraqi-sponsored terrorism." In
addition to such alleged terrorism, Iraq has been evasive in cooperating
with the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in providing
information on the location of missing Kuwaiti nationals resulting from the
invasion of Kuwait and the Gulf War itself.'8 In fact, as recently as
December 1995, the General Assembly expressed its concern with major
human rights violations in Iraq by condemning the torture, mutilation,
execution, and disappearances of its own citizens.' 9
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. U.N. DEP'T OF PUB. INFO., supra note 5, at 490.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 667.
14. Iraq offered an ultimatum at one point. Early in August 1995, Iraq stated that
.cooperation would cease if no progress was made in the Security Council in the direction of
easing or lifting sanctions and the oil embargo." Id. at 773.
15. David Von Drehle & R. Jeffrey Smith, U.S. Strikes Iraq for Plot to Kill Bush, WASH.
POST, June 27, 1993, at Al.
16. Id.
17. Surchin, supra note 4, at 467.
18. U.N. DEP'T OF PUB. INFO., supra note 5, at 793.
19. Id. at 821.
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Saddam Hussein also challenged the world's military nerves
following the war.? In October of 1994, Iraq conducted military
deployments in the direction of the Kuwait border in violation of paragraph
2 of Resolution 678.2 The United Nations Security Council officially
condemned this action, demanding that Iraq not redeploy troops to the
South or take any other action to enhance its military capacity in southern
Iraq." This official condemnation of Hussein's troop movements
demonstrated the Council's belief Iraq could still pose a threat to the
region.
The initial concern following the end of hostilities which lead to
the original formation of the no-fly zones was the safety of Iraqi nationals
whom had opposed Saddam Hussein, namely the Kurdish in northern and
southern Iraq. 2 Saddam Hussein began repressing those whom opposed
him during the war which led to a United Nations demand through
Security Council Resolution 688 that the repression end.,, The United
States still contends Saddam Hussein, "shows no signs of complying with
United Nations Security Council Resolution 688."2 This type of non-
compliance led the United States and its Coalition partners to establish the
original no-fly zones in June 1991, and in August 1992.26 This type of
non-compliance has also prevented the United Nations from lifting the
embargoes levied against Iraq by Resolution 661 .27
The underlying threat Saddam Hussein presented to the United
States, and at varying times to the Coalition, was Iraq's threat to its
neighbors in the South and consequently, their oil interests2 The United
States believes Hussein's "aggressive military action" constitutes a viable
threat to the flow of oil and the national security of Israel, Jordan, Kuwait,
and Saudi Arabia. 29 These interests are the primary reason why the United
20. Id. at 694.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Bob Deans, Conflict in Iraq: Arab Response, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Sept. 4, 1996,
at 6A.
24. Id.
25. Text of Clinton Letter on Military Force Against Iraq Resolution, U.S. NEWSWIRE,
Nov. 5, 1996.
26. Iraq Protests to U.N. Over No-Fly Zones, REUTERS N. AM. WIRE, Sept. 11, 1996.
27. S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2933rd mtg. & 9(b), U.N. Doc. S/RES/661
(1990).
28. Secretary of Defense William J. Perry & Gen. Joseph Ralston, USAF Vice Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, News Briefing and Question and Answer Session, Pentagon (Sept. 3,
1996) <http://www.dtic.dla.mil/defenselink/pubs/di96/dil179.html>.
29. Id.
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States remains and maintains its presence in the Gulf region.
Nevertheless, Hussein's actions in the North have been sufficient to
demand, according to the White House, a strong response?0
On August 31, 1996, Saddam Hussein sent thirty-thousand Iraqi
troops to assist the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) with the Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan in the Kurdish enclave of Irbil.' Consequently, the
KDP overran their rivals in northern Iraq.32 This Iraqi attack, as the White
House called it, "adds fuel to the factional fire and threatens to spark
instability throughout the region."3  This action resulted in the military
strikes against southern Iraqi defense installations and President Clinton's
extension of the southern no-fly zone from the thirty-second to the thirty-
third parallel.3
II. THE UNITED STATES' UNILATERAL RESPONSE
United States officials conceded that the purpose of the September
3' attacks on the southern defense radar installations was not to "forcibly
evict the Iraqi army from the north," but to "make it safe for American
and other jets to enforce the new restrictions [no-fly zone]." 3 Any type of
military attacks in the north would have posed too many risks and
dangers.36 The terrain is more mountainous than in the South and would
have prevented a quick and effective strike . By all indications, the true
punishment to Hussein for his incursion into the Kurdish conflict was the
extension of the southern no-fly zone. The action was a broad stroke
attempt to restrict and monitor Hussein in his own territory.
As President Clinton stated in his letter to the United Nations,
"[w]e are extending the no-fly zone in southern Iraq airspace from the
Kuwaiti border to the southern suburbs of Baghdad and significantly
restrict Iraq's ability to conduct offensive operations in the region. " 3 The
letter makes no reference to restricting Hussein in the North in a similar
30. Graham, supra note 1.
31. Provocation and Response, ECONOMIST (U.S. ed.), Sept. 7, 1996, at 37.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Graham, supra note 1.
35. John F. Harris & John Mintz, U.S. Warplanes Patrol Wider No-Fly Zone, WASH.
POST, Sept. 5, 1996, at Al.
36. John F. Harris & Bradley Graham, After Quick Response to Iraq, A Lengthy Debate on
Motive; Politics at Home and Abroad Dictated Military Action, Sources Say, WASH. POST, Sept.
8, 1996, at A29.
37. Id.
38. Letter dated 3 September 1996, supra note 3.
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manner and indicates that the Clinton Administration was more concerned
with southern security than protective measures for the Kurdish settlements
in the North.
The extension increases the no-fly zone northward by
approximately 110 kilometers (seventy miles) 9 and curtails Hussein's
military capability in defending Baghdad, advancing towards the South,
and using two major training areas.40 In fact, the United States had even
considered extending a similar restricted zone towards the West, making it
safer for allied aircraft to maneuver between Turkey and Saudi Arabia.4
This plan was abandoned because, as one official said, "one problem with
it was the difficulty we would have explaining it to the public and the
allies. The decision to expand the southern zone was complicated enough
to explain."'
The extension, although denounced by the Iraqi government as a
"flagrant aggression against Iraq's sovereignty and the safety of its
political independence in contravention of United Nations Charter and
norms of international law," abided by the new additional seventy miles of
restricted airspace.4 3 Although the current United States action has served
to control Saddam Hussein further in his quest to reestablish himself
militarily in the South, some argue that the no-fly restrictions imposed
after the Gulf War are most likely illegal" and consequently, so is the
recent extension of the southern zone.
39. Graham, supra note 1.
40. By expanding the southern no fly zone one degree X from the 32nd to the 33rd
parallel, a distance of about seventy miles X officials said Saddarn will be deprived of
two major air force training areas and use of about forty percent of the air defense
capability that existed in the greater Baghdad area. The huge banned area, over half of
Iraq, includes a couple of air bases where the planes have either been moved north or
are presumably grounded.
Id.
41. Harris & Graham, supra note 36.
42. Id.
43. Iraqi helicopters accompanying UN weapons inspectors are providing concrete
proof that Iraq is respecting an expanded no-fly zone which now extends almost to the
Baghdad suburbs, a top UN official said Friday. Rolf Ekeus, the chairman of the UN
Special Commission, told AFP that on Thursday, when he instructed a UN team in
Baghdad to fly for the first time into the new no-fly zone, two Iraqi helicopters
accompanying a UN helicopter had turned sharply to avoid entering the zone.
Iraq Respecting New No-Fly Zone: U.N., AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Sept. 20, 1996.
44. Timothy P. McIlmail, No-Fly Zones: The Imposition and Enforcement of Air Exclusion
Regimes over Bosnia and Iraq, 17 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 35, 83 (1994).
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III. THE ORIGINAL CREATION AND IMPOSITION OF THE No FLY-
ZONES
In June 1991, the Coalition forces, led by the United States,
created a no-fly zone north of the thirty-sixth parallel in Iraq.' In August
1992, a southern no-fly zone was established from the Kuwaiti Border to
the thirty-second parallel. 6 According to the United States Department of
Defense, the "UN authorized the United States to organize a coalition to
conduct Operation Provide Comfort, which enforced a no-fly zone north of
36 degrees, and later authorized Operation Southern Watch, which
enforced a no-fly zone south of 32 degrees."4 7  However, no United
Nations Security Council Resolution specifically authorized or mandated
any member state to take such actions." In fact, the United Nations
acknowledges the restricted zones only by stating that, "some of the
coalition countries, in what they stated was an effort to enforce and
monitor compliance with resolution 688 (1991), created two no-fly
zones"(emphasis added).49 The report goes on to say that, "[a]ccording to
these coalition countries, the cease fire agreement ending the war
empowered them to impose such controls over Iraqi military flights. "5
Although this demonstrates that the Coalition members are acting on their
own initiative, this language hardly condemns the imposition of the zones.
Alan D. Surchin states in his article titled, Terror and the Law:
The Unilateral use of Force and the June 1993 Bombing of Baghdad, that
"it is essential that explanations for controversial uses of force be grounded
in law, not expediency."' The explanations provided by the Gulf War
Coalition for the creation of the no-fly zones are based on their
interpretation of several Security Council Resolutions, including
Resolutions 678, 688, 686, and 687.32 However, the justification provided
for the recent United States action seems limited to the enforcement of
Resolution 688 . 3
45. U.N. DEP'T OF PUB. INFO., supra note 5, at 41.
46. Id.
47. Perry & Ralston, supra note 28.
48. McIlmail, supra note 44, at 49-83.
49. U.N. DEP'T OF PUB. INFO., supra note 5, at 41.
50. Id.
51. Surchin, supra note 4, at 457.
52. McIlmail, supra note 44, at 50-53.
53. "Saddam Hussein shows no signs of complying with UNSCOR 688, which demands
that Iraq cease the repression of its own people." U.S. NEWSWIRE, supra note 25.
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Article 39 of the United Nation's Charter mandates that the
Security Council, "shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations,
or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with articles 41 and
42 to maintain or restore international peace and security." ' This serves
as a statement by the international community on an event or situation,
"thereby focusing international attention on the event and encouraging the
relevant parties to seek an expeditious resolution.""5 This also, "triggers"
the Security Council's ability to, "pursue enforcement powers under
Chapter VII of the Charter," namely articles 40, 41 and 42 .56 Once such a
determination is made, as it was with Iraq's actions against Kuwait, article
42 permits the Security Council to take adequate actions, "by air, sea, or
land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace
and security."57 A member nation, such as the United States, attains its
powers for enforcement of Security Council resolutions from article 49,
which provides that, "[t]he members of the United Nations shall join in
affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by
the Security Council.",,
It seems apparent that the only time a member state may act
unilaterally is under article 51 which states, "[n]othing in the present
Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self
defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations
until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace." 9 In this current situation, as with the conditions
following the Gulf War, the United States has not been attacked, nor has
the Security Council mandated a response by member states.
Resolution 688 was adopted to address and abate a "vast
humanitarian calamity" occurring with approximately 1.5 million Iraqi
citizens, mostly Kurds, "fleeing towards and across bleak mountain
borders with Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran."60 The Security
Council, by the powers of the United Nations Charter under article 2,
paragraph VII, identified this problem as a threat to "international peace
54. CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND STUDIES ON KUWAIT, UNITED NATIONS ROLE IN
MAINTAINING INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY 80, 84 (1995).
55. Sean D. Murphy, The Security Council, Legitimacy, and the Concept of Collective
Security After the Cold War, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 201, 210 (1994).
56. Id.
57. CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND STUDIES ON KUWAIT, supra note 54, at 85.
58. Id. at 87.
59. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
60. U.N. DEP'T OF PUB. INFO., supra note 5, at 40.
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and security in the region."6  Although this resolution exhibits the United
Nation's resolve to condemn and rectify the deteriorating humanitarian
situation in Iraq, it did not create any no-fly zones, nor did it authorize the
United States or any of its Coalition partners to "enforce the demand that
Iraq cease its repression of civilians."62 In its call for action, this
resolution only appeals to the "Member States and to all humanitarian
organizations to contribute to these humanitarian relief efforts. " 3
If the Security Council had intended for the Coalition to directly
enforce its resolution, the Council would have surely used its typical
procedures by including in the resolution a "specific invocation of Chapter
VII authority, an authorization of Member State's action, and the use of
the term all necessary means to indicate authority to use force," as it had
in Resolution 678." Although the Security Council's authorization to use
force has been granted infrequently, there are examples of the Council's
use of specific and unambiguous language. In 1950, the Security Council
permitted member states to "furnish such assistance to South Korea as may
be necessary to repel the attack and restore international peace and security
in the area."6 The Council here allows the "necessary" nature of the
actions to be determined by member states, but limits such action to
"repelling the attack" and restoring of peace and security." When the
Security Council passed Resolution 665, it specifically allowed necessary
measures to be taken to enforce the maritime embargo against Iraq, but
limited the permissible action to the enforcement of the embargo, nothing
else. 67
The Security Council has also used such empowering language in
Resolution 836, stating that member states could take, "all necessary
measures, through the use of air power" in the safe havens of Bosnia-
Herzegovina." Here, the language is specific and unambiguous because it
allows measures to be taken, but limits such measures to air power. If the
61. S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess. at 1, 2982nd mtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES/688
(1991).
62. McIlmail, supra note 44, at 50.
63. S.C. Res. 688, supra note 61.
64. Mclimail, supra note 44, at 50.
65. Murphy, supra note 55, citing S.C. Res 83, U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., at 5, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/83 (1950); S.C. Res. 82, U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., at 4-5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/82 (1950).
66. Id.
67. Alissa Pyrich, United Nations: Authorizations of Use of Force - Security Council
Resolution 665, August 25, 1990 & Security Council Resolution 678, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 270
(1991).
68. S.C. Res. 836, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3228th mtg. at & 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/836
(1993). See also, Murphy, supra note 55, at 232.
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Security Council wished for such force to be used to enforce Resolution
688, there is no reasonable explanation why no specific language was used
to that effect. Therefore, from this narrow interpretation, Resolution 688
does not justify the imposition of the no-fly zones either in northern or
southern Iraq.69
The Coalition, when originally imposing these zones, also relied
on Resolution 678 to justify their actions.7 0 Resolution 678 demanded that
Iraq "comply fully with Resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant
resolutions" and authorized member states "co-operating with the
Government of Kuwait . . . to use all necessary means to uphold and
implement Resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions
and to restore international peace and security in the area. "'1 (emphasis
added). This resolution addresses the restoring of international peace, not
the maintenance of international peace.72 Resolution 660, in addition to
condemning the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, demands that, "Iraq withdraw
immediately and unconditionally all its forces to the positions in which
they were located on 1 August 1990. " 11 It can be argued that once the
Iraqis had withdrawn back beyond their own borders, and the threat to
Kuwait was terminated, the objective had been achieved, no further
measures need have been taken within Iraqi territory.
Alternatively, the American government may maintain, and
perhaps legitimately, that the language of Resolution 678, namely, "and all
subsequent relevant resolutions" includes Resolution 688.4 By this
interpretation, Resolution 678 would allow the Coalition, to "use all
necessary means to uphold" Resolution 688.13 At first blush, this seems a
viable reading of the resolutions, but an argument presented by Timothy P.
McIlmail, suggests that "subsequent relevant resolutions" only pertain to
Resolutions adopted "after the invasion of Kuwait" but "prior to the
authorization of force to liberate Kuwait. "76 This would clearly limit the
Coalition's reach in imposing any type of multilateral or, as in the recent
extension of the no-fly zone, unilateral measures to control Saddam
69. McImail, supra note 44, at 50.
70. Id. at 54.
71. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963rd mtg. at para. 2, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/678 (1990).
72. McIlmail, supra note 44, at 52.
73. S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2932nd mtg., & 2 U.N. Doc. S/RES/660
(1990).
74. McIlmail, supra note 44, at 51-2.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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Hussein's future actions, unrelated to the invasion and liberation of
Kuwait. A contrary interpretation of the Resolutions would allow the
Coalition to indefinitely impinge upon the sovereignty of a nation merely
based upon their national interests and political motivations.
This is contrary to the Security Council's intent stated in
Resolution 686 as affirming,
the commitment of all member states to the independence,
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq and Kuwait,
and noting the intention expressed by the Member States
cooperating under paragraph 2 of Security Council 678
(1990) to bring their military presence in Iraq to an end
as soon as possible consistent with achieving the objectives
of the resolution (emphasis added)."
It may also be argued that the objectives of the resolution include,
as it states, "a definitive end to the hostilities," as well as "the need to be
assured of Iraq's peaceful intentions, and the objective in Resolution 678
(1990) of restoring international peace and security in the region. "7 The
integrity of this argument rests heavily upon the question of whether
hostilities in Iraq have truly ended and whether international peace and
security in the region have been restored. Hussein's incessant violation of
certain resolutions may contribute to the theory that security in the region
still has not been established. Therefore, such an argument would contend
that a continued military presence by the United States and the Coalition
forces is not only prudent and justifiable, but within the authority provided
by the United Nations Security Council.
Another possible justification originates from Resolutions 686 and
687."9 Resolution 686 recognized the "suspension of offensive combat
operations," and demanded that Iraq, "implement all 12 relevant Security
Council Resolutions. "' In actuality, this Resolution set the terms for a
formal cease fire and "in effect," created a no-fly zone around Coalition
aircraft while over Iraqi territory."3 But such language cannot be read too
broadly since it is specific as to its purpose.
Another argument of illegality is that "Resolution 686
contemplates the presence of Coalition aircraft in Iraqi airspace," but that
77. S.C. Res. 686, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2978th rntg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/686
(1990).
78. Id.
79. McIlmail, supra note 44, at 54.
80. U.N. DEP'TOF PUB. INFO., supra note 5, at 182.
81. Mclimail, supra note 44, at 53.
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this same resolution, "contemplated an end to these activities by offering
Iraq cease fire terms."82 Therefore, as the formal hostilities ended, so
should the restriction on Iraqi aircraft over its own territory. 3 But, again a
valid counter argument is that Resolution 686 authorizes a use by member
states, through its invocation of paragraph 2 of Resolution 678, of "all
necessary means to uphold and implement . . . all subsequent relevant
resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area."81
Resolution 686, in Paragraph 3, Section d (4), recognizes that, "during the
period required for Iraq to comply with paragraphs 2 and 3 . . . the
provisions of paragraph 2 of resolution 678 remain valid." ', Resolution
687 formalizes Resolution 686's terms and could be argued to allow
member states to use military force to implement the cease-fire terms. 6
Resolution 686, therefore, applies Resolution 678's use of force clause
until Iraq complies with Resolution 686. Logically, if the United States
believes that Iraq has yet to comply with both Resolutions 686 and 687,
Resolution 678 would still allow the use of force. Therefore, one could
conclude that as long as Iraq does not comply with any provision of
Resolution 686, Coalition forces may implement all necessary measures to
enforce compliance, as per Resolution 678, which would include no-fly
zones to protect Coalition aircraft.,"
As noted by the United Nations, the Coalition countries believed
that the cease fire agreement ending the war empowered them to impose
no-fly zones over Iraqi military flights to enforce Resolution 688.U The
purpose of Resolution 688 was to address the Kurdish repression in Iraq
and to demand the allowance of humanitarian relief to enter Iraq. 9 The
cease fire resolutions did not address all necessary means to "protect Iraqi
civilians," only the conditions set forth in Resolution 686 and 687.
Although, if one argues that "all relevant subsequent resolutions"
includes Resolution 688, contrary to Timothy P. McIlmail's analysis,9° the
Coalition forces could have the authority under Resolution 678 to impose
the no-fly zones to protect the Kurds. But as Resolution 686 seems to
indicate under Section d(4), paragraph 2 of Resolution 678 is then limited
82. Id. at 52-53.
83. Id.
84. S.C. Res. 686, supra note 77.
85. Id.
86. McIlmail, supra note 44, at 54.
87. Id. at 53-54.
88. U.N. DEP'T OF PUB. INFO., supra note 5, at 41.
89. S.C. Res. 688, supra note 61.
90. McIlmaii, supra note 44, at 51-52.
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to the time, "during the period required for Iraq to comply with paragraph
2 and 3" of Resolution 686. 9' This argument of legality seems to fail
because, as noted above, the end of the repression of the Kurds was not a
factor in the cease fire agreements and would not be a condition to its
enforcement.9 Iraq's repression of the Kurds does not violate the cease-
fire agreements.
By this interpretation, the Coalition forces did not have authority
to impose the no-fly zones to protect Iraqi civilians." The only
justification allowed would have been the enforcement of the cease fire
agreement resolutions. Resolution 688 only directs member states to
provide humanitarian assistance to the repressed people of Iraq, not use
military intervention or impose restrictions on Iraqi airspace.95 Resolution
688 alone would not justify the impositions, and the argument that
Resolution 678 allows a blanket use of force and military presence to
enforce Resolution 688 does not seem credible under the language of
Resolution 686. Essentially, as Timothy P. McIlmail states, "[i]f the
Security Council wished to establish a no-fly zone to protect the Kurds, it
could have drafted language to reflect that intent."9 Essentially, there is
very little doubt that the no-fly zones, "had no explicit basis in the
resolutions of the Security Council. "w
The original imposition of the no-fly zones could be legal under
article 106 of the United Nations Charter. 9 Article 106 allows permanent
members of the Security Council, such as the United States, France, and
Great Britain to enforce Security Council decisions if acting in coalition.w
Therefore, once the Security Council determines that a threat to
international peace exists, under article 106, permanent members, "have
independent authority to act and may use armed forces."'1° The article
seems to demand that action under its authority must be joint and only
after consultation with other permanent members.'0 ' The problem and
91. S.C. Res. 686, supra note 77.
92. See S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2981st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/687
(1991).
93. Mclimail, supra note 44, at 54-55.
94. Id.
95. S.C. Res. 688, supra note 61.
96. Mcllmail, supra note 44, at 59.
97. Murphy, supra note 55, at 234.
98. McIlmail, supra note 44, at 60-62.
99. Id. at 59.
100. Id. at 60.
101. Id. at 61.
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uncertainty about this article 106 argument is that "precise rules governing
the application of article 106 do not yet exist.'°0 Consequently, although
states have never invoked or rejected article 106, it seems probable its use
would only be permissible if the Security Council was incapable of
enforcing its own resolutions under article 42.03 Conversely, since no
rules have been applied it can be argued the article, "permits action
without strict unanimity of purpose among permanent members."' °' By
this latter conclusion, the Coalition can argue that they could impose its
own no-fly zones to enforce Resolution 688, and to "oversee the
maintenance of international peace."'0
IV. THE PROBABLE ILLEGALITY OF THE EXTENSION
The White House claims the extension of the no-fly zone is
permissible to enforce Resolution 688, which calls for the protection of the
Kurdish areas north and south of Baghdad. By its own admission, the
extension of the no-fly zone was not for the protection of the Kurds, but
for a more stable and sure-footed hold on Saddam Hussein's ability to
strike out at its neighbors.'10 As President Clinton stated,
America's vital interests in the Persian Gulf are constant
and clear: to help protect our friends in the region against
aggression, to work with others in the fight against
terrorism, to preserve the free flow of oil and to build
support for a comprehensive Middle East peace.' °' We
must reduce Iraq's ability to strike out at its neighbors and
we must increase America's ability to contain Iraq over the
long run.'0
Therefore one could conclude that the recent action by the Clinton
Administration is not in pursuance of the enforcement of Resolution 688
and is purely a unilateral action without United Nations support or
mandate. If such action was permissible for the enforcement of the
resolution, Resolution 688 would have contained the words, "all necessary
102. Id. at 62.
103. Id. at 60.
104. McIlmail, supra note 44, at 62.
105. Id.
106. Graham, supra note 1.
107. Nancy Mathis, Clinton Reiterates his Resolve to Keep Saddam in Check, Hous.
CHRON., Sept. 15, 1996, at Al.
108. Letter dated 3 September 1996, supra note 3.
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means, as is customary for United Nations resolutions calling for the use
of force."°0
It is clear that the Kurds were merely a catalyst for military
prudence and strategy in a political feud between the United States and
Saddam Hussein. As Clinton stated, "[n]ow, we control the skies over
Iraq from the border of Kuwait to the southern suburbs of Baghdad. This
action tightened the strategic straightjacket on Hussein, making it harder
for him to threaten Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and easier for us to stop him
if he does."" 0 The United States took the opportunity to place themselves
in a more strategic position to deter future actions by Hussein and
consequently placing themselves in a more favorable position if such action
occurs. The extension was never designed to protect or even address the
Kurds, it was merely designed to keep closer tabs on Hussein. In fact,
"administration members who deal regularly with Iraq had been looking
for an opportunity to implement just such measures.""' As one United
States official stated, "[t]he U.S. is no longer willing to act just around the
periphery of Iraq X in the Kurdish north or the Shiite south . . . We are
now prepared to respond with attacks to the center."" 2 This is clearly a
strategic action which has no United Nations mandate. It deals with
Hussein's "control of his own turf," which to date, no United Nations
Security Council Resolution has directly addressed." Most importantly,
the no-fly zones are created and extended in this case to protect the oil
fields of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia."4
The Clinton administration does have some legitimate concerns for
the region. Clinton has stated that Hussein is, "in better shape than he was
the day after the Gulf War in 1991.""1 Hussein has maintained a military
presence in the south which consistently poses a threat to Saudi Arabia as
well as Kuwait." 6
In response to questions at a Pentagon press conference, Defense
Secretary William J. Perry admitted that within the last six months or year,
109. Bob Deans, Conflict in Iraq: Arab Response, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Sept. 4, 1996, at
6A.
110. Mathis, supra note 107.
111. Graham, supra note 1.
112. Robin Wright, News Analysis; In Hussein's Backyard, a New Line in the Sand, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 4, 1996, at Al.
113. Id.
114. Operation Desert Prick, NEW REP., Sept. 30, 1996, at 7.
115. Greg McDonald, Kuwait Balks at U.S. Plans; Arab Allies are Hesitant to Support
Deployments, Hous. CHRON., Sept. 16, 1996, at Al.
116. Perry & Ralston, supra note 28.
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the area between the thirty-second and thirty-third parallel had shown,
"significant training activity."' In the same news conference, he stated
that, "[e]ven after their defeat in Desert Storm, the Iraqis still have the
largest and most powerful military force in the region.""' With evidence
of heavy training and troop movement around Iraq, the United States
wishes to contain a "theoretical threat" from becoming a "real threat.""'
The President, in his letter to Congress regarding this latest
incident presents perhaps a better attempt at justifying the military
presence in southern Iraq.'1 Clinton cites Security Council Resolution
949, passed in 1994, which "demands that Iraq not threaten its neighbors
or UN operations in Iraq and that it not redeploy or enhance its military
capacity in southern Iraq."'' Although the Security Council expressly
recognizes that any action by Iraq against its neighbors "constitutes a
threat to peace and security in the region," it does not provide authority to
the permanent members to enforce this resolution.122 One argument is,
since the Security Council is recognizing Iraqi military activity near the
Kuwaiti border,23 and since Resolution 949 specifically refers back to
Resolution 687, such action breaches Resolution 687 and subsequently, the
conditions of the cease fire. The United States could have authority under
Resolution 686, by its reference to Resolution 678, to use all means
necessary to enforce the breached cease-fire agreement, which would
justify the extension of a no-fly zone to ensure compliance and abate the
ever growing threat in southern Iraq. This would be a more credible
justification of the extension than the stated reason of enforcing Resolution
688, primarily because Resolution 688 only addresses the repression of
Kurds and does not mandate enforcement of the resolution by member
states.
It should not be mistaken, that although a theoretical threat exists,
the threat is felt most by the United States, as evidenced by the Coalition
response to the extension of the no-fly zone and the military attacks on
defense installations. Great Britain, Germany, Canada, and Japan were
the only Security Council members to offer general support for the United
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Text of Clinton Letter on Military Force Against Iraq Resolution, supra note 25.
121. Id.
122. S.C. Res. 949, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess. 3438th mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/949
(1994).
123. Id.
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States' action. '1' Russia denounced the action while France and Spain felt
the United States "acted too hastily" or "should have sought a political
solution."1" Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov said the
unilateral use of force by any country is absolutely impermissible.'1
France in fact refused to fly into the new expanded zone and would only
do so within the old zone, up to the thirty-second parallel.12  French
Foreign Ministry Officials said, "Saddan may have been within his rights
to send troops to the North. He did nothing illegal." '  However, it is
important to note that France has its own interests in mind, since it stands
to gain a great deal of trade, namely oil, once the limited embargo on Iraqi
oil shipments is lifted.'219
The wavering support by Coalition members, including Saudi
Arabia,30 does prove problematic since most initiatives by the United
Nations seem to require concerted action. This lack of support indicates
that even if the United States would have attempted to attain approval from
the Security Council, permanent members such as Russia and China could
have prevented such action to be mandated. Therefore, the only way in
which the United States and certain Arab interests could be protected, was
for the United States to act unilaterally and forego the arguable costs of
delay that preceded the Gulf War.
124. Graham, supra note 1.
125. Id.
126. John Lancaster & Bradley Graham, Iraq and U.S. Move to Slacken Tensions; Baghdad
to End Missile Firings; Perry to Visit Region, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 1996, at Al.
127. Graham, supra note 1.
128. Id.
129. "France hopes to restore long-standing commercial ties with Iraq when United Nations
sanctions eventually are lifted. And Chirac . . . has domestic political considerations -- a large
and sometimes restive Muslim population that might make trouble if it saw a disproportionate or
unjustified attack against a Muslim Arab state." Thomas W. Lippman, France Refuses
Christopher Bid for Aid in Expanded Iraqi 'No-Fly' Zone, WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 1996, at A32.
mhey also saw in France's refusal to support America an attempt by Paris to establish
a strong French presence in the Middle East, and a long-term calculation that this
would put France in a good position to win Iraqi oil and trade contracts once the U.N.
sanctions were lifted. With millions of pounds worth of potential deals at stake when
sanctions end, France has emphasized its concern for the territorial integrity of Iraq.
Ben MacIntyre & Michael Binyon, France Refuses to Patrol Widened Iraq No-Fly Zone, THE
TIMES, Sept. 6, 1996, available in 1996 WL 6517544.
130. An initial attack plan that called for having jet fighters take off from air bases in
Saudi Arabia and Jordan was abandoned, U.S. officials said, after leaders of those
countries made clear to Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. John Shalikashivili and Assistant
Secretary of State Robert Pelletreau . . . that such an operation would cause them
political problems at home.
Graham, supra note 1.
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Essentially, the United States is worried that Hussein will once
again, as recent actions seem to indicate, establish himself militarily and
pose a greater threat to the stability in the Middle East region, and the
crucial supply of oil. In accordance with international law, a nation should
not act unilaterally unless it is defending itself, as proscribed by the United
Nations Charter.'3 ' However, a power such as the United States must at
times consider its own national interests and forgo the costs of delay that a
United Nations response may procure. The lack of response by the
Security Council may be an indication that its purpose of ensuring
international peace and security is failing. A nation, with the resources of
the United States should not jeopardize its national security and overall
interest by waiting without reason for the Security Council to act. As one
commentator stated, "a legal system which merely prohibits the use of
force and does not make adequate provision for the peaceful settlement of
disputes invites failure."' 2 The United States financed the brunt of the
Gulf War and has a consequential interest in preventing a recurrence, even
if it requires the unilateral violation of Iraqi sovereignty in order to contain
this incessant agitator of international peace and civility. United Nations'
actions of "issuing declarations" and the placing of economic sanctions,
"by themselves" have not resolved crisis.'
This may indicate a legitimate concern by the Clinton
Administration that waiting would serve little purpose, but the political
purposes of others, such as the situation with France.'34 It is also important
to note that the United Nations has not condemned the Coalition no-fly
zones,' 3 originally, and in response to this latest extension of the no-fly
zones by the Clinton Administration. As President Clinton noted,
"historically, the United States takes the lead in such matters. "' 16 As one
commentator stated,
[t]he Iraq-Kuwait situation provided the United Nations
and the United States with an opportunity to posture on
and strengthen the virtues of international law and world
131. John Quigley, Missiles with a Message: The Legality of the United States Raid on
Iraq's Intelligence Headquarters, 17 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 241, 250 (1994).
132. Surchin, supra note 4, at 459 (citing Sir Humphrey Waldock, The Regulation of the
Use of Force by Individual States in International Law, 81 Recueil des Court 456 (1952 vol. II),
reprinted in International Law 1223-24 (Barry Carter & Phillip Trimble eds., Little, Brown and
Company 1991)).
133. Murphy, supra note 55, at 223
134. Maclntyre & Binyon, supra note 129.
135. MclImail, supra note 44, at 58.
136. Graham, supra note 1.
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order. The seemingly congenial relationship developing
between the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as
the unsavory nature of Hussein and his actions, presented
the United States with a prime situation in which to
legitimize international law.'
Such an approach may not only be prudent, but necessary to abate
future threats to international peace in regions such as the Middle East.
V. CONCLUSION
The extension of the southern no-fly zone in Iraq from the thirty-
second to the thirty-third parallel finds little, if any, support in Security
Council Resolutions, especially Resolution 688, which is claimed by the
Clinton Administration to be a justification for the extension. Resolution
688 was drafted and passed to address the treatment of Kurds in Iraq, but
never mandated force or no-fly zones to be used to enforce its demands.
No resolutions expressly address or allows the United States to unilaterally
extend the zones to satisfy its political and military purposes. In fact,
many questions remain as to the legality of the original imposition of the
zones in 1991 and 1992.
Actions pursuant to a lack of direct adherence to United Nations
Resolutions should not be dispositive of the validity of those actions.
Although the extension is seemingly illegal due to its lack of United
Nations authority, policy reasons may justify the original imposition and
the recent extension. Saddam Hussein has proven to be an unpredictable
foe of international peace, and requires treatment more severe than current
international procedures allow. Despite this departure from strict
adherence to Security Council resolutions, the Security Council and
General Assembly still have not formally condemned the zones and
consequently have indirectly condoned its imposition and enforcement,", as
well as its recent extension.
The necessity of containing Saddam Hussein's military action is
readily apparent and the unilateral actions of a world leader, such as the
United States, may be necessary to effectuate the international peace and
security demanded by the Security Council. Hussein's behavior since the
Gulf War has been provocative and incendiary, demanding unique
responses. The United Nations must be flexible to address these
unprecedented challenges to the world community. In doing so, it must
137. Thomas YoxalU, Iraq and Article 51: A Correct Use of Limited Authority, 25 INT'L
LAW. 967-68 (1991).
138. McIlmail, supra note 44, at 58.
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allow a broad reading of its resolutions, to allow its permanent members,
either collectively, or individually, to follow through and enforce what the
Council and the member states have defined to be a threat to international
peace and security. President Clinton's extension of the southern no-fly
zone in September of 1996 was technically illegal, but its validity and
necessity is apparent in light of Saddam Hussein's incessant testing of an
international resolve to maintain peace in the Middle East.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper seeks to defend United States intervention in states that
violate international human rights law. To explain the modem framework
behind the legal justifications for intervention, it is necessary to review the
historical development of international human rights law, the concept of
sovereignty, and the continuing conflict between the two principles.
II. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
A. Definition
It has been customary to call humanitarian law that considerable
portion of international public law that owes its inspiration to a feeling for
humanity and that is centered on the protection of the individual.' The
concept of an international law of human rights reflects a general
acceptance that how a state treats individual human beings is not always
the state's business alone and, therefore, not exclusively within its
domestic jurisdiction, but is a matter of international concern.2
B. Origins
The development of human rights law emanates from the ancient
distinction between the morality of the decision to instigate war and the
morality of the means of waging that war.3 The concept has evolved from
centuries of warfare in which combatants (states) have increasingly turned
against civilian populations as a means of waging war or of countering
internal conflicts. As the "staggering cruelty practiced in the wars of the
last 150 years continually prodded the human conscience, the law has been
evolved to improve its protection for civilians and combatants." The
evolution of this concept derives from a split in the perception of the
1. JEAN PICTET, HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE PROTECTION OF WAR VICTIMS 11
(1975).
2. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
701 cmt. a (1987).
3. See generally, Laura Lopez, Uncivil Wars: The Challenge of Applying International
Humanitarian Law to Internal Armed Conflicts, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 916, 918 (1994).
4. Id. at 918. See also, JUDITH G. GARDAN, NON-COMBATANT IMMUNITY AS A NORM
OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 124 (1993).
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underlying activity of conflict.' The term jus ad bellum refers to the
threshold question of whether the reasons for fighting a war in the first
place are just, while jus in bello refers to whether the war is being fought
justly or unjustly. International human rights law disregards the sovereign
state's prerogative to engage in warfare and focuses mainly on the jus in
bello. As will be discussed, the essential parameters of human rights law
are sometimes allegedly breached when the promotion of jus in bello
necessarily encroaches upon the state's claim of sovereignty in its jus ad
belium.7
C. Codification of International Human Rights Law
The intentional systematic employment of genocide, both within
and without the borders of Nazi Germany, generally awakened states and
jurists to the need for a more concrete establishment of international
human rights law. The experience of World War II resulted in the
expansion and codification of the laws of war in the four Geneva
Conventions of 1949.9 The Conventions provide for treatment of the sick
and wounded (both in the armed forces and at sea); for treatment of
prisoners of war; and for protection of civilian persons in time of war.9
Despite the broad application of these Conventions, there remained a
strong impediment to the protection of international human rights within
the domestic jurisdiction of individual states since almost all of the
provisions applied only to international wars.'0 Regardless of the growing
idea that international human rights law should permeate beyond the
borders of sovereign states, the traditional notion of state sovereignty was
still powerful at the drafting in 1949. Hence, protection of the sovereignty
concept still dominated this codification of international human rights law,
and prevented a more substantially enforceable protection of domestic
human rights abuses.
5. Lopez, supra note 3, at 918.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 921.
9. INT'L COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF AUG. 12,
1949 (photo. reprint 1981) [hereinafter GENEVA CONVENTIONS].
10. Lopez, supra note 3, at 924 (stating that the Geneva Convention describes international
war as "all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or
more of the High Contracting Parties.") Id.
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Another codification attempt occurred following World War II in
the form of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Germany."
As a result of the proceedings, the Geneva Conventions of 1949
incorporated criminal prosecution as an essential enforcement mechanism
of both domestic and international human rights abuses. Violations of the
Protocols of the Geneva Conventions during international conflicts were
designated as grave breaches, which signatory states were required to
punish.' 2 Again, the problem in applying the Nuremberg Charter through
the Geneva Conventions, is that article 2 of each of the four Conventions
applies the provisions only to "all cases of declared war ... between two
or more of the High Contracting Parties." 3
A further codification of international human rights, with
subsequently much greater enforcement capability than found in the
Geneva Conventions, is in the United Nations Charter (U.N. Charter)
which states that "[tihe purposes of the United Nations is [t]o achieve
international co-operation in solving international problems of an
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting
and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms
for all . . . . "1 Unlike the failed Covenant of the League of Nations,
human rights were woven in as an important, indeed a guiding thread,
throughout the fabric of the U.N. Charter.', The enforcement of
applicable U.N. Charter provisions and the prior codifications of
international human rights law will be addressed following discussion of
the concept of sovereignty and its conflict with international human rights
law. A review of this continuing legal dialectic is essential before
demonstrating how sovereignty is steadily losing its status as the bedrock
of public international law to international human rights.
III. SOVEREIGNTY
A. Definition
Sovereignty is the principle that "except as limited by international
law or treaty, each state is the master of its own territory . . ." and that
11. See CHARTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, The London Agreement,
Aug. 8, 1945, reprinted in REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON, UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE
TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MILITARY TRIBUNALS 420-28 (1949) [hereinafter
NUREMBERG CHARTER].
12. Lopez, supra note 3, at 922.
13. GENEVA CONVENTIONS supra note 9, at 23.
14. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3.
15. JAN MARTENSON, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, A
COMMENTARY 18 (Asbiorn Eide et al. eds. 1992).
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"[e]ach sovereign state can only be legally bound by those commitments it
willingly makes to other sovereign states, and by those few principles
which are viewed as binding on all states."16 Sovereignty has traditionally
been viewed as an absolute power that may be wielded by the sovereign,
within its own territorial jurisdiction. Until modem times,'7 the
sovereignty principle has implied that a state is answerable to no other
entity but itself when dispensing authority within its own borders or when
engaging in warfare with other sovereign states.,8
B. The Historical Development of the Sovereignty Principle
Despite the role that sovereignty has traditionally played in
preserving the notion of unnaccountability for a state's internal affairs,
there is another side to the sovereignty coin. States have always been
limited in the legitimacy of their sovereign status by their reciprocal
respect for the concept. 9 In other words, an act by a state in contravention
of a legitimate agreement or treaty, could result in other states' collective
retaliatory disregard of that outlaw state's sovereign status.2 Such
retaliatory disregard historically resulted in effects ranging from
disenchanted states becoming reluctant to enter trade agreements and
treaties with the outlaw state, to sanctions, and to outright hostility.
The notion that a state's sovereignty is dependent upon its respect
for the sovereignty of other states has customarily included the
16. Claudio Grossman & Daniel D. Bradlow, Are We Being Propelled Towards A People-
Centered Transnational Legal Order?, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L. L. & POL.'Y 1, 1 (1993).
17. Here the phrase modem times refers generally to the period following World War II,
with the subsequent creation of international human rights treaties such as the Geneva
Conventions of 1949, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the United Nations
Charter.
18. See generally, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 206(b) (1987).
19. Early in 1988, the United States Defense Department became aware of a ship
approaching the Gulf with a load of Chinese-made Silkworm missiles en route to Iran.
• . the Defense Department ... argued for permission to interdict the delivery. The
State Department, however, countered that such a seizure on the high seas, under
universally recognized rules of war and neutrality, would constitute ... an act of war
against Iran . . . the delivery ship with its cargo of missiles was allowed to pass.
Deference to systemic rules had won out over tactical advantage.
THOMAS M. FRANCE, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 3 (1990).
20. Report of the Commission Appointed Under Article 26 of the Constitution of the ILO
to Examine the Complaints Concerning the Observance by Greece of Human Rights Conventions,
cited in B. G. Ramcharan, Washington College of Law Conference, The Role of International
Bodies in the Implementation and Enforcement of Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law in
Non-International Armed Conflicts, 33 AM. U.L. REV. 99, 106 (1983). (Claiming that a state
cannot use its sovereignty to brush aside performance of an obligation under international law).
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maintenance of respect for agreements entered'into with other sovereign
states. 21 Whether the agreement is a trade pact or a military alliance, is a
voluntary cession by the contracting states of a portion of absolute
authority to determine its own actions. Thus, while a sovereign state has
the customary ability to act as it will, it may also agree to waive its
absolute ability to exercise that will. The notion of a state's ability to waive
sovereignty and to be bound by that waiver has been a pervading theme
throughout the attempts to codify the sovereignty principle in modern
times.
C. Recognition of Sovereignty in the Codification of International
Human Rights Law
Even in modem times, the codification of human rights law would
not have been possible without the incorporation of the sovereignty
principle into provisions of the various treaties and conventions following
World War II. Without this inclusion, states would have been extremely
reluctant to enter into binding agreements, since there would be no
definable boundary as to how much of a state's sovereignty could be ceded
to the tenets of the agreement. Independent states that were subject to
colonialization in the past have been particularly fearful of entering into
international agreements that even hint at restrictions upon their
sovereignty .22
The four Geneva Conventions attempted to cut through the
sovereignty barrier. Article 3, which is common to all four Conventions,
applies in the case of an armed conflict not of "an international
character."2 3  It prohibits "violence to life and person, the taking of
hostages, outrages upon personal dignity, and the denial of judicial
guarantees .... "24 On its surface, this indicates an intention by the
drafters, and subsequent compliance by the state signatories, to bypass
sovereignty in applying the Geneva Convention's humanitarian provisions
within the sovereign states themselves. However, interest in the protection
21. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
206, cmt. e (1987). "[S]tatus as a legal person ... to make contracts and enter into international
agreements .... " Id. at (b).
22. During the first few decades after World War II, the movement away from
sovereignty often was not perceptible. Indeed, in the wake of decolonization, the role
of sovereignty in international law appeared strengthened by . . . their aggressive
assertion of . . . [sovereignty by new nation-states]. These developments, however,
masked a slow but steady diminution in the realities of sovereign power ....
Grossman and Bradlow, supra note 16, at 6.
23. GENEVA CONVENTIONS, supra note 9, art. 3 at 24, 52, 75, 154 (1949).
24. GENEVA CONVENTIONS, cited in Lopez supra note 3, at 924.
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of sovereignty has permeated the codification.2 As a result, no specific
enforcement procedure was included. Concern for the preservation of
sovereignty seems to have prevailed over internal application of
international human rights law in the initial drafting of the Geneva
Conventions.
The U.N. Charter does not contain a specific definition of
sovereignty, but does continue to adhere to the historical principle of
sovereignty."6 There is, however, an important caveat to the U.N.
Charter's recognition of this principle. Article 2, paragraph 7 of the
Charter refers to the U.N.'s lack of authority to intervene in a states
domestic affairs, but also reads that "this principle shall not prejudice the
application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII."2 By becoming
signatories adhering to the Charter's provisions, member states have
demonstrated a commitment to waive sovereignty under the purview of
Chapter VII.2 For the first time, state parties to an organization or treaty,
are denied the sovereignty cloak as a defense to nonconformity with an
agreement's provisions.
IV. VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW CREATES
AN IMPLIED WAIVER OF SOVEREIGNTY BY THE VIOLATING STATE
A. Modern Examples of Sovereignty Prevailing Over International
Human Rights Law
There now seems to exist a paradigm that the once impregnable
barrier of sovereignty can now become quite malleable in the face of
persistent international human rights law violations. Historic examples of
scenarios where nations such as the United States have foregone
intervention, despite what could be argued as an implied waiver of
25. Id. "Although the Geneva Conventions generally contain extensive provisions for the
enforcement and implementation of their norms in an international context, in an internal conflict
article 3 provides only that the ICRC may offer its services to the parties, an offer that may be
refused." Id.
26. (4) All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations ....
(7) Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state
or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present
Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures
under Chapter VII U.N. Charter.
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, §§ 4, 7 (emphasis added).
27. Id. at art. 2, § 7.
28. See generally, U.N. CHARTER art. 2, § 7.
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sovereignty, help to convey the importance in acting when a violating
state's veil of sovereignty can be pierced.
A glaring example of a foregone but necessary intervention,
occurred during the Khmer Rouge seizure of Cambodia. 29 The rampant
massacres did not cease until actual intervention in 1979 by the unlikely
savior of the occupying forces from Vietnam 0 Despite international
condemnation of Cambodias human rights abuses, the United States lacked
the means or political will to intervene. China supported the regime in
Cambodia, and the United States likely felt itself in no position to become
embroiled in another conflict in Southeast Asia. However, the fact that
intervention by other states did not occur prior to Vietnam's role is even
less dubious than the tragic reality that subsequent accountability has not
been forthcoming. 3'
Although international politics and lack of military means played
roles in denying United States intervention, the tragedy of Cambodia
demonstrates two undeniable developments. First, that intervention, even
by a brutal totalitarian power, brought the Khmer Rouge genocide to a
near halt. Second, Vietnam's use of the Pol Pot regime's human rights
violations (even as an unsuccessful pretextual argument for intervention)
demonstrates the growing recognition by states that the sovereignty barrier
can potentially be pierced by way of claiming persistent international
human rights violations . 2
Another example of sovereignty prevailing over intervention,
despite an implied waiver of sovereignty based on human rights abuses, is
the Castro regime in Cuba. Since Fidel Castro seized power in 1959, his
regime has maintained authority through politically-motivated
29. Barbara Crossette, Before Rwanda, Before Bosnia; Waiting for Justice in Cambodia,
N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 25, 1996, at §§ 4, 5.
[Fjrom April 17, 1975, until January 7, 1979 . . . the Khmer Rouge . . . waged a
manic campaign to ... start over as an ethnically pure Khmer nation purged not only
of its minorities but also of its professional middle class ... it was estimated that up to
one million Cambodians, in a population of about 7.5 million, died. Id.
30. See generally 1979 U.N.Y.B. 271, 272, U.N. Sales No. E.82.I.1. (regarding how
Vietnam dubiously claimed the intervention was initiated on behalf of persistent human rights
violations).
31. Crossette, supra note 29, at 5 (stating that "[tlhe International Criminal Tribunal
system is already overstretched and underfinanced in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda"). Id.
32. See Questions Concerning Asia; Democratic Kampuchea and Vietnam, 1979 U.N.Y.B.
271, 272, U.N. Sales No. E.82.I.1. "[V]ietnam transmitted a declaration . . . . [tihese
documents charged that . . . Pol Pot . . . had usurped power, transformed the revolutionary
forces into mercenaries for the Chinese authorities, and threatened the Kampuchean people with
extermination... and called for support ... from all governments and national and international
organizations." Id.
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imprisonment, torture, execution, and through repression of emigration,
the media, and any political dissent." The United Nations General
Assembly (U.N.G.A.), in addition to its broad condemnation of the type of
violations orchestrated by the Castro regime, 3' has specifically singled out
Cuba's flagrant disregard for international human rights law."
The U.N.'s condemnation of Cuba's human rights violations
provides a likely basis for arguing an implied waiver of sovereignty since
Cuba is a signatory to the U.N. Charter. Although the Security Council
has not authorized such an intervention, Cuba's violations render its
sovereignty an incapable defense were the United States to intervene
unilaterally on behalf of international human rights law. Despite the
possibility of claiming Cuba's implied waiver of sovereignty, political and
economic factors commit the United States to a policy of continued
recognition of Cuba's sovereignty.
Two political factors have smothered past arguments and efforts at
intervention. First, in 1962, the United States promised never to invade
Cuba in exchange for removal of Soviet Intercontinental Ballistic Missles
(ICBMs) during the Cuban Missile Crisis. It is now debatable whether this
foreign policy obligation was inherited by Russia following the demise of
the Soviet Union. Second, diplomatic and trade tension would likely result
from certain Organization of American States (OAS) member states that
fear potential future intervention based on their own international human
rights violations. 6 However, recent criminal acts of this outlaw regime,
such as the shooting down of civilian aircraft in international airspace,
33. See generally, Situation of Human Rights in Cuba; Report of the 3rd Committee. G.A.
Res. 50/198, U.N. Doc. A/50/635/add.3 (1996).
34. Id.
35. (20) The United Nations Commission on Human Rights has repeatedly reported
on the unacceptable human rights situation in Cuba and has taken the extraordinary
step of appointing a Special Rapporteur ....
(21) The Government of Cuba has consistently refused access to the Special Rapporteur
and formally expressed its decision not to implement so much as one comma of the
United Nations Resolutions appointing the Rapporteur ....
(22) The United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 1992/70 ... Resolution
1993/48/142 ... and Resolution 1994/49/544 ... referencing the Special Rapporteur's
reports to the United Nations and condemning violations of human rights and
fundamental freedoms in Cuba.
H.R. 927, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1995).
36. See generally, Stephen J. Schnably, The Santiago Commitment as a Call to Democracy
in the United States: Evaluating the OAS Role in Haiti, Peru, and Guatemala, 25 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REV. 393, 402 (1994).
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have finally begun to task the patience of United States lawmakers
reluctance at some form of intervention.,,
From the end of World War II through the collapse of the Soviet
Union in 1991, the prolonged proxy wars of the struggle between the
democratic and communist blocs often masked gross human rights
violations.38 Even when atrocities received international attention and
subsequent condemnation, intervention often carried with it the threat of
potential escalation among the major powers. The geo-political
consequences inherent in this Cold War paradigm prevented intervention
even when the United States possessed sufficient military capability and
could have argued that the violating state had impliedly waived its
sovereign status on the basis of international human rights violations.
The Cold War and its bloody proxy battles, such as Nicaragua and
others, now seem a past period. With the strategic and political restraints
of the Cold War, no longer a near total albatross, a new paradigm of
foreign policy is foreseeable. For instance, the United States can now
intervene in more places where it perceives there has been an implied
waiver of sovereignty, without fearing retaliation from a now non-existent
Communist bloc. A necessary first step, however, is for other states to
recognize that the sovereignty principle is no longer a viable cloak for
international human rights abuses. This new interpretation is significantly
aided by the modern transformation of the very meaning of the phrase,
sovereignty.
B. The Traditional Meaning of Sovereignty is No Longer Viable
The traditional notion of sovereignty as an inviolable, impenetrable
barrier that neatly defines a nation's physical and political boundaries is
now an outdated concept. One author states that:
[T]he Second World War provided members of the
international community with a powerful and tragic lesson
in the dangers inherent in an international legal order
based on a notion of absolute sovereignty. The
37. H.R. 927, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1995). The Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1995. "A Bill to seek international sanctions against the Castro
government in Cuba, to plan support of a transition government leading to a democratically
elected government in Cuba ... and for other purposes." Id. This controversial Bill penalizes
foreign companies that do business with Cuba. Following the downing of Brothers to the Rescue
aircraft on February 24, 1996, the Bill sailed through Congress, and was subsequently signed into
law by President Clinton. See George Rodrique, House Oks Tighter Cuba Sanctions; Clinton
Expected to Sign Bill, WASH. BUREAU OF THE DALLAS'MORNING NEWS, Mar. 7, 1996, at IlA.
38. See Grossman & Bradlow, supra note 16, at 9.
[Vol. 3:895
Meyers
contemporary international order severely limited the
ability of the international community to intervene in the
internal affairs of sovereign states. This lesson provided
the impetus for the creation of international organizations.
. .given some ability to compel member states to comply
with their rules and decisions.39
In addition to the voluntary cession of a portion of a state's
sovereignty to international organizations, treaties, and agreements, there
has been a de facto demographic alteration in the historical definition of
sovereignty. Borders are becoming less rigid. Technology is leading to a
new international consciousness,'0 and modem United States military
capability, as well as that of other states, is becoming more efficiently
designed for rapid intervention and nation-building missions.
Borders between states can no longer simply be maintained at just
physical checkpoints. Communications technology has led to the rapid
dissemination of information in an almost uncontrollable torrent throughout
the globe." The ability of individual states to control the spread of
information, and effectively regulate communication between individuals
or organizations within and without their borders, significantly undermines
the previously established parameters of a states authority. In addition, the
limitless dissemination and communication to all points on the globe
creates a sense of international community that did not exist during the
formative centuries of the sovereignty principle.' 2
Besides the limits imposed on sovereignty by communications
technology, economic interdependence has also served to erode the
sovereignty principle. The Maastricht Treaty, signed by the member states
of the European Community, was designed to form a super state out of a
once solely economic union.4 3 Of all the post-World War II treaties, this
has been the most ambitious with its near complete cession of sovereignty
by its member states, both in foreign and domestic affairs." In response to
the potential trading juggernaut of the European Union, the United States
Congress passed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in
39. Grossman & Bradlow, supra note 16, at 2-4.
40. Id. at 12.
41. Id. at 11. "Human rights and other social activists can use facsimiles and E-mail to
inform the world of developments in their countries." Id.
42. Id. at 12.
43. Europe after Maastricht; Not the Union They Meant, 329 ECONOMIST, Nov. 6, 1993,
at 56.
44. Id.
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1993.4- Despite domestic pressure against the treaty for fear of an exodus
of United States industry and jobs to Mexico, the Congress recognized that
economic strength cannot be sustained from within a state's own borders
alone.- As a result of NAFTA, the level of trade has increased throughout
Canada, the United States, and Mexico. In fact, Congress is now
considering an expansion of NAFTA to other states in the western
hemisphere. Comprehensive trade agreements have often been historical
predecessors to the loosening of borders and stronger political ties between
states."
Sovereignty as a feasible defense to legitimate intervention should
not be limited by the reality that the majority of current conflicts are civil
in nature.4 9  If a state is violating the international human rights of its
citizens, and the facts are known to the outside world, it seems a fallacy
for the violating government to claim that its sovereignty has been violated
upon legitimate intervention.10
These factors demonstrate that the sovereignty principle,
embedded even in modem codifications,' is no longer viable as a defense
to legitimate intervention based on that state's international human rights
45. North American Free Trade Agreement, done Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Mex.-Can., 32
I.L.M. 605 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA].
46. See David S. Broder & Michael Weisskopf, Business Prospered in Democratic-Led
103rd Congress, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 1994, at Al, cited in G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism
and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J.
829, 883 n.259 (1995).
47. Broder & Weisskoph, supra note 46, at 883.
48. Peter E. Quint, The Constitutional Law of German Unification, 50 MD. L. REV. 475,
478 (1991). The Germanic Confederation in 1871 ". . . was more in the nature of a treaty
community than any sort of real political union. But it and the early nineteenth century Customs
Union were steps in that direction." Id.
WTO dispute resolution decisions will automatically come into force as a matter of
international law in virtually every case. The new judges of international trade thus
have jurisdiction to rule that governments must amend or repeal domestic laws that are
inconsistent with world trade norms or risk imposition of trade sanctions.
Shell, supra note 46, at 832.
49. Ernie Regehr, Warfare's New Face; Civil War has Become the Norm in Warfare, 41
WORLD PRESS REV. 14 (1994). "All three dozen wars raging in the world today are fights
within single states - none is a fight between states .... They are ... a consequence of failed
states .... " Id. See Binaifer Nowrojee, Recent Development: Joining Forces: United Nations
and Regional Peacekeeping--Lessons from Liberia, 8 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 129 (1995). "[Pliaces
such as Somalia, Yugoslavia, and Liberia . . . reflect . . .war in today's world - internal
conflicts fueled by political, ethnic, religious, and economic antagonisms no longer contained by
Cold War politics." Id.
50. Grossman & Bradlow, supra note 16, at 1.
51. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, § 7.
1997] Meyers 907
violations. If a state commits human rights violations on a persistent basis,
these acts are not likely to go unnoticed by the general population of that
state. Unlike the time of Nazi Germany, human rights violations
committed virtually anywhere in the post-Cold War world cannot go
unnoticed for long, even if witnessed by only a few.12 Communications
technology and the reach of the global media are simply too pervasive and
unregulated to be thoroughly silenced by any single state." This spread of
global awareness, coupled with the proliferation of massive trade pacts and
voluntary cessions of sovereignty, are indicative of a new international
consciousness" that has reduced the once formidable principle of
sovereignty into a more malleable concept.
C. A State's Implied Waiver of Sovereignty
A state has impliedly waived its sovereignty when it is no longer in
compliance with international human rights law. International human
rights law applies to all states as a universal principle of jus cogens,
regardless of whether a particular state is a non-signatory to such treaties
and agreements.1
When a state commits human rights abuses against nationals of
another state, or against its own population, it has waived its sovereignty
specifically under the Nuremberg Charter& and the United Nations
Genocide Convention."' The Nuremberg proceedings were begun to bring
the Nazi leaders and their subordinates to justice.-8 Nuremberg was key in
52. Grossman & Bradlow, supra note 16, at 12. See also Donatella Lorch, Burundi After
Mutiny; Horror Stories Everywhere, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1993, at 3. "Even though all
communication lines were cut, loyal ministers, using newly bought cellular phones, managed to
mobilize Burundians through Rwandan radio broadcasts." Id.
53. Grossman & Bradlow, supra note 16, at 12.
54. Nowrojee, supra note 49, at 129. "The slow, but evident, erosion of an absolute
position on sovereignty is leading to an emerging right, and perhaps even duty, for states to
intervene on humanitarian grounds." Id.
55. See MARTENSON, supra note 15, at 20. "The spirit and philosophy of the UDHR
[Universal Declaration of Human Rights] . . . not exclusive of one group or another but aims at
the protection of the human rights of every person." Id. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 6. "The
organization shall ensure that states which are not members of the United Nations act in
accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international
peace and security." Id.
56. See NUREMBERG CHARTER, supra note 11.
57. See generally, SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON THE
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF
GENOCIDE, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., EXEC. REP. 99-2, (1985).
58. Lopez, supra note 3, at 922. "The establishment of an International Military Tribunal.
introduced criminality, albeit retroactively, into humanitarian law for the first time." Id.
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that it was designed to recognize that human rights abuses committed even
within a sovereign's domestic arena, were nonetheless criminal acts.
Seizing upon the invaluable precedent of Nuremberg as a tool to penetrate
the sovereignty veil, the U.N.G.A. adopted the fundamental principles of
Nuremberg in the United Nations Genocide Convention of 1948.19 The
Convention is but one important, specific example of the codification of
this modem legal philosophy of accountability. It has come full circle
from its inception at Nuremberg to the recently created International
Criminal Tribunal for crimes against humanity in the former Yugoslavia. 6
The U.N. Genocide Convention and the principles established at
Nuremberg do not provide for a specific preemptive enforcement
provision. However, they do lay a framework for establishing the
illegitimacy of a violating state's sovereignty defense, and the legitimacy
of another state's preemptive intervention. If the community of nations
provides for international military tribunals to punish offenders within a
violating state, it is reasonable to infer that preemptive action is even more
legitimate and desirable to prevent the offenses. The question remaining
should be not whether actual enforcement should occur, but how will it
occur?
V. AUTHORIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES TO ENFORCE
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
A. United States Multilateral Enforcement of International Human
Rights Law
Following the inception of the U.N., Congress committed the
United States to its multilateral goals and service through enactment of the
United Nations Participation Act (UNPA) of 1945 .61 As a significant
portion of its commitment, the United States has provided massive funding
and military support, in accordance with Article 43 of the U.N. Charter.6 2
59. Henry T. King, Jr., Nuremberg and Sovereignty, 28 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 135,
136 (1996). "[N]uremberg penetrated the veil of national sovereignty to recognize individuals as
having rights independent of nation-state recognition . . . . The United Nations Genocide
Convention was designed to secure adherence to the international human rights recognized at
Nuremberg. . . ." Id.
60. Resolution 827, S/Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 3217th mtg. (1993) (establishing an
International Criminal Tribunal on the former Yugoslavia by vote of the Security Council).
61. United Nations Participation Act, Pub. L. No. 264, ch. 583, 59 Stat. 619 (1945)
(codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 287 (1958)), [hereinafter UNPA], cited in Gregory L.
Naarden, U.N. Intervention after the Cold War: Political Will and the United States, 29 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 231, 236 (1994). "The UNPA outlined the character of the United States' participation
in the UN's system of collective security." Id.
62. Id.
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Congress authorized the President to commit armed forces, facilities, or
assistance, but subject to congressional approval of a special agreement
with the U.N. 6 This was probably an attempt by Congress to limit the
President's ability to commit forces under a U.N. mandate without
congressional approval. As subsequently observed during the Cold War,
congressional power to restrict executive deployment of armed forces
atrophied due to the rapidity in which conflicts erupted versus the slow
process of congressional hearings and votes.
The effectiveness of congressional control of the President's
deployment power under UNPA eroded significantly by the Korean
conflict in 1950. After the U.N. Security Council authorized U.N.
member states to counter North Korean aggression," President Truman
deployed United States troops without waiting for Congress to approve a
special agreement with the U.N. President Truman merely sidestepped the
constitutional question of executive action requiring congressional approval
by "not referring to the conflict as a war." 5 Today, a debate continues in
Congress over whether the United States military should continue to play a
role in peacekeeping operations. House and Senate Republicans argue that
the United States spends a disproportionate amount on peacekeeping; that
American peacekeepers are prominent targets for extremist groups abroad;
and that generally the United Staes is better off withdrawing into the quiet
nest of isolationism."
However, it is vital for international human rights law that the
United States remain the military backbone of U.N. peacekeeping
operations. Withdrawal of United States military and financial support
would set back enforcement of international human rights law to its
nonexistent position prior to Nuremberg. Although Congress may choose
to abrogate its obligations under the U.N. Charter,67 the international
obligation would continue based on its original adherence to the Charter.
Outlaw regimes and fanatical extremist groups could interpret United
63. U.N. CHARTER art. 43. "All members . . . undertake to make available to the
Security Council .... in accordance with a special agreement ... armed forces, assistance, and
facilities .... ." Id.
64. Naarden, supra note 61, at 236-7.
65. S.C. Res. 83, U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., 474th mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. S/1511 (1950),
quoted in Naarden, supra note 61, at 241 (regarding Security Council authorization for U.N.
member states to repel North Korean aggression).
66. See Ruth Wedgewood, Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, & Peacebuilding: The Role of
the United Nations in Global Conflict: The Historical Evolution of the United Nations in Global
Conflict: Creating, Defining, & Expanding the Role of the United Nations: The Evolution of
United Nations Peacekeeping, 28 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 631, 638 (1995).
67. See U.N. CHARTER art. 43.
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States intransigence as meaning they have free reign to commit
unnaccountable acts of terrorism and genocide.
Congressional Republicans may claim there is no need to provide
troops and military aid to U.N. peacekeeping operations, and that other
nations troops are more expendable. However, with the end of the Cold
War, the role played by U.N. authorized deployments has changed from a
primarily peacekeeping role, to one of peacemaking. 6  Rampant human
rights abuses now tend to occur within states embroiled in civil wars (the
former Yugoslavia); in territories where government has simply ceased to
exist (Somalia); and where juntas have seized power illegally (Haiti). The
function of all committed U.N. member states armed forces is no longer
just peacekeeping. They must be ready to meet the need for rapid
deployment and potentially prolonged nation-building missions, in what is
essentially a restorative occupation of peacemaking.
The U.N. itself lacks the military, intelligence, and
communications technology necessary for low-risk, rapid intervention. 69
Instead, the U.N. must rely on the military contribution from its member
states.70 The United States has the most efficient capability for complex,
rapid intervention designed to minimize bloodshed and maximize success.'"
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States military has been ordered
to steadily refocus strategy towards smaller scale, regional conflicts.12
68. Naarden, supra note 61, at 242. See also Wedgewood, supra note 66, at 635 (stating
that "[i]n Somalia, and in elements of the Yugoslav operation, the Security Council authorized
peace keepers to operate even without the consent of the parties, under Chapter VII enforcement
authority").
69. Wedgewood, supra note 66, at 636.
The United Nations lacks real-time intelligence . . . and lacks satellite phones to
communicate straight to the field. For example, in the Rwanda emergency, Secretary
Boutros-Ghali had no direct link to the head of UNAMIR troops. The U.N.
Department of Peacekeeping Operations was never set up to be a military command
center. Id.
70. See BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T ST. DISPATCH. Vol. 6, No. 5, (Aug.
28, 1995). Absolute cost to the United States remains a small portion of its national security
expenses, a far cheaper choice than taking an isolationist stance until forced to confront crises
after they have spread to directly threaten United States interests. See Wedgewood, supra note
66, at 636. "There is now a sense that intervention . . . must be contracted out to a coalition.
who are militarily able." Id.
71. TIM RIPLEY, MODERN UNITED STATES ARMY 6 (1992). "United States military
planners now work on the basis of a forward presence to be reinforced in a crisis by rapidly
deployed forces from the continental United States." Id.
72. Id. at 13. "United States army chiefs have stated that small, mobile and highly trained
light forces will be of increasing importance in a world where low-level regional conflicts are
likely to be the most prevalent form of warfare." Id.
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This effort at United States military adjustment has already borne
results for the enforcement of international human rights law. Where the
U.N. Security Council has recognized the need for intervention,
sovereignty has been pierced, and the initial rapid deployment of United
States peacemaking forces has resulted in mostly successful transitions to
the U.N.'s peacekeeping authority. 3
One notable failure, however, occurred in Somalia. The problem
resulted not from a flaw in the goals of intervention, but in the confused
chain of command. 4 In fact, the initial success of the Somalia intervention
in providing food, relief, and protecting the population against factional
violence, demonstrates the need for the United States armed forces to be
the spearhead of any multilateral intervention, and for the maintenance of a
unified chain of command.
Congressional budget trimming on future intervention and funding
for human rights operations can only harm the growing trend of
multilateral action in dealing with international human rights abuses. If
multilateral consensus dwindles, customary international law could revert
back to the old pure sovereignty defense. Then, international human rights
law could potentially evaporate into an extinct legal concept.
B. United States Unilateral Enforcement of International Human
Rights Law
Multilateral intervention is not always feasible in certain
circumstances. Despite a desire by the United States to take collective
action," it is sometimes necessary for the United States, or other states, to
act unilaterally to enforce international human rights law. The most
succinct example of the need for unilateral action can occur when a
Permanent Security Council member state vetoes a resolution for
73. See BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T. ST. DISPATCH, supra note 70, at 662.
Recent peacekeeping successes include Mozambique, El Salvador, Cambodia, and Namibia, all
countries where the U.N. helped bring long, bloody conflicts to an end and then assisted in the
establishment of more democratic and stable governments. Id.
74. United States military participation in United Nations-authorized Peacekeeping
Operations: Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm. on Airland Force of the Comm. on Armed
Sev., 104th Cong. (1995) (testimony of John R. Bolton on May 3, 1995).
After the point of effective transition of responsibility from the United States-led
Unified Task Force ("UNIFAF") to the second U.N. operation ... there were really
separate chains of command . . . . Moreover the mission of the United States forces
(and the U.N. force generally) was not well defined, positioning them somewhere
between traditional peace keepers and peace enforcers. Id.
75. See BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, supra note 70, at 660.
Burden sharing of funding and military force, spreads the sometimes expensive cost among
participating states. Id.
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intervention.76 In the wake of the Cold War, the threat of the veto power
used against United States interests has been minimized since Russia is for
the moment more willing to accommodate United States interests in its
quest to maintain loan guarantees. China frequently abstains in what may
be an effort to ensure continuation of its most favored-nation trading status
with the United States. However, the current geo-political situation is not
frozen indefinitely. Elections, coups, and changes in strategic interests, all
can play a role in the unpredictable future of global politics and
subsequently U.N. Security Council voting.
Since the United States favors multilateral action, if unilateral
intervention is deemed necessary for whatever reason, the United States
can attempt a subsequent ratification by the U.N. 77  The Somalia
intervention 7 demonstrates United States eagerness to obtain subsequent
ratification for unilateral action. The United States, however, has not
always been dissuaded from unilateral action in its enforcement of
international human rights law when it perceives its interests as paramount
to international obligations.
One argument supporting unilateral action is that, despite a bias
towards the maintenance of sovereignty (except at the behest of the U.N.
Security Council under Chapter VII), the U.N. Charter, itself, supports
unilateral action when necessary. Article 2(4) of the Charter requires
member states to refrain from infringement on another state's sovereignty,
yet "[a]rticles 55 and 56 ... [require] each U.N. member to take joint and
separate action to insure the 'universal respect for, and observance of,
human rights and fundamental freedoms.'" 79 Thus, under the UNPA,
enacted by Congress to bind the United States to the U.N. Charter, the
United States, and other states, have a treaty obligation to intervene
unilaterally when violations of international human rights law occur. Not
only is this argument a defense for United States unilateral intervention, it
also presents such intervention as a binding obligation.
76. U.N. CHARTER art. 27, § 3 (stating that,"[d]ecisions of the Security Council. .. shall
be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent
members.") Id.
77. Byron F. Burmester, On Hwnanitarian Intervention: The New World Order and Wars
to Preserve Human Rights, 1994 UTAH L. REv. 269, 270 (1994) (Inferring that "[a] state that
employs force against another state will attempt to define its acts as being justified under the
Charter.")
78. Id. at 269 (claiming that the United States entered Somalia not at the request of the
U.N., but rather, after unilaterally volunteering, the U.N. quickly ratified the United States offer,
authorizing the newly formed multilateral force to use all means necessary.)
79. Burmester, supra note 77, at 275 (explaining articles 55 and 56 of the U.N.
CHARTER).
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A second strong defense for unilateral intervention arises from
what could be interpreted as a violating state's implied waiver of
sovereignty. If a state forfeits its sovereignty through human rights
abuses, and an intervening state is merely trying to eliminate the
violations, then the intervening state has not violated international law.
Critics may charge that this justification can be used by any aggressor state
trying to cloak the illegality of its intervention. Yet, subsequent actions
taken by the intervening state can demonstrate for itself the true nature of
the intervention.' International organizations, such as the U.N., can
choose to ratify the action or request that member states use multilateral
force to eject the intervening state. It is more practical to support swift
unilateral intervention to halt human rights violations, than to favor an
endless dialogue over motives, funding, and consequences.
VI. CONCLUSION
The codifications and precedents of the last fifty years have
provided strong authority that a state forfeits its sovereignty when
committing human rights abuses. Through international organizations,
treaties, and growing customary international law, states are learning that
sovereignty is no protective barrier for torture, rape, political
imprisonment, enslavement, and murder. The U.N. can provide a
powerful legitimacy in its authorization of intervention. However, the
United States remains the predominant enforcement power of both Security
Council Resolutions and of its own interest in preserving international
human rights. Elements in the United States Congress and elsewhere
should understand that the funding, military backing, and general support
of the United States in peacemaking operations is a vital deterrent against
international chaos. Indeed, preservation of international human rights law
is a more important United States interest than is the harm to international
stability that would ensue in a decline of respect for international human
rights law.
80. Id. at 284. "[I]t is not relevant that the United States justified intervention in Panama
by claims that General Noriega violated international drug laws. To the contrary, the United
States returned the lawfully elected government to office, thus demonstrating its altruistic motives
by its actions." Id.
1997] 913
INFANCY AND MATURITY: A COMPARISON OF
THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND
FREEDOMS AND THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION
Bruce E. Shemrock'
I. INTRODUCTION ......................................................... 916
A . H istory ............................................................ 916
B . The Charter ...................................................... 917
C. Structural Overview ............................................ 919
II. COMPARISON WITH THE UNITED STATES
C ONSTITUTION .......................................................... 921
A . Judicial Review .................................................. 921
B. Infringement of Protected Rights ............................. 922
C . Standing .......................................................... 926
D. Search and Seizure and the Exclusionary
Sanction .......................................................... 927
III. C ONCLUSION ............................................................ 928
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms' (Charter) was
Canada's first foray into constitutional governance. It represents Canada's
first specific guarantees of individual liberty on a constitutional level. It
also expanded the role of the Canadian judiciary by explicitly charging
courts with interpreting the Charter's provisions and with developing
analytical applications when evaluating constitutional issues.,
This paper discusses some interesting facets of Canada's new
constitution, judicial holdings since the constitution's inception, and
compares it to the more-developed constitutional jurisprudence in the
United States. The Introduction section briefly discusses Canada's
constitutional history, and then outlines some considerations necessary for
the subsequent discussion. The Introduction also gives an overview of the
* B.S. cum laude, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University; candidate for Juris Doctor,
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structure of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The
Comparison section offers a discussion of the differences between
Canadian and American judicial review theories and tests, and then
contrasts individual rights litigation jurisprudence under the two
constitutions. The Comparison section then discusses the issues of: 1)
standing, 2) search and seizure, and 3) the exclusionary sanction, by
contrasting the two constitutional models. The paper then concludes that
considerable differences exist between the two constitutions,
notwithstanding the similarities in both cultures. It also concludes that the
Canadian Charter has many advantages over the United States
Constitution, but that Canadian courts are handicapped by the temptation
to blindly follow United States constitutional jurisprudence.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. History
Canada was formed through the British North America Act
(hereinafter B.N.A.) executed in 1867 by the British Parliament.3 The
B.N.A., also known as the Constitution Act of 1867, defined the basic
element of Canada's judicial system.4 It did not, however, define the
powers of the federal or provincial governments, and provided no way to
transcend government actions which infringed on individual rights.-
Contrary to the United States system, which relies heavily on the Federal
Constitution as the primary source of legal protection against governmental
interference upon individual rights, the Canadian system followed the
British convention of parliamentary supremacy whereby the Supreme
Court served in a purely advisory capacity.6
While individual liberties were not addressed in the B.N.A., they
were guaranteed by the Canadian Bill of Rights.7 The Bill did, however,
not have constitutional status, and the Canadian Supreme Court historically
3. British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. C. 3 (Eng.) [hereinafter B.N.A.].
4. B.N.A., supra note 3, §§ 96-101.
5. Robert A. Sedler, Constitutional Protection of Individual Rights in Canada: The
Impact of the New Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1191,
1192 (1984).
6. Id.
7. Canadian Bill of Rights, 1960, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, ch. 44 (Can.). While labeled Bill of
Rights, the legislation was merely a statute, able to be repealed at any time. Further, the Bill
probably was not binding on the provinces. William C. Hodge, Patriation of the Canadian
Constitution: Comparative Federalism in a New Context, 60 WASH. L. REV. 585 n. 110 (June
1985).
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hesitated to employ the Bill to invalidate government actions., This
changed in 1982 when the British Parliament enacted the Canada Act of
1982. 9
B. The Charter
The Charter essentially changed the structure of Canada's
government.'0 The Canada Act removed all of the United Kingdom's
authority in governance over Canada" and, along with the Constitution
Act, formulated the central law of Canada.' 2 Already, a primary contrast
between the Charter and the United States Constitution is evident: the
Canadian Charter was enacted by the British Parliament, while the United
States Constitution came from the people which it was meant to protect
and emancipate from the British. However, the Canadian people were
involved to some extent in creating the Charter. The Canadian Charter
required ratification via the Canadian Parliament in essentially the same
way as the United States Constitution was ratified by the states."
Before entering into an analysis of the constitutions of the two
nations, it is necessary to understand some fundamental differences
between the Canadian and American systems of government. First, in the
judicial scope, Canada basically has a unitary judicial system with no
separate division of federal and provincial courts. '4 The United States, in
contrast, has a dual system which provides for the power of both state and
federal courts. Contrary to the American judicial system, the Canadian
Supreme Court, the nations highest court of appeal, has authority to decide
any federal or local question raised in a case." However, while
jurisdiction may remain in theory, appeals to the Canadian Supreme Court
as of right were abolished in 1975, and the Court now rarely grants leave
8. Franklin R. Liss, A Mandate to Balance: Judicial Protection of Individual Rights
Under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 41 EMORY L. J. 1281, n.5 (Fall 1992).
9. Canada Act, 1982, ch. 11, sched B (Eng.).
10. Prior to 1982, Canada was controlled by a parliamentary system of government, with a
Prime Minister as leader and the Monarch of England as the supreme head of state. Under this
model, there is not a separation of power but a fusion of power between the legislative and
executive branches of government. Parliament both creates the executive branch and regulates
the judicial branch. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Constitututional and Presidential
Leadership, 47 MD. L. REV. 54, 55 (Fall 1987).
11. Canada Act, supra note 9.
12. CANADIAN CHARTER §§ 52, 60.
13. Sedler, supra note 5, at 1194 n.10.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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to hear questions of provincial law.16 The constitutional process in Canada
concerns the association between the courts and the government, while in
the United States it concerns the federal courts and the branches of both
the federal and state governments." Additionally, the Canadian Charter
expressly provides that the courts are responsible for defining the Charter's
provisions and for making decisions regarding governmental actions in
light of the Charter."' Such responsibility is not so explicitly mandated in
the United States Constitution.
There is another difference in the relationship between the
judiciary and the government in each country. In the United States,
judicial review is perceived as being confrontational. The United States
Supreme Court strikes down laws or actions, appearing to be directly in
conflict with the legislative branch of the system.,9  In Canada, the
Supreme Court judicial review process most often takes the form of a
procedure called references where the interested party, usually the
government, voluntarily requests the Court to determine the
constitutionality of a government action or legislation.20  The interested
parties do not ask the Court to strike down a law, and the Court in Canada
takes on a more advisory role. Such a role is impossible under the United
States constitutional jurisprudence. 2' In Canada, the reference procedure
and review by the Court is a matter of right," and the courts' role in
defining the Charter was explicitly provided for in the body of the
Charter. 2 Rather than a confrontational process as in the United States,
Canadian Supreme Court judicial review of government action appears to
be a more cooperative effort between the judiciary and legislative bodies.'
Secondly, the way powers are allocated to the provinces and to the
federal government differs from the governmental hierarchy system in the
United States. The Constitution Act of 1867 explicitly defines the
Canadian federal government's exclusive powers5 and the powers of the
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1231.
18. CANADIAN CHARTER § 52.
19. Sedler, supra note 5, at 1232.
20. Id.
21. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26, (1945) (holding that the United States
Supreme Court was not permitted to render advisory opinions).
22. Sedler, supra note 5, at 1233 (citing Attorney-General of Ont. v. Attorney-General of
Can., [1912] A.C. 571 (Can.)).
23. CANADIAN CHARTER § 52.
24. Sedler, supra note 5, at 1233.
25. B.N.A., supra note 3, § 91
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provincial legislatures?' These powers do not overlap, but in case of
direct conflict over an activity, the federal power prevails .27 The only
amendment in the 1982 Act which affected allocation of power was the
expansion of provincial powers over non-renewable natural resources.,
Conversely, a prominent feature of American allocation of power is
concurrency: states have power to govern in the interests of the health and
welfare of their citizens except when the Constitution explicitly prohibits
the states from exercising such powers.2" Furthermore, any power not
guaranteed to the federal government is left to the states. 0 States do not
derive their sovereignty from the Constitution, as the Canadian provinces
do, rather the United States Constitution limits the extent of state powers.
Before a proper analysis of the Canadian Charter and comparison
with the American Constitution can be performed, it is necessary to first
gain an albeit cursory familiarity with the provisions of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
C. Structural Overview
The structures of the provisions of the Canadian Charter differ
significantly from those of the United States Constitution. One reason for
this is that the Charter was written at a time when Canada had over a
century to develop its jurisprudence ' while the American Constitution was
developed at the inception of the country. In fact, many provisions of the
United States Constitution were designed to prohibit colonial practices
which the framers found particularly repugnant.3 2  Another contrast
between the two constitutional systems is thus evident: since the Canadian
Charter is a contemporary document, it was drafted with experience
relevant to modem contemporary life, allowing for provisions relevant to
twentieth-century rights protection. The United States Constitution rarely
directly addresses modern rights issues, and the Supreme Court has had to
develop rights protections relevant to contemporary American society by
creating penumbra rights. 33
26. B.N.A., supra note 3, § 92.
27. Sedler, supra note 5, at 1196.
28. CANADIAN CHARTER § 50.
29. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
30. Id.
31. Sedler, supra note 5, at 1212.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1212-13.
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The limiting provision of section 1 of the Charter outlines the
consideration required when analyzing alleged infringements on individual
rights.?' According to this section, the rights and freedoms guaranteed by
the body of the Charter are subject only to reasonable limits prescribed by
law as can be justified in a democratic society. As discussed above, this
section, taken along with section 24, has been regarded as the Canadian
courts' mandate to interpret the Charter's provisions.
Section 2 proclaims the explicit guarantees of freedom of religion,
opinion, expression, peaceful assemble, and association." They are
enumerated as explicit declarations of rights, as opposed to the provisions
of the American Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. Sections
3, 4, and 5 outline the federal parliamentary election system and the
system for the legislative assembly. 36 Section 6 discusses mobility rights,
while sections 7 through 14 cover the legal rights of life and liberty,
freedom from arbitrary detention, unreasonable search and seizure, and
prohibition of cruel punishment. 7 This area, subtitled Legal Rights, also
addresses criminal procedure provisions such as: double jeopardy, rights
to speedy trial, and the presumption of innocence until proven guilty. 38
Particularly unique to the Charter is the guarantee of language
rights. 39 The section first grants unequivocal equal status to both French
and English as official languages of the country. This section guarantees
citizens the right to engage in debate in parliament, to receive public
services, and to be tried in court in either language. This section also
guarantees the right to be educated in either language through the
secondary school level.4°
As mentioned above, section 24 is particularly important from the
judicial perspective, as it mandates the courts' role in interpreting the
Charter's provisions.41 This section commands the courts to hear
complaints of those whose rights have been allegedly infringed or denied,
and orders the courts to consider the complaints and apply appropriate
remedial measures.
Another unique provision which warrants special consideration is
section 33. Called the section 33 override, its provisions are all but
34. CANADIAN CHARTER § 1.
35. Id. § 2.
36. Id. §§ 3, 4, 5.
37. Id. §§ 6-14.
38. Id. §§ 7-14.
39. Id. §§ 16-23.
40. Id. §23.
41. Id.§ 24.
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prohibited in the American constitutional system. The section permits,
with qualification, a province to decide that certain provisions of the
Charter will not apply to them and enables the provincial legislatures to
enact provisions which completely contradict their Charter counterparts.4 2
II. COMPARISON WITH THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
A. Judicial Review
The United States has had well over 200 years to develop its
constitutional jurisprudence. In contrast, Canada has had only fourteen.
The Canadian judiciary must constantly battle with the temptation to follow
United States constitutional case law. Such borrowing could lead to
illogical analysis and the creation of a legal framework and structure that is
inconsistent with the differing Charter. Consequently, Canadian courts
risk developing tests which apply incorrect logic to issues and exceptions
inherent in a Charter with differing provisions.
Contrary to the American view of courts, judicial review in
Canada is seen as supportive of the legislature rather than being in conflict
with it. 4 The Charter expressly legitimizes judicial review of government
actions, and the right to review such actions did not need to evolve as it
did in the United States, through Marbury v. Madison." Since the Charter
expressly mandated the right to review its provisions to the courts, no such
evolution was required in Canada.4 1
42. (1) Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act of
Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a provision thereof
shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of
this Charter.
(2) An Act or a provision of an Act in respect of which a declaration made under
this section is in effect shall have such operation as it would have but for the provision
of this Charter referred to in the declaration.
(3) A declaration made under subsection (1) shall cease to have effect five years
after it comes into force or on such earlier date as may be specified in the declaration.
CANADIAN CHARTER § 33.
43. Sedler, supra note 5, at 1198-99.
44. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). The United States Supreme Court in this
landmark case observed that it is implicit in a written constitution that it cannot be changed at
will. Further, the Court mandated the task of interpreting the laws of the land; "[i]t is the
province and duty [of the court] to say what the law is." Id.
45. CANADIAN CHARTER § 24.
1997]
ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law
B. Infringement of Protected Rights
In individual liberty litigation, section 1 of the Charter has been a
central feature. The section acknowledges that the government may limit
freedoms guaranteed elsewhere in the Charter." It also creates a
framework for analysis when an alleged infringement occurs: the claimant
must first establish that the government's action has infringed some right
protected by the Charter. Such infringement can then still be declared
constitutional if it falls within the reasonableness of parameters of
governmental action as defined in section 1. Contrasted with American
constitutional analysis, government interests do not enter into the formula
as they do in the United States system. The Canadian test does not limit
the extent of individual rights with an evaluation of government interests.41
The first prong of the test, government action, was defined in
Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Union, Local 580 v. Dolphin
Delivery, Ltd."1 The Canadian Supreme Court's threshold definition of
government action, developed in this case, has since come to be known as
the Dolphin Delivery Government Action Requirement. In the case, the
plaintiff-union contended that a court-imposed injunction against picketing
constituted an infringement of the Charter's section 2(b) freedom of
expression. The Court held that the injunction constituted judicial
enforcement of common law and did not rise to the level of government
action for individual liberty litigation purposes.' 9 The Court then went on
to limit government action to legislative, executive, or administrative
action by a government body which is alleged to have infringed on a right
enumerated in the Charter.?° Charter right infringement litigation was held
to be inappropriate in cases such as Dolphin Delivery, where the cause of
action is between two private parties and no government action is relied
upon as the basis for the litigation.,' Contrast this with American cases
such as Shelley v. Kraemer" in which the United States Supreme Court
held that judicial enforcement of covenants in a private agreement
constituted government action for Fourteenth Amendment purposes.
46. CANADIAN CHARTER § 1.
47. Liss, supra note 8, at 1284.
48. Retail, Wholesale & Dep't Store Union, Loc. 580 v. Dolphin Delivery, Ltd., [1986]
S.C.R. 573 (Can.).
49. Id. at 600.
50. Id. at 598-99.
51. Id. at 603.
52. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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Once government action has been established, a plaintiff must
demonstrate an infringement of individual rights as defined in the
Charter.53 The degree of infringement was defined in Operation Dismantle
Inc. v. The Queen.14 The plaintiffs alleged that the Canadian Cabinet's
permission, allowing the United States to test missiles in Canadian
territory, violated their guarantee of life and security of person because it
increased the probability of nuclear war.5" The Canadian Supreme Court
denied the claim as speculative and hypothetical, and in its holding defined
infiingement as an actual or probable deprivation of a guaranteed right
which can surely result directly from the government action.56 The Court
further held that, while allegations should be taken as true for litigation
purposes, such allegations must be capable of proof."
Once the plaintiff has established the prima facie infringement
case, the government has the burden of showing that its action was
reasonable as outlined in section 1 in order to prevail.-" As discussed
above, unlike American constitutional analysis, the government interest is
of no importance and takes no part of the analytical framework. Thus, in
Canada an infringement of the rights outlined in the Charter may be saved
by a showing of reasonableness as provided by section 1.
When government action takes the form of legislation, the
Canadian Supreme Court now employs the Oakes three-prong test
developed in Regina v. Oakes5 9 In Oakes, a federal narcotic statute
required that defendants proven to be in possession of narcotics were
required to prove that they were not in possession for purpose of
trafficking. The Court in Oakes determined that this statute infringed upon
Charter section 11(d) which provides that those accused of offenses are
presumed innocent until proven guilty. Having determined the
infringement, the Court then decided whether the government action could
be saved under section 1.6 After analyzing the legislative objective,' the
53. CANADIAN CHARTER § 1.
54. Operation Dismantle, Inc. v. The Queen, [1985] S.C.R. 441 (Can.).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 456.
57. Id.
58. Retail, Wholesale & Dep't Store Union, Loc. 580 v. Dolphin Delivery, Ltd., [1986]
S.C.R. 573 (Can.).
59. Regina v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.R. 103 (Can.).
60. Id. at 114.
61. The Court held that, to maintain the reasonableness of the government infringement,
the government's legislative objective must be "of sufficient importance to warrant a
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Court used a three-prong analysis to test the means used by the legislature
to achieve its objective: 1) the means must be rationally connected to the
objective; 2) there must be minimal impairment of the right in question;
and 3) the effects of the measures impairing the right must be in proportion
to the legislative objective.62 The Court held that the legislative objective
of protecting society from drug traffickers as sufficiently warranted, but it
held that the statute failed the first prong of the three-prong test because
the statute was applied to those arrested with minimal amounts of narcotics
who could not possibly be found to be traffickers.6 3 While the third prong
of the Oakes test may seem to implicate a government interest analysis, the
Canadian Court has yet to employ this prong to a large extent." Justices
have stuck to the first two prongs of the test to invalidate government
actions, and in doing so have appeared more deferential to the legislature.65
Further, the Court has yet to define the requirements and applications of
prong three.66
There are several advantages to the Canadian constitutional
analysis framework over its American counterpart. Because of the
contemporary nature of the Charter, the drafters were able to resolve many
constitutional questions that United States courts have had to resolve
through extensive litigation and interpretation of the Constitution. Many
constitutional issues which had been previously litigated in the United
States are addressed and remedied by the text of the Charter.67
One advantage of the Charter, removing analysis of the
government's interest, may be appealing."8 In his article A Mandate to
Balance, Franklin Liss illustrates" through the folowing example, the
contrast between the two analytical systems. A and B wish to engage in
the same act under differing factual circumstances which appears to fall
under the protection of the Canadian Charter. The government desires to
regulate the conduct in the same way with respect to both A and B.
Because of differences in facts, the government action takes the form of
constitutionally protected right or freedom" and such objective must "relate to concerns which
are pressing and substantial in a free and democratic society." Id. at 138-39.
62. Id. at 139.
63. Id. at 142.
64. Liss, supra note 8, at 1312.
65. Id. at 1311.
66. Id. at 1312.
67. Sedler, supra note 5, at 1223.
68. Liss, supra note 8, at 1312.
69. Id. at 1312-13.
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two different statutes. The government's legislative objective in regulating
within A's case is far superior to its objective in B's.
Assume the government's regulation in A's case is upheld under a
section 1 reasonableness analysis. This result would not prejudice, and
may assist B's constitutional challenge. B could use A's unsuccessful
challenge to show the infringement and establish his prima facie case. B
could then use A's case to show that the legislation in B's case must fail
under a section 1 analysis because the legislation in A was held to be
reasonable.
In the United States, a court upholding the legislation in A's case,
after balancing the competing interests of A and the government, could
structure its analysis so that the conduct in both A and B's cases would not
be constitutionally protected. In the United States the conduct could be
broadly regulated if A loses his case, while in Canada, each case is
differently, and the legislation in B's case may be found unreasonable,
partly due to the government prevailing in A's case. 0 Therefore, when
government interests are analyzed, as in the United States, litigants are
precluded from bringing cases subsequent to a holding detrimental to their
argument. When no government interest is analyzed, as in Canada more
litigants may have their day in court.
Another advantage is the probable consistency in Canadian Charter
analysis." The section 1 reasonableness of government infringement on
guarantees of freedoms framework is independent of the Charter guarantee
infringed.2 Holdings subsequent to Dolphin Delivery and Oakes appear to
use the same analysis despite the nature of the transgressed right." In
American constitutional jurisprudence, the tests and analyses employed
depend on the right infringed. There are no textual provisions in the
United States Constitution to guide the courts, and the Supreme Court has
been left to develop its own mode of analysis. The consistency enjoyed in
Canada is impossible under the United States model.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1313.
72. Id.
73. Id., citing Devine v. Quebec, [1985] S.C.R. 790 (Can.)(holding language provisions
infringed on Charter section 2(b) but were justified under section 1 analysis); and Regina v. Paul
Magder Furs, 60 O.R.2d 172 (Ont. Ct. App. 1989)(holding that analysis by the Supreme Court in
another case was equally applicable to a challenge to the same legislation alleging infringement of
a different Charter provision).
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C. Standing
The United States and Canadian courts have addressed the issue of
standing in different manners. The Supreme Court of Canada has taken
the opposite approach of its American counterpart regarding standing
issues. The Canadian Court permits third parties to apply for
constitutional remedies. This has lead to a substantial difference between
American and Canadian standing holdings in constitutional-challenge
cases.
Section 24 of the Canadian Charter grants remedy only to persons
"whose rights or freedoms . . . have been infringed."74  Standing often
depends on the scope of the right or freedom as defined by the provision
guaranteeing it. The Canadian Supreme Court has also permitted third
parties to assert the constitutional rights of others. 5  Further, anyone
charged with a criminal offense has standing to challenge the
constitutionality of the law under which they were charged even if their
own rights had not been violated76 This was the holding in Big M Drug
Mart," a landmark case regarding standing in Canadian constitutional
jurisprudence. This holding has been cited favorably in subsequent cases,
and third-party standing status still prevails in Canada.7' By contrast, the
United States Supreme Court has held that complainants must demonstrate
a violation of their own constitutional rights before they can claim standing
to challenge the constitutionality of legislation.79
The issue of personal standing in search and seizure cases has not
been conclusively defined by the Canadian Supreme Court. Section 8 of
the Charter proclaims the right to be secure against unreasonable search
and seizure, and the Court had the opportunity to address the section in
Hunter v. Southam.'0 In Hunter, the Court referred to an American case,
Katz v. United States,8' to interpret the provision of section 8 as based on
privacy interests and not property interest.' 2 The Court cited the much-
74. CANADIAN CHARTER § 24.
75. Paul Denis Godin, A Comparative Study of the Exclusionary Rule and Its Standing
Threshold in Canada, the United States, and New York State: The Relation of Purpose to
Practice, 52 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 52 (Winter 1994).
76. Regina v. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] S.C.R. 295 (Can.).
77. Id.
78. See e.g., Regina v. McDonough, 44 C.C.C.3d 370 (Ont. D.C. 1988)(holding the
defendant had standing to constitutionally challenge search of third person's car).
79. Broderick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
80. Hunter v. Southarn Inc., [19841 S.C.R. 145 (Can.).
81. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
82. Hunter, [1984] S.C.R. 145, at 159.
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used Katz standard approvingly, and has imposed the standard of this case
as useful when construing section 8 protection."
In most instances, standing issues represent another contrast
between the provisions of the American constitution and Canadian Charter.
They also present another example of why Canadian courts should resist
the temptation to blindly apply American rules to Canadian constitutional
challenges.
D. Search and Seizure and the Exclusionary Sanction
When issues involve search and seizure, and admissibility of
evidence obtained in an illegal search and seizure, the two countries'
systems also differ. As mentioned above, the Canadian Court, in its
limited experience construing section 8, seems to believe that the section is
similar to the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. However, the two provisions are not identical. The
crux of the contrast between the two lies in the remedial provisions of the
two constitutions.
The remedy in illegal search and seizure situations in Canada is
expressly contained in section 52 of the Canadian Charter." This theory
was confirmed in Regina v. Collins" in which the Court held that evidence
illegally obtained should be excluded, and thatsuch exclusion is expressly
provided for by section 24 of the Charter." Exclusion of such evidence in
the United States stems from judge-made law, and no express remedial
provision is present in the United States Constitution. Further, in Canada,
exclusionary sanctions are seen as protection of the integrity of the justice
system, while in the United States the theory is that exclusion is used as a
deterrence to police misconduct . 7
Section 24 prescribes a discretionary exclusionary rule under
which a court may exclude evidence if its admission "would bring the
administration of justice into disrepute."" Collins, the definitive case in
this area, breathed life into the remedial provision of section 24.69 It set up
a three part balancing test of factors to which American courts give little
83. Id.
84. CANADIAN CHARTER § 52.
85. Regina v. Collins, [1987] S.C.R. 265 (Can.).
86. Id. at 266.
87. Jonathan Dawe, Standing to Challenge Searches and Seizures Under the Charter: The
Lessons of the American Experience to Canadian Law, 53 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 52
(Winter 1994).
88. CANADIAN CHARTER § 24(2).
89. Collins, [1987] S.C.R. 265 (Can.).
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or no weight.0 Under the Collins test, the Canadian courts weigh the
nature of the evidence, the prejudice of the forced contribution of the
evidence against the accused, and the seriousness of the rights violation. 9'
This test also requires that after evidence is shown to be illegally obtained,
the defendant must show that admitting the evidence will bring the
administration of justice into disrepute. Judges in Canada can also use this
balancing test to factor in such elements as probative value and need for
evidence." This is contrary to the American position on excluding
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
. The Canadian approach has advantages over the American
approach. While the Fourth Amendment addresses individual rights,
remedies are societal. The Supreme Court must therefore apply
inconsistent Fourth Amendment theories to rights and remedies. 9 Such
inconsistency theoretically will not exist in Canadian exclusionary cases.
This position is furthered because of the express provision and the Court's
subsequent interpretation in Collins. Further, because of the express
nature of the remedy, there seems to be no danger that the exclusionary
sanction will disappear in Canada. However, in the United States, because
the sanction is judicially fabricated, it is possible that the remedy can be
eroded by an anti-crime Supreme Court which may not be as willing to
liberally read the exclusionary sanction into the United States
Constitution.9' A second advantage is the flexibility of the balancing test
enunciated in Collins, but this advantage may be overshadowed by the
American system which assigns definitive weight to factors like inevitable
discovery."- Courts in Canada, while enjoying their flexibility, may be
sacrificing the consistency of the American model.9
III. CONCLUSION
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is an infant
compared to the two-hundred-year-old United States Constitution. While
many of the provisions appear to be based on its American counterpart,
there exist many differences. Because of the difference in the nature of the
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Godin, supra note 73.
93. Donald L. Doernberg, "The Right of the People": Reconciling Collective and
Individual Interests Under the Fourth Amendnent, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 259, 283 (May 1983).
94. Godin, supra note 73.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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Canadian Charter and the United States Constitution and because of
differences in the two countries' theories regarding the relationship
between the judiciary and government, constitutional jurisprudence must
naturally develop differently in Canada than in the United States,
notwithstanding the similarities in the two countries' culture and
democratic governance.
In the domain of individual rights protection, the provisions in the
Charter are more explicit than in the Constitution, and the infringement
test is more concrete and more consistently applicable. Standing to
challenge government action is awarded more liberally in Canada.
Additionally, the exclusionary rule has different theories and systems in
the two countries.
Canadian courts have the burden of developing constitutional
guidelines to analyze their Charter's provisions while evading the added
temptation of importing American theories into their decisions. However,
Canadian courts have the advantage of interpreting a constitution which
was drafted in modern contemporary times with contemporary
considerations. In addition, important provisions are explicitly provided
for in the Charter. These same provisions required two centuries of
judicial development in the United States Supreme Court.
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Sofija, a thirty-year-old Muslim woman, was raped some 900
times by Serbian soldiers during the six months she was detained in a
prison camp. After her release, Sofija was hiding from her family in
humiliation while expecting an unwanted Serbian baby.'
I. INTRODUCTION
For almost four years, former Yugoslavia was ravaged by a war in
which acts of incomprehensible and shocking cruelty were carried out on
an enormous magnitude. Among the atrocities were the rapes of an
estimated 30,000 to 50,000 Bosnian women by the Serbian military.,
After World War II, several international documents were created
to prevent the recurrence of such cruelty and bloodshed.' These treaties
address rape specifically but do not provide sufficient enforceable remedies
for their violations. The atrocities committed in former Yugoslavia,
however, have prompted the United Nations Security Council to institute
an International War Crimes Tribunal (Tribunal) to prosecute the
responsible individuals for the horrors committed in former Yugoslavia
since 1991.1
This article discusses the key international documents currently in
place which could be used to prosecute Serbs for the mass rapes and
focuses on the prosecution of rape in the Tribunal. Although the Tribunal
has demonstrated its willingness to prosecute rape as a war crime, it
remains to be seen whether the Tribunal and the international community
will bring the suspects to justice.
1. Tom Post et al., A Pattern of Rape, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 4, 1993, at 32. Under Muslim
culture, a baby takes its father's ethhicity. See infra note 23.
2. Post et al., supra note 1. See also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, BOSNIA-
HERZEGOVINA:, RAPE AND SEXUAL ABUSE BY ARMED FORCES 3-5 (1993) (stating that all sides
to the conflict have committed rape, and Serbs also used rape as an instrument of war).
3. John Darnton, Does the World Still Recognize a Holocaust?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25,
1993, § 4, at 1.
4. Compliance with international law is usually only ensured by the state's desire to
maintain good world relations which may lead it to recognize international jurisdiction. See
generally Theodor Meron, The Case for War Crimes Trials in Yugoslavia, FOREIGN AFF.,
Summer 1993, at 122.
5. The Tribunal was established under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter which
requires that before a tribunal can be created, the situation must constitute a threat to international
peace. UNITED NATIONS, SECURITY COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 2 OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 808, U.N. S/25704 (1993)
[hereinafter Secretary-General's Report].
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II. BOSNIAN SERB ETHNIC CLEANSING STRATEGY
The historical ethnic division and animosity between Serbs and
Muslims dates back over 600 years.6 At that time, the Ottoman Turks
dominated the region comprised of southern Slavic minorities: Serbs,
Croats, and Muslims.' Strong Serbian nationalistic feelings surfaced
during the Turkish dominion,8 and their intensity grew over the years.9
In 1991, the former Yugoslavia 0 started to disintegrate." After
Bosnia declared its independence from the former Yugoslavia in 1992, '12
the Serbs who lived in Bosnia feared they would be persecuted by the
Muslim majority.' 3 Supported by the government of neighboring Serbia,
Bosnian Serbs began a strategy of expelling Muslims from Bosnia." Serb
leaders use the term ethnic cleansing5 as a cynical euphemism to
characterize their vicious campaign to create a homogeneous Serbia.16
Mass rape was an instrument of the Bosnian Serbs' ethnic
cleansing campaign.'7 The Serbian strategy was to eliminate the Muslim
6. Water Russel Mead, West Can't Quell Balkan Hatreds, Resentment in Region Is
Centuries Old, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Aug. 16, 1992, at D2.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See generally VLADIMIR DEDIJER ET AL., HISTORY OF YUGOSLAVIA (1974)
(discussing the history of the internal conflicts during Ottoman and Hapsburg Empires). For
additional analysis of civil conflicts during the 20th century, see Mead, supra note 6.
10. Prior to recent dissolution, the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia consisted of
six republics: Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia. EC Ministers to
Discuss Bosnian Conflict and Aid to CIS, INTER PRESS SERVICE PORT., Apr. 30, 1992, available
in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File.
11. For a discussion of history of the ethnic conflicts in Yugoslavia, see ALEX N.
DRAGNICH, SERBS AND CROATS: THE STRUGGLE IN YUGOSLAVIA (1992). See also infra note
12.
12. U.S. Seeks Support for Action in Bosnia; Christopher Sent to Talk to European Allies,
ORLANDO SENTINEL TRB., May 2, 1993, at Al, available in LEXIS News Library, ARCNWS
File [hereinafter U.S. Seeks Support].
13. Before the present war, Muslims made up 44% of Bosnia's population while the Serbs,
who are Eastern Orthodox Christian, accounted for 33% and Croats, who are Roman Catholic,
constituted 17% of the population, U.S. Seeks Support, supra note 12.
14. David M. Kresock, "Ethnic Cleansing" in the Balkans: The Legal Foundations of
Foreign Intervention, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 203, 221 (1994).
15. The term is deceiving because Bosnian Muslims, Serbs, and Croats, all have a Slavic
ethnicity and are split more by their religious identity. For a historical background of ethnic
cleansing generally, see Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing, FOREIGN
AFF., Summer 1993, at 110.
16. Kresock, supra note 14.
17. Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia
Submitted by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights,
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population of Bosnia through an attack on Muslim women.'" Subsequently,
the body of a woman was "used to send a message to the woman and her
community that she and it are conquered," 9 since rape wounds not only
the individual woman but also the morale and identity of her society.20
III. THE RAPE OF MUSLIM WOMEN IN WARTIME BOSNIA
A. Reports of Mass Rape in Bosnia
To accomplish their mission, Serbian soldiers raped Muslim
women in a typical pattern. 21 Serbs transformed villages into rape camps
for the convenience of their soldiers and for easy access to women.2 The
rapes were committed particularly to impregnate Muslim women and to
keep them captive past the period for obtaining a safe abortion so that they
would "give birth to unwanted Serbian babies." 2
Shocking reports reveal information of gang rapes during which
victims died - systematic rapes of girls as young as six years old, some
performed in front of their fathers, mothers, and siblings and as many as
two hundred witnesses? In one instance, a twenty-eight-year-old woman
U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., Annex, Item 115(c), at 57, 74, U.N. Doc. A/48192, S/25341 (1993)
[hereinafter Report of the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights].
18. Rape Was Weapon of Serbs, U.N. Says, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1993, at Al. Although
the reported rape cases involve female victims, ranging from children to elderly women, there is
evidence that Bosnian men have also been subjected to rape. See Louise Branson, Sexual Abuse
of POWs Widespread in Yugoslav War, STRAITS TIMES, Aug. 2, 1993, at 13.
19. Laurel Fletcher et al., Human Rights Violations Against Women, 15 WHITTIER L.
REV. 319, 321 (1994) (discussing that the lower social status of women makes them targets for
rape, and that such an injury to a woman is a reflection on the community in which women are
passive and protected by men).
20. Lance Morrow, Unspeakable: Is Rape an Inevitable and Marginal Part of War?,
TIME, Feb. 22, 1993, at 48.
21. Sharon A. Healey, Prosecuting Rape Under the Statute of the War Crimes Tribunal for
the Forner Yugoslavia, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 327, 339 (1995).
22. Roy Gutman, Ethnic Cleansing, 'Rape' Camps: Bosnian War Is Savage as Ever, ST.
Louis POST DISPATCH, Sept. 30, 1993, at A4. Once a village is taken over, the male population
is sent to prison camps while women are taken to facilities where they are repeatedly raped in
front of numerous witnesses. See Fletcher et al., supra note 19, at 320.
23. Post et al., supra note 1. Muslims will consider the babies Serbs because under
Muslim culture and Islamic law, a child assumes its father's ethnicity. Rebecca 0. Bresnick,
Reproductive Ability as a Sixth Ground of Persecution Under the Domestic and International
Definitions of Refugee, 21 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 121, 127 (1995) (citing Mary
Elizabeth Mayer, Law and Religion in the Muslim Middle East, 35 AM. J. COMP. L. 127
(1987)).
24. Post et al., supra note 1.
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was raped by twenty-eight soldiers before she lost consciousness.5
Countless women have experienced a fate similar to one nineteen-year-old
woman who was detained four-and-one-half months in a Serb facility
where she was raped five or six times daily. 2
B. Consequences of Rape
Forcible rapes produce numerous harmful consequences, such as
impregnation, ostracism of rape victims by their families, and
psychological harm. Many rape victims who become pregnant choose
abortion if possible.,, However, many of the women in Bosnia could not
have a safe abortion and were therefore forced to bear the Serbian
offspring toward whom they felt disgust and repugnance.2 Conceived
during savage Serbian rapes, the children born of these rapes are the
youngest victims of the war. Numerous children all have been abandoned
by their mothers and are left to live in woeful conditions in hospitals and
orphanages.29
Rape victims are often ostracized by their husbands, families, and
communities if they reveal that they have been raped ° because the Muslim
culture, "views rape victims as particularly shameful."' Women face
family rejection if they speak publicly about their rapes 32 because if "they
have been defiled, their family has been defiled, and by extension their
community has been defiled. ,,33
Rape is a humiliating experience which creates enduring social
trauma. When a woman is raped, not only does she suffer physically, she
25. Terry Atlas, U.N. Will Pursue War Crimes Trials for Bosnia Rapes, CHI. TRIB., Jan.
30, 1994, at C1.
26. Fletcher et al., supra note 19, at 368.
27. Women in Bosnia can obtain legal abortions within the first six months of pregnancy.
Fletcher et al., supra note 19, at 377-78 (discussing the legal requirements for obtaining abortion:
after the 10th week of pregnancy, women must obtain a certificate from an ethics committee in
order to legally abort). See also Post et al., supra note 1.
28. Fletcher et al., supra note 19.
29. Id. at 378; see Louise Branson, Balkan "Rape Babies" Face Dark Future, STRAITS
TIMES, July 5, 1993, at 12.
30. Fletcher et al., supra note 19, at 321.
31. Bresnick, supra note 23, at 126. For a detailed analysis of women's chastity in
Muslim cultures, where virginity is considered the greatest gift a woman can give to her husband,
see generally NAWAL EL SAADAWI, THE HIDDEN FACE OF EVE: WOMEN IN THE ARAB WORLD
(Sherif Hetata trans., 1980).
32. The family shame brought on by rape was so great that rape victims were killed by
their own relatives. See Associated Press, Shamed Muslims Killing Rape Victims, CHI. TRIB.,
Feb. 10, 1993, at 5N.
33. Fletcher et al., supra note 19, at 321.
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also experiences profound shame and internalizes a sense of guilt.3 ' Rape
victims may also suffer serious psychological disorders, such as
depression, phobia, suicidal impulses, or severe psychosis.' A part of the
healing process for some victims would be for the international community
to recognize what has happened to them by punishing their tormentors. 6
IV. TREATMENT OF WARTIME RAPE BY THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY
A. Rape Historically Unenforced
Rape has been prohibited by international law, but historically, the
rape of women in wartime has been deemed not as serious as other abuses
and has often been forgotten.1 For example, mass rapes by the Russians,
Germans, and Japanese during World War II received limited attention.38
Similarly, the rapes by soldiers during the Vietnam war, 9 and by the
Pakistans against Bangladeshi women in 1971 were also ignored. 4
The Nuremberg war crimes trials after World War II,41 which set
an example for future tribunals, did not indict any suspects for rape.4 2 The
only reference to rape after World War II was in the Tokyo Tribunal;
however, these rapes were given only an ephemeral attention.4 1
34. Id. at 367.
35. Id. at 378, Many victims are left gynecologically scarred. Clare Dyer, Law: Bringing
Barbarians to the Bar; Bosnian Rapists are in Danger of Getting Off Scot-free, GUARDIAN, Sept.
24, 1996, at 17.
36. Robert Marquand, A Dogged UN Hudge Propels "the Real Trial of the Century,"
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 23, 1995, at 7.
37. Dianna Marder, Once Again, Rape Becomes a Weapon of War, ATLANTA CONST.,
Feb. 17, 1993, at All.
38. SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN, AND RAPE 53-62
(1975). See also LEON FRIEDMAN, THE LAW OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1060-64
(1972).
39. BROWNMILLER, supra note 38, at 87-118.
40. Id. at 78-87.
41. The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg was empowered to punish
individuals who committed war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes against peace. Rape
was not explicitly listed in any of these crime categories, but was probably encompassed within
the definitions in the Nuremberg Charter. See Nuremberg Charter, annexed to the London
Agreement on War Criminals, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 6, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
42. Atlas, supra note 25.
43. Id.
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Historically, women have been considered a prize of the war, seized by
the conquerors as their well deserved reward.u
B. International Documents Addressing Rape
In the aftermath of World War II, several international documents
were created to prevent the recurrence of similar tragedies. Serbians could
be prosecuted for the mass rapes they committed under the following
treaties.
1. Genocide Convention
One of the most significant documents which emerged after World
War II was the Genocide Convention designed to recognize genocide as a
crime under international law.45 The Genocide Convention defines the crime
of genocide" and makes any party liable, regardless of the defense of
respondent superior.4"
The mass rapes of Muslim women in Bosnia fit the definition of
genocide under the Genocide Convention because they were committed as
part of the Serbs' campaign to exterminate a national, religious, or ethnic
group.48 This determination has been recognized by the International Court
of Justice which issued a provisional ruling prohibiting various Serbian acts
in Bosnia.4 9 The ruling declared that Bosnian Serbs were committing acts in
44. Susan Brownmiller, Making Female Bodies the Battlefield, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 4, 1993,
at 37.
45. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted Dec.
9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
46. The crime of genocide is defined as follows:
Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole
or in part, a national, ethical, racial or religious group, as such:
a. Killing members of the group;
b. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
c. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part;
d. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
e. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Id. at art. 2.
47. Article 4 of the Genocide Convention states: "Persons committing genocide or any
other acts enumerated in article 3 shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible
rulers, public officials or private individuals." Genocide Convention, supra note 45.
48. See Fletcher et al., supra note 19, at 355-56.
49. Id.
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violation of the Genocide Convention by virtue of their ethnic cleansing in
Bosnia.n0
2. Geneva Conventions and Protocols
The Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War"' (Civilian Convention) is highly applicable to the
treatment of Muslim women in Bosnia. Rape is explicitly prohibited under
article 27 of the Civilian Convention: "Women shall be especially protected
against any attack on their honor, in particular against rape, enforced
prostitution, or any form of indecent assault." 2 Although rape is not listed
as a grave breach of the Civilian Convention, the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC) interpreted rape as a grave breach under article 147 of
the Civilian Convention.13 Thus, the Civilian Convention is another potential
medium for prosecuting rapes of Bosnian women.1 However, whether rape
can be prosecuted as a grave breach and as such be subject to universal
jurisdiction also depends on whether the conflict in Bosnia is considered
international or civil because the grave breaches provision of the Civilian
Convention applies only to international conflicts.55
50. Id. (citing the International Court of Justice:
[T]he Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
should. . ensure that any military, paramilitary or irregular armed units. . . do not
commit any acts of genocide, of conspiracy to commit genocide, of direct and public
incitement to commit genocide, or of complicity in genocide, whether directed against
the Muslim population of Bosnia and Herzegovina or against any other national,
ethical, racial or religious group .... ).
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo. (Serbia and Montenegro)), 1993 I.C.J. 3, at para. 52.A(2) (Provisional
Measures, Order of Apr. 8).
51. The Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287
[hereinafter Civilian Convention]. The Civilian Convention is one of the four 1949 Geneva
Conventions drafted after World War II.
52. Civilian Convention, supra note 51, at art. 27.
53. Id. at art. 147; See Theodor Meron, Rape as a Crime Under International
Humanitarian Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 424, 426 (1993) (stating that the ICRC recognized rape
as grave breach because it is torture or inhumane treatment "willfully causing great suffering or
serious injury to body or health").
54. Meron, supra note 53, at 427.
55. Healey, supra note 21, at 341. The division of former Yugoslavia into independent
republics has complicated the analysis, because the status of the conflict is not clearly defined.
On one side, Bosnia's declaration of independence suggests that the rapes by Bosnian Serbs
constitute part of a civil conflict. On the other side, Bosnia's independence may imply that the
conflict is international, especially due to the Serbia's intervention on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs
in Bosnia. Id. at 343. Most countries recognized Bosnia as an independent state. Also, a
number of United Nations. Security Council resolutions have apparently assumed that the conflict
is to be governed by the standard of international armed conflict. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 771, U.N.
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Similarly, Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, developed to
clarify those Conventions, does not list rape as a crime constituting grave
breach.?' However, article 76(1) of Protocol I explicitly provides that
women "shall be protected in particular against rape. "5 In addition, Article
4(2)(e) of Protocol II5 to the Geneva Conventions expressly prohibits rape.
While Protocol I applies to international armed conflicts, Protocol H pertains
to non-international armed conflicts. Both Protocols specifically refer to
rape as a crime under international law regardless of whether the conflict in
Bosnia is ultimately considered international or civil.
3. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 9
prescribes to states a duty to guard civil and political rights of the its citizens.
Article 17 applies to women specifically as a prohibition against unlawful
attacks on honor.60 Article 7 prohibits "torture and other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment. 6 1  Since rape can be considered such a treatment2
under both the ICCPR and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Torture Convention),' 3
these provisions are violated by the Serbian rapes.
There is some question, however, whether these treaties are
binding on the states of the former Yugoslavia. Because the former
Yugoslavia was a party to both the ICCPR and the Torture Convention,
the succession to this obligation by Bosnia is arguable."4 Moreover, even if
SCOR, 3106th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/771 (1992); S.C. Res. 780, U.N. SCOR, 3119th mtg.,
U.N. Doc. SIRESI78O (1992); S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 3175th mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRES/808
(1993); Fletcher et al., supra note 19, at 355.
56. Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 76(1), [hereinafter Protocol 1].
57. Id.
58. Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature Dec. 12,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, art. 4(2)(e), [hereinafter Protocol II].
59. International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16,
1996, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR], reprinted in UNIFO, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 1948-1982, 91-99 (1983).
60. Id. at art 17.
61. Id. at art. 7.
62. See supra note 53.
63. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/46 (1984) [hereinafter Torture
Convention].
64. Fletcher et al., supra note 19, at 356.
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not bound by these treaties per se, wartime rape can be also regarded as a
violation of customary international law since "the major conventional
humanitarian law has become part of customary international law."6
C. No Enforceable Remedy Against Non-Complying States
The international treaties discussed above are applicable to the
prosecution of the mass rapes in Bosnia. However, despite the fact that
these treaties contain prohibitions against the rape of women, the question
remains whether these documents have any concrete effect on the
protection of women during wartime.
United Nations authorities have considered these treaties applicable
to the present situation in Bosnia," and the Serbs' actions have generally
been punished through diplomatic and economic channels.6 7 Yet, this did not
stop the rapes.
The stimulus behind creating these treaties was condemnation of the
atrocities of World War II to prevent them from recurring. But, not even
fifty years later, they occurred again and the world appeared to fight the
brutality with a noble principle alone." One must conclude that while the
international community is efficient in constructing documents of
condemnation, it has no ability to implement its aspirations and to protect
women's human rights during armed conflict.69 The newly founded War
Crime Tribunal may be viewed as partial protection of women's rights.
V. CURRENT PROGRESS TO HALT THE MASS RAPES IN BOSNIA
A. Creation of War Crimes Tribunal
In May 1993, the United Nations Security Council established a
war crimes tribunal" and adopted a statute proposed by the United Nations
65. Secretary-General Report, supra note 5, at Annex, art. 1; see also Healey, supra note
21, at 331-32 (stating that violations of customary international law provide a basis for
prosecuting rape in the Tribunal).
66. See Report of the Special Rapportear on Human Rights, supra note 17.
67. Alan Riding, Europeans Impose a Partial Embargo on Belgrade Trade, N.Y. TIMES,
May 28, 1992, at Al; RES. 757, U.N. SCOR, 3082nd mtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES/757 (1992).
However, it is unclear whether rapes played much part in the imposition of the sanctions.
68. See Elaine Sciolino, U.S. Names Figures It Wants Charged With War Crimes, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 17, 1992, at Al.
69. See Jean-Michel Stoullig, Rights Panel Probes Rape as Wartime Weapon, AGENCE FR.
PRESSE, Aug. 7, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Int'l News File.
70. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 3217th mtg., U.N. Do. S/RES/827 (1993) (reaffirming
its resolution 713 of Sept. 25, 1991). There is a dual view on the Tribunal's creation. Some
legal scholars say that the Tribunal will verify whether the nations that signed the Geneva
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19971 Kovalovska 941
Secretary-General which gave the Tribunal universal jurisdiction over
"persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian
law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991.""
The statute grants the Tribunal subject matter jurisdiction over the
following crimes: grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions,72
violations of the laws or customs of war,"3 genocide, and crimes against
humanity." These categories of crimes constitute "beyond doubt ... part
of international customary law ... applicable in armed conflict." 6
B. Prosecuting Rape Under the Tribunal's Statute
The rape of women in Bosnia could be prosecuted under the statute
of the Tribunal as a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions and as
genocide under the Genocide Convention." In addition, rape constitutes a
crime against humanity.78 Since the Tribunal's statute explicitly recognizes
rape as crime against humanity, it can be prosecuted in the Tribunal as
such.
Moreover, the rape of Bosnian women can be prosecuted in the
Tribunal as a violation of the laws or customs of war.w Article 3 of the
statute is based on l the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunalu and the 1907
Conventions will ever implement the legal norms of the treaties. Robert Marquand, A Dogged
UN Judge Propels 'The Real Trial of the Century,' CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 23, 1995, at
7. Others claim that the Tribunal's creation is a reflection of the international community's
inability to solve conflicts such as the one in Bosnia. Healey, supra note 21, at 377.
71. SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 5, at Annex, art. 1. The international
humanitarian law exists in two forms: conventional law and customary law. Although some of
the customary international law is not listed in the conventions, "the major conventional ... law
has become part of customary international law." Id. at § 33.
72. Id. at Annex, art. 2.
73. Id. at art. 3.
74. Id. at art. 4.
75. Id. at art. 5.
76. Id. at art 1, § 35. See also Meron, supra note 53, at 425.
77. See supra prior analysis in Parts IV.B. 1-2.
78. "Crimes against humanity" as defined in Nuremberg Charter consisted of brutal,
inhumane acts on the same level of severity as murder and torture, committed on a massive scale.
See Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of
a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2588 (1991).
79. SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 5, art. 5(g), at 13. Crimes against
humanity are more difficult to prove than grave breaches. See Oren Gross, The Grave Breaches
System and the Armed Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 783, 823 (1995)
(contending that if the Tribunal decides to label rape as grave breach, that will put a seal on the
historical intolerance on violence against women).
80. Healey, supra note 21, at 350.
81. SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 5, § 34, at 9.
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Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land. 3 Rape
may be covered in article 46 of the Hague Regulations' which states that
"[flamily honor . . . must be respected. " " This indicates that the mass
rapes committed in front of many witnesses, deliberately dehumanizing not
only the victim but also her family,8' could be included as attacks on family
honor and as such be prosecuted under the statute of the Tribunal as
violations of customs of war.
Finally, as the first body in history, the Tribunal recognized rape
as a war crime when it indicted eight Bosnian Serbs on charges of rapes of
Muslim women in Bosnia.87 Thus, the Tribunal has sufficient legal basis
for the prosecution of the mass rapes.
C. Collecting Evidence for Prosecution
How the prosecution in the Tribunal will proceed depends on the
quality of collected evidence. 8 However, since vital documentation is in
the hands of the persons responsible for the violations, and many victims
and witnesses of the atrocities have widely scattered, 9 the collection of
evidence is problematic.
In addition, the Tribunal cannot try suspects in absentia;9' thus,
unless the suspected war criminals are arrested by their government,
consent to trial, are captured outside their own country9 or are arrested by
NATO forces, it is doubtful that justice will be served.8 '
82. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82
U.N.T.S. 284.
83. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat.
2277, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter Hague Regulations].
84. Id. at art. 46.
85. Healey, supra note 21, at 350.
86. See discussion supra Part II.B., stating that the Muslim culture views rape victims
especially shameful and that when the rape victim is defiled, her family is defiled as well.
87. Marlise Simons, U.N. Court, for First Time, Defines Rape as War Crime, N.Y.
TIMES, June 28, 1996, at Al. However, the suspects are at large. Id.
88. The British Broadcasting Corporation, War Crimes Commission Has Evidence on
17,000 Criminals, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Nov. 7, 1994, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, News File.
89. Fletcher et al., supra note 19, at 360.
90. SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 5, at art. 1. A trial in absentia would
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One of the major obstacles in collecting evidence for rape
prosecution is that the women are ashamed to come forward and testify
publicly about the torture they endured. As a result, the acts of rape are
under-reported. 9 Despite the estimated 30,000 to 50,000 rapes in Bosnia,
the United Nations Commission has examined about 3,000 accounts of
rape1' and has named about 800 victims. 9  An important role in
identification of evidence rests with non-governmental organizations and
special commissions.16
Another reason why rape victims are disinclined to testify is that
"they fear retaliation either from their families or from their
perpetrators. "7 However, this barrier could be viewed as partially
resolved by the statute's provision for in camera proceedings to protect the
victim's identity. 91
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94. The reports were compiled by the International Human Rights Law Institute of DePaul
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The British Broadcasting Corporation, supra note 88. The Commission has prepared about 7,100
cases supported with documents and eyewitnesses. The criminals are responsible for 50 mass
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Id.
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D. Current Progress in the Prosecution of Rapes
1. First Trials in the Tribunal
So far, the Tribunal has issued warrants for the arrest of seventy-
four suspected war criminals, including the Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan
Karadzic, and Bosnian Serb military commander, Ratko Mladic; however,
only seven are in custody in the Hague.9 The first international war
crimes trial since Nuremberg in 1945 was the prosecution of Dusan Tadic
accused of murder and torture. '® The verdict against Tadic is anticipated
in the spring.' °' Recently, the Tribunal handed down its first decision,
sentencing a Croat soldier to ten years in prison for killing about seventy
Bosnian Muslims. 10 In January 1997, the Tribunal prosecuted four
suspects charged with rape, murder, and torture. 103
Some indicted suspects live quite freely and work daily, even
though they could be arrested by the 50,000-strong NATO forces in
Bosnia.' 4 Moreover, until now the international community has failed to
arrest the two most wanted suspects, the orchestrators of the mindless sea
of destruction, Karadzic and Mladic.
2. Recognition of Rape in National Courts of Former Yugoslavia
A court in Sarajevo convicted two Serbian soldiers for committing
several rapes and murders of Bosnian Muslims and sentenced the soldiers
to death. °0 But, the United Nations military chief, Phillippe Morillon,
criticized the trial and claimed that Bosnian's should have turned those two
Serbs over to the Tribunal.'°0
99. One Killer Down, 73 to Go, USA TODAY, Dec. 2, 1996, at A13. See Julian Rake,
First Yugoslav War Crimes Trial Postponed to 1996, REUTERS WORLD SERV., Oct. 24, 1995,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File.
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3. Civil Lawsuits Filed in the United States
In the United States, two lawsuits have been filed on behalf of
Bosnian rape survivors under the Alien Tort Act,' °' a federal statute which
provides jurisdiction when an alien sues for torts committed in violation of
the law of nations.' °0 The plaintiffs allege that Radovan Karadzic is
responsible for the rapes of Muslim women in Bosnia and seek damages
and an injunction which would order Karadzic to stop the rapes.' A
lower court refused to confer subject matter jurisdiction,11 but the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit"' unanimously ruled that
victims can sue Karadzic in the United States "for genocide, war crimes,
and crimes against humanity. '"" 2  However, the court cannot compel
Karadzic to come to the United States and collecting damages will be quite
difficult."
VI. CONCLUSION
It has been fifty years since the end of World War II, and
barbarian war crimes have emerged again. All the international documents
have proven to be of no worth in this situation. Although the Tribunal
took the opportunity to recognize rape for the first time as a war crime, the
Tribunal and the international community have an obligation to arrest and
convict the criminals guilty of rape and other sexual abuses.
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